Open access peer-reviewed chapter

An Analysis Framework of Power Imbalance in Supply Chains

Written By

Driss Essabbar, Maria Zrikem and Marc Zolghadri

Submitted: 28 August 2023 Reviewed: 30 November 2023 Published: 05 June 2024

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.114026

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Operations Management - Recent Advances and New Perspectives

Edited by Tamás Bányai

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Abstract

Is a huge multinational company always powerful, and is a small company always weak? What actually makes a company stronger than another one? These are two typical questions students, researchers and practitioners encounter when they study or practice management. Decision-makers in companies have to be able to account for power in their daily tasks because of the potential partners’ reactions to wrong decisions. Major papers studying power do agree that power and its direct consequence, i.e., decision imbalance, could have direct impacts on how soundly a supply chain operates. Even though power has been analyzed for a long time in various fields, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of scientific literature examining and modeling power imbalance and its consequences in supply chains. An important challenge regarding this issue is analyzing power in networks of partners. This chapter contributes to the development of a power analysis framework by presenting a set of concepts and properties to model and examine various aspects of power and the interactive process that leads to its use or does not. This framework will use data collected from a set of interviews conducted with main decision-makers to analyze a real case of four companies from the high-tech sector. The chapter does not address strategies or techniques to cope with power exertion but helps to elucidate the process of power evolution.

Keywords

  • power
  • supply chain
  • collaboration
  • influence analysis
  • partnership

1. Introduction

Modern companies focus on their core businesses to enter new markets or to consolidate their advantages. Therefore, manufacturing products may require partner coordination. There are several strategic suppliers sharing risks and revenues with which the focal company tends to create long-term and stable relationships. This association is known as an enterprise network or supply chain [1, 2, 3, 4]. These partnerships correspond to links between independent firms [5] seeking to achieve goals that each one could not attain when acting alone [6]. Collaboration should be based on mutual trust and commitment by sharing a common vision of the supply chain’s objectives. A number of studies [2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] support that developing collaborative relationships has a positive influence on business success. However, this target is quite difficult to achieve, given the opportunistic behavior of certain partners who might intend to take advantage of the established relations. These companies give priority to their own objectives first and could deteriorate the whole supply chain’s performance (see for instance Tost [12]).

The development of relationships between companies is significantly affected by a key factor, which is the power imbalance. This imbalance primarily arises when a more powerful company can impose unfavourable terms on its less powerful counterparts. In a broader sense, power can be defined as the degree to which individuals believe they can exert control over the results and experiences of others; see Fast et al. [13]. This concept will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter. Being able to apply pressure upon weaker actors means that the stronger partner has been able to understand its real source of power and was able to use it. However, if a company overestimates or underestimates its own power, its consequent actions could affect its ability to negotiate successful collaboration with the supplier or customer and reduce its agility [14]. The role of power is crucial to its interactions with other relationship structures; power can seriously affect the level of confidence and commitment between parties [15].

Several authors [16, 17] have discussed that the exertion of power, in the case of buyers and suppliers for instance, is likely to result in unproductive partnerships because, under such circumstances, exploitation, rather than cooperation, might result [15]. Zolkiewski [18] emphasized that power plays a central role in networks, influencing the contest for resource control, shaping the networks’ overall dynamics and potentially giving rise to competitive dynamics. To reinforce this idea, Cendon and Jarvenpaa [19] have identified the direct impact of a power imbalance on strategic choices, governance structures, relative dependence, resources and activities performed by a supply chain, while [15] suggest that the power of network actors is likely to influence the distribution of responsibilities and the flow of benefits between them significantly according to their dependencies.

According to Porter [20], the market position of a firm is the main focus of strategy building. In this respect, his five forces model also involves a struggle for control over buyers and suppliers (parties perceived as representing threats to the success of any focal firm). The factors at play here encompass the bargaining strength of suppliers, the potential for substitute products, the threat of new entrants, rivalry among competitors and the bargaining power held by customers. According to Trienekens and Beulens [21], companies should base their strategy on the status and development of these forces.

One of the key tangible reasons for conducting research on power is to proactively mitigate potential conflicts and operational disruptions that might arise in the product design phase or due to implicit imbalances in decision-making within a supply chain. Analyzing power dynamics offers the benefit of contextualizing a company within a web of interdependencies. It prompts decision-makers to view their company as a node within a broader network upon which they rely. Table 1 summarizes some relevant papers from the scientific literature on power where authors show how these dependencies influence a number of activities in the supply chain, such as the choice of strategies (partner choice, market development), coordination planning, risk management [29] or global performance. Hereafter, we focus on two typical cases among the industrial-based cases found within the scientific literature.

AuthorsUse caseConclusion
Ming et al. [22]Aeronautical supply chainsTrust, power, commitment and dependence are some of the non-technical concepts that may help to develop an understanding of a situation of cooperation and its underlying problems.
Shou et al.Industrial sectors in the Yangtze River DeltaInnovative, financial, human and organizational resources are significantly important for the companies to take control over others. Organizational resources help the buyer to create its power over suppliers.
Belaya and Hanf [23]The relationships between suppliers and buyers in Russian agri-food supply chainsPower can be viewed as one of the most accessible and potent instruments in vertical relationships throughout the entire food supply chain. Every participant in the supply chain endeavours to establish a dominant position, enabling them to exert control over other members and maximize their earnings through the exercise of their power.
Munksgaard et al. [24]A multiple case study of companies in the food industry, the construction industry and the energy sectorThe research affirms that leading companies, whether categorized as hubs, brokers or facilitators, can either enhance or hinder the collaborative development initiatives within the network.
Wei [25]Case studies in two industries (automotive industry and laptop computer industry)Power seems to have an impact on schedule flexibility, either through direct or indirect means. The supplier’s ability to adapt their processes can diminish the effect of customer power, whereas the customer’s willingness to share information and their commitment to purchase quantity may not necessarily be contingent on their level of power.
Su et al. [4]The Japanese sugar disputeAn actor’s positional power is also normative in that actors can also exert influence over others through shared values and expectations. Relationship atmosphere and indirect power were perceived as crucial to understanding sources of conflict and conflict management, respectively.
Zhuang et al. [26]The research was conducted in the People’s Republic of China. The dyadic relationship examined is between department stores and their suppliersThe study found that channel members’ power (supply chain members) has a positive impact on their uses of non-coercive power regardless of their relative position in channel dyads; their uses of coercive power are negatively sensitive to their own power if they are at a power advantage (stronger), and positively sensitive to the target members’ power if they are at a power disadvantage (weaker).
Benton and Maloni [16]Daimler-Chrysler (with 178 suppliers) and Honda (with 392 suppliers)These findings underscore the significance of skilful power management as a strategy for improving supply chain integration. This, in turn, fosters a heightened awareness of the influential role of power in the supply chain, which is valuable for both industry professionals and researchers.
Welch and Wilkinson [27]Samples from manufacturing firms in Shaanxi, Gansu and XinjiangTo create a harmonious atmosphere, firms need to pay attention to power balance, conflicts resolution and cooperation.
Zolkiewski [18]Three, in-depth case studies were undertaken in the UK National Health Service (NHS)The cases utilized to exemplify the application of power within a network context offer a valuable catalyst for advancing both theoretical understanding and enhancing managerial proficiency. When viewed from a network perspective, it becomes evident that substantial effort has been dedicated to scrutinizing the bonds between actors, the connections between resources and the links between activities. In contrast, other influential network dynamics have not garnered as much scrutiny.
Helper [28]U.S. and Japanese Auto IndustriesCompanies holding significant power in their end-product market can leverage that power to reshape the dynamics of their input markets. In a scenario where suppliers possess substantial bargaining power within a voice system, the company might discover it advantageous to transition to an exit system, enabling them to capture the benefits of their favorable position in the final product market.

Table 1.

Some industrial case studies with relevance of power issues.

The development of Audi’s and Suzuki’s supply chains in Hungary was studied by Demeter et al. [30] through interviews with supply chain managers of 13 different companies including two assemblers (Audi and Suzuki), two system integrators, and nine direct and indirect suppliers. In the case of Audi, the purchased volume of each part is divided between two suppliers, and they cannot obtain more than 30–50% of their sales from Audi. The objective of this policy is to avoid an overly dependent relationship and to reduce risk. Following this policy, if one of the system integrators becomes too strong, Audi reduces its dependency by promoting a second-tier supplier to the first tier to fill the gap in supply. Using an opposite strategy, Suzuki usually has one supplier for each part. However, to maintain its bargaining power, Suzuki strives to keep the dependency of its suppliers through the volume of sales.

In the aeronautic supply chain described by Marcotte et al. [31], strategies are clearly influenced by implicit power relationships. This study was undertaken in the south-west of France, through interviews with supply chain managers, responsible for coordination aspects in companies of various tiers. Customers behave as dominators during the negotiation process because they know that they represent a significant cash flow for their suppliers. However, some suppliers, i.e., small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that produce high-value subassemblies and that also participate in other supply chains, do not analyze the power situation as the customers do. They argue that power stems for their much-needed mastered niche technologies. Such companies create difficult relationships in the supply chain hampering trust among partners and threatening the performance.

If these practical examples emphasize the importance of power in supply chain practices, they also illustrate the lack of a structured framework to assess the relative power of actors and its consequences in supply chain performance. In particular, the aeronautic example demonstrates how different assessments of a power situation can weaken the relationship between two actors and supply chain performance. Thus, it is important for companies to be aware of power, its properties and characteristics, to better analyze their collaborative situations.

Based on these aforementioned studies and those summarized in Table 1, we can conclude that the researchers and practitioners do identify power as a contributor to the substantial and stable operation of a partnership while it appears that further research is needed to actually address these problems [32]. The research presented in this chapter is motivated by these management situations in which companies find themselves, and the obtained results primarily concern modeling power and addressing the gap between the abstract concept of power and its application.

The objective of this chapter is to examine various aspects of power and the interactive process. To do so, we clarify and analyze the concept of power and its application. We will formally specify some properties of power more in terms of practical application than the philosophy of power dynamics. The formalization of these properties helps not only interested analysts and observers but also the actors in a particular power relationship to determine relevant collaborative strategies and tactics. This is due to this chapter extending beyond highlighting sources of power but also its instruments. In short, the primary contributions of the chapter are the following:

  1. Characteristics and properties of a power relationship: We discuss some formal results modeling the concept of power and some of its characteristics formulated by algebraic properties. To the best of our knowledge, these efforts are the first attempts within the scientific literature to suggest a robust foundation of power theory formulated in an algebraic manner.

  2. Types of power: According to the large state-of-the-art literature review we have done and the results on the characteristics and properties of power, we suggest a power taxonomy that clarifies the main differences between the classes of power that appear during a negotiation process among two actors or parties. This negotiation process can be analyzed as a power evolution process.

  3. Power evolution process: The contribution of this study is to model the negotiation process from the point of view of power types evolution. We present here the stages of exercise of power in a negotiation between a company A and one of its customers (or supplier) B.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of power. The third section discusses the research methodology. Sections 4–6 present the findings: characteristics and properties of a power relationship, power types and the power evolution process. In Section 7 we illustrate the results of interviews of experts in a real supply chain between Morocco and Spain. Finally, managerial insights, conclusions and perspectives are presented.

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2. Literature and related works

2.1 What is “power”?

This review provides a synthesis of various contributions on the topic of power. The concept of power is pervasive across multiple domains, extending beyond its role in social science research to also encompass areas such as industrial management, business strategy and marketing.

Koning et al. [33] argue that the concept of power is often considered as one of the more perplexing and elusive ideas, despite its frequent usage. This is to say, defining the concept of power in an uncontroversial manner has been proven to be difficult. When one party exerts control over another, it looks for achieving some desired outcomes. While power is commonly defined as one party’s capacity to influence another, control should be seen as a result of the power exertion process, which may or may not yield success [34]. This is the consistent distinction between the ability to influence and the achieved influence [35].

Power is defined in various ways within different fields. In supply chain collaboration, two or more firms working jointly to plan and execute supply chain operations [2, 36], power is regarded as the ability of a firm to affect another’s decision making and/or behavior [37]. Most definitions of power within studies on supply chains marketing channels are based on the definition of El-Ansary and Stern [38], who define power as “the ability of a channel member to control the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in a given channel at a different level of distribution”. Power in supply chains is also defined as “the ability of a firm to own and control critical assets in markets and supply chains that enable it to sustain its ability to appropriate and accumulate value for itself by constantly leveraging its customers, competitors and suppliers”. One of the most prominent studies on power was carried out by French and Raven in 1959. They identified five bases and forms of power that an actor (O) can exert over another actor (P). These different forms of power are defined below.

  1. Reward power is defined as power whose basis is the ability to reward. The strength of the reward power of O over P (or O/P in short) increases with the magnitude of the rewards.

  2. Coercive power of O/P stems from the expectation of P punishment (by O) if it fails to conform to the influence attempt.

  3. Legitimate power of O/P is generated from the acceptance by P of the legitimate right of O to influence P.

  4. Expert power: The strength of the expert power of O/P varies with the extent of the knowledge or perception that P attributes to O within a given area.

  5. Referent power of O/P derives from P’s respect for O and their desire to identify with or emulate him.

In the supply chain network context, coercive power [39] reflects the fear of a network member being put under more or less high pressure if it fails to comply with the requirements of the focal company [40]. The effectiveness of reward power hinges on the power holder’s capacity to provide incentives to others [23]. When a focal company possesses resources that hold value for other participants in the network, it can compel these network actors to act in a manner that aligns with its objectives. Expert power emanates from an individual’s or entity’s proficiency or specialized knowledge in a specific subject. In the context of a supply chain network, a central company can attain expert power if the network participants believe it possesses unique technology, expertise or know-how that they deem valuable [41]. Legitimate power arises from a rightful authority to exert influence and an associated obligation for others to acknowledge and accept this influence. In this context, network members as having the legitimate right to make certain decisions [42] acknowledge a central actor. Referent power relies on the capacity to be appealing or likable to others, and it is contingent on the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder [43]. In the supply chain context, this power is observed when network actors want to join a network [23].

In the resource dependency theory [44], companies perceive that they are interdependent when they realize that they cannot control all necessary conditions to achieve desired outcomes. Therefore, power is based on the control of resources that are considered strategic within the organization [45]. The partners’ dependency often leads to power imbalance and an advantage of one party that may limit the autonomy and constrain the behavior of the other party [37, 46, 47].

Martin [48] discusses evaluation techniques for power, stating that a major reason for the lack of research concerning power is the difficulty of measurement. In fact, it seems unrealistic to suggest a metric measurement for the power of a business. This is because power is an amalgam of complex social, economic and even psychological factors [15]. Power is a subjective phenomenon predicated on one’s belief or expectation of how another actor will create an impact on oneself [49]. There were some attempts to assess the relative power by comparing two or more actors together, (see Cho and Chu [49], Zolghadri et al. [41]). In other words, the final conclusion that can be made regarding an actor involved in a relationship is either stronger than or weaker than. This comparison can be expanded to a larger scale.

According to all these aforementioned descriptions of power, in this context, power is defined as the ability to influence and mold the decision-making and actions of another party.

2.2 Use of power in supply chains

Koning et al. [33] agree that power differences greatly affect negotiation outcomes. He demonstrated that bargainers reached higher outcomes when they had more control over the decisions of the other party. The concept of power became popular in engineering industries when Porter [50] presented its five forces model. This model analyzes the structure of an industry and shapes the nature of competitive interactions within an industry. The supply chain context offers new perspectives to the study of power because of the presence of, for example, multilateral relationships, diversity of links and number of power inducers. The use of power can influence various aspects of the supply chain, such as buyer-supplier relationships, conflicts, actor performance, supply chain integration, etc. Coming back to the five types of power defined by French and Raven, some studies have shown that their usage did not reach to the same results in different situations or even countries. For instance, Yeung et al. [51] argued that the use of coercive power might have a detrimental impact on cooperation in Western cultures but can enhance supplier integration. In a general sense, a company can employ coercive power to strengthen internal coordination among buyers, which may subsequently foster supplier integration within a trust-based relationship. The research of Maloni and Benton [40] provides initial evidence that the exploitation of the supply chain by the power partner may lead to dissension and under performance thus hurting the power holder. Likewise, a judicious use of power may serve to benefit the power holder. Power is therefore not necessarily opposed to cooperation and should not always be observed in a negative way for a weaker party; see Peter Dapiran [52]. In this school of thought, several authors argue that power imbalances do not necessarily hinder the establishment of close and effective relationships, and they provide evidence that suppliers can attain improved economic performance and enhance their capabilities through collaborative relationships with influential retailers [53].

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3. Research approach

The research we dealt with was exploratory. In fact, even if previous studies do exist, they rarely looked for formalizing the power properties as we desired to develop. Our goal was to find a set of properties and power patterns that could become the basis for further research. The techniques we used here include an extensive review of state-of-the-art academic and industrial studies and theoretical papers. Based on this extensive state-of-the-art review, we proposed a set of power properties and concepts necessary to build a power analysis framework that consists of describing and characterizing the power in an interactive process between two actors A and B (companies in a supply chain). Finally, an in-depth case study was performed to show the applicability of the framework. This case study was based on interviews as the main source of data collection, and it gave authors the opportunity of highly detailed discussions, in which the questions “why” and “how” were asked, and the most fundamental reasons and backgrounds behind the power patterns were explained by decision-makers, see [54]. The supply chain we focused on consists of an SME located in the center of Morocco, which is the focal company of the study, a software editor (also an SME located in SPAIN), a supplier (a very small business located in Morocco) and a customer (also an SME located in the north of Morocco). In these collaborative relationships, the focal company and its partners work together to coordinate the implementation of the information system for a large customer. We interviewed high-position persons (general directors, business consultants, technical directors, etc.) in each of these companies.

Given the approach of this study, the questions concerned the roles and capabilities of firms, their power positions and the nature of these relationships with other actors, sources and properties of power. The interviewees were asked to reveal some of their experiences in which the power of the customer or supplier lies behind the negotiations. No pre-formulation of concepts was suggested to the interviewees during these interviews to avoid any influence on their formulation of answers. Interviews remained semi-structured until the end. After completing each interview, we transcribed the answers to each question in a spreadsheet. We then analyzed the interview results and synthesized a series of findings and accompanying recommendations. The details about these interviews will be provided in Section 7.

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4. Characteristics of power relationships

4.1 Characterization and a formal definition of power

After scrutinizing various aspects of power, it can be concluded that power typically pertains to the capacity or potential to influence or regulate the intentions, decisions or actions of others in order to further its own goals or interests. The various definitions across different sciences seem to use similar terms, apply the same common sense and reflect both the ability to control or influence with a difference of context in which they are applied. So, we formalize our understanding of power by the following definition: Power is a property of a relationship established between two parties A and B [55]. Power of A over B, notedPAB, is A’s conscious ability [56], derived from the possession of a source of power [54]. This ability can be used or not used to control or influence B’s behavior and decisions, even against its resistance. Possessing power does not automatically imply successful power exertion, which is nothing more than control. The control is therefore the successful application of power exertion. We can characterize a relationship generating power by.

  1. The sources of power [57]: A has the ability to control or influence B because A possesses a source of power. Sources of power are the assets that form the basis of one partner’s control over another. Let us denote σA as the set of sources that A possesses. A’s sources of power may encompass factors like A’s knowledge, skills, scarce resources, expertise, and other attributes that are needed by B within a particular context. The power of any actor in a relationship is determined by the sources of power that the actor possesses at any given moment [38]. Ireland and Webb [58] cited some sources of power in supply chains: the number of major customers of a supplier’s component, a supplier’s market share of a given component, the number of suppliers from which a buyer purchases a particular component, the number of potential suppliers for a given component or the amount of revenue a supplier generates from a single buyer.

  2. The interactive context: The interactive context between A and B defines the context of the relationship between them. By convention, if there are several relationships between A and B, we distinguish them by an index i (i.ePiAB), for example two companies working together in two different supply chains.

  3. The resistance of B [59]: Denoted RB, the resistance of B against the power exercised by A is its ability to absorb the power exercised by A without changing its behavior or decisions. It is a reciprocal power (i.e.,PiBA). Anderson and Weitz [60] note that there is ample evidence that the weaker party becomes mistrustful and apprehensive about the stronger party’s intentions. The weaker partner consequently may even engage in a pre-emptive strike against the more powerful partner to protect its knowledge assets [15].

  4. The instruments of power [61, 62]: Denoted InsA, the instruments of power are defined as tools or means used by A to exert its power over B. To explore A’s instrument of power is to examine its operation, decision making and media accompanying this power.

  5. The tactics of use [63, 64, 65]: Denoted T(A), the tactics of use is a set of methods and sequences of actions associated with the power instruments. These methods are defined by A to exert its power and represent how A plans to achieve its goals. For example, gaining market share from established competitors is at the top of most small businesses’ strategic agendas. A number of marketing tactics can help to achieve this goal: (i) reducing prices in the growth stage can encourage consumers to try a company’s product, (ii) offering promotions, such as coupons or generous loyalty programs, also can encourage customers to try a company’s product. In these tactics, the company uses as an instrument, e.g., the price, coupons or loyalty programs.

Finally, a formal description of power can be given below such that the power of A over B in an established relationship is a function of the relationship, the sources of power of A, the tactics and instruments used by A and finally the resistance of B:

PiAB=fiσATAInsARBE1

4.2 The properties of a power relationship

This section analyzes power as a generic concept to characterize certain of its main properties. A first list of these properties is provided hereafter. This list of properties demonstrates that the power relationship is not naturally, randomly or spontaneously established. There is logic to the process, which can be explained or modeled by algebraic properties. These properties help to better understand the mechanisms of power relationships.

  1. Power is relational: This property means that there is no power without relationships between parties. Power appears only in a situation where two or more actors are connected, it only exists within a relationship. Rojot [66] agrees that an actor is not powerful or weak in absolute but relative to another party.

  2. Power could be transitive: This means that if two power relationships PiAB and PiBC exist, then the transitivity applies:

    PiABPiBCPiAC.E2

    The application of the transitivity rule is limited by three necessary conditions: (i) each actor A and C knows the existence of the other, (ii) the same relationship exists between all of the three actors, and (iii) actors A and C should be aware of PiAB and PiBC. These conditions show that power is not always transitive. It means that if two different power relations PiAB and PjBC exist, no transitive conclusion can be drawn about the relationship between A and C. An example of transitivity is “the boss of my boss is my boss”. On the contrary, “my boss has no relationship with my child” and therefore the transitivity has no place between them. In this case, the relationship could not be transitive.

  3. Power is not continuous: The non-continuity property means that if A has power over B in a given moment ti, there is no certainty about this relation remains the same in another time tj.

    tjtiPABtiPABtjE3

    For instance, in a case study of the relationship between a supplier S1 and a customer C, two situations may be found for PCS1:

    • At one instance in time, C needs to buy products based on technologies developed exclusively by the supplier S1. In this case, S1 can be considered as stronger than C because of its dependency to S1’s technology.

    • If another supplier S2 develops similar or comparable technologies to S1, thus becoming a competitor, C can then choose between S1 and S2. In this new case, as the customer has the choice between two suppliers, the power imbalance is more favorable to C than before.

  4. Non-generalization of power: The generalization is a reasoning that claims to demonstrate a universal proposition from particular examples. From a logical point of view, this argument reduces to x,fxxfx. No generalization can be made based on the power relationship between two actors. The first interpretation of this property is that if the supplier Ak has power over its customer B (i.e., PAjB,j), we cannot deduce that any supplier Aj is also stronger than B (i.e., PCB). The second interpretation of this property is that is A has power over its customer B for a given relation i, we cannot deduce that the A has power over B for all relations.

    PiAkB,AkA=A1AmPiAjBijE4
    PiABPiABiE5

  5. Power means reciprocity: It means that no power relation can be considered as strictly unidirectional. This is to say,

PiABPiABPiBAE6

The concept of reciprocity in power relationships brings up the question of assessment of PiAB and PiBA. When there is inequality, the power model is referred to as a dominance model [47], power imbalance [36, 67] or power asymmetry [68, 69]. Power asymmetry pertains to the extent to which one firm possesses significantly more or significantly less power than another [69]. It is a scenario in which an actor is positioned to enforce its preferences and perspectives. In other words,

  • If PiAB>PiBA Then, A dominates B.

  • If PiAB<PiBA Then B dominates A.

  • If PiAB=PiBA Then we say that there is equality of power between A and B.

The power balance or imbalance is judged, more or less easily, by an observer and even by each of the actors. Each of them could conclude whether A is stronger or weaker than B or that they have equal power. Each actor or the observer can evaluate the power imbalance using subjective and objective evaluation processes.

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5. Various types of power

Power has several types. These types are situations in which power achieved certain conditions. These conditions may be characteristics, decisions or actions of an actor. This section presents the different types of power that are perceived during the interactions between actors (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Types of power.

5.1 Potential power

Potential power is “the underlying capacity of negotiators to obtain benefits from their agreement” [70]. This definition shows that potential power is an ability not necessarily used. Potential power could be a source of influence even when it is not exercised. For example, the more dependent firm may comply with something it believes that the more powerful firm wants, even if this latter firm may never make the request [23]. The potential power of A over B is a function of the dependence of B upon A (B’s dependence on A and thus A’s potential power over B). Almost all research works agreed on the fact that the power is derived from dependence [45]. This assertion is based on the pioneering work about power in organizations conducted by Cook et al. [71] and Emerson [72]: “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency”. In the theory of resource dependence, as presented by Pfeffer and Salancik [44], dependency arises from the exchange process and the need for organizations to obtain resources and engage in exchanges with their environment. Within a supply chain, an actor can gauge the value of the resources they provide and the dependencies that result from these exchanges. Resources are broadly defined to include people, assets, materials or capital used to achieve specific goals, whether they are human, intellectual or financial in nature. Stronger members within the supply chain may assess the dependencies of others, thereby gauging their potential power.

In cases of mutual dependency, it becomes more or less crucial for each party to have the ability to control or at least influence the behavior of the other. Simultaneously, these mutual dependencies imply that each party has the capacity to grant or deny, facilitate or obstruct the satisfaction of the other party’s needs or desires.

5.2 Latent power

In certain instances, a party may be aware of its own strength but chooses not to leverage its power for personal advantage or to manipulate the actions of the weaker party. This is a case of latent power. It is a consequence of choosing to not use potential power. Some researchers [62, 73, 74, 75] have proposed that power exists in its potential, while others have argued that power is only evident in its utilization (an actor with power should demonstrate a greater propensity for action, irrespective of the social consequences of their actions). The differentiation between possessing power and actively employing it is of significance when investigating relationships within a supply chain.

For example, a customer can influence the decisions made by a company without exercising its power. This means that the company does account for potential (negative) reactions of its customer while making decisions. A does not do anything to influence B’s behavior; the weaker party simply anticipates the needs and wishes of the more powerful one.

5.3 Exerted power

Exerted power, denoted P, is the conscious use of potential power using adopted protocols and instruments. Exerted power is directly connected to the will of a party to use its potential power. This is to observe that having power does not necessarily imply its use, but to exercise power requires possessing potential power. The decision of whether to wield power hinges on a party’s goals and its negotiation approach. Spangler [76] makes a distinction between positional and interest-based bargaining, emphasizing that real-world business negotiations likely involve a blend of these two strategies. Positional bargaining is characterized as an adversarial negotiation strategy, often employed by negotiators who view negotiations as a win-lose scenario. In contrast, interest-based bargaining is a collaborative strategy, with both parties aiming to collectively fulfil each other’s needs, resulting in a win-win outcome.

If one partner is stronger than the other and has the propensity to exert its power then the parties will be engaged in a positional negotiation, and the stronger party will obtain a significant advantage, while the weaker will have small benefit from collaboration. In this case, the weaker actor has no or low capability to push negotiations from a positional negotiation towards an interest-based one if the stronger partner does not wish it. The only possible solution for the weaker company to transform both situations is to apply clever negotiation techniques. If one partner is stronger than the other, and it does not choose to exert its power (according to its business philosophy for instance), then the parties will be involved in an interest-based negotiation, and benefits for the weaker party can be guaranteed. Acting based on power might increase the tendency towards action even when power is not directly possessed, applicable, or relevant. Exerted power allows an individual to engage in actions that can promote successful completion of goals.

5.4 Perceived power

The exercise of power depends on its tactical use by A to influence B’s decisions and behavior. However, B may not understand this power exertion by A or it could misunderstand A’s will. In this case, it is possible for B to not comply with A, and choose to act according to B’s own will. Here again, a conflict could appear between the actors A and B, see Marcotte et al. [31]. Therefore, another critical factor in the process of application and use of power is the perceived power by the actor, subject to the process exertion process, which is known here as B. For Ford and Johnson [77], the perception of power is a step in a process in which power capabilities may or may not be used and, if used, have an uncertain probability of success. The process of perception is never objective; it is the interpretation that gives meaning to the power received. The success of the A’s power exertion process is thus profoundly conditioned by perception of B.

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6. Power evolution process

A power relation between two actors is created after the establishment of a relationship between them. The relation establishment and the consequent power relation are modeled through the evolution process shown in Figure 2. We suppose that a rational actor prepares its negotiations with another one. Each party tries to rationally use its advantages to convince or persuade the other party [5]. In our case, A actively uses its power to influence or control B. This process involves several steps depicted in Figure 2: column A corresponds to all actions concerning the actor A, the column A and B correspond to all actions that require intervention and the existence of two actors and the column B corresponds to all actions specific to B.

Figure 2.

Power evolution process.

This process, namely, the “power evolution process”, describes various scenarios in which a party develops these characteristics and advantages in a given context to potential power and how this power is transformed to other types of power (exercised, latent and perceived). This process can be divided into four stages described in the following.

  1. Defining potential power: At this stage, A looks to determine its position regarding B through the evaluation of its sources of power that could give it advantages over B.

  2. The situational analysis: The environment in which A is located plays an important role in strategic preparation. Once A determines its position and its potential power, the second step in this process is to analyze the environment in terms of rules, knowledge, beliefs, goals and any constraints that may limit the actions of A. This is a necessary step before making decisions if one expects to have good results [78]. The purpose of this situation analysis is to determine the characteristics of the internal and external environment that directly affect A’s strategic plan. It also allows A to be aware of these characteristics in its decision-making tasks. A’s analysis effort focuses on the generation of answers to a series of strategic questions and then using these responses to form an image of the strategic situation [79]. At the end of this analysis, the party would then be able to make a decision on the exercise of power. If the party decides to keep this power, the potential power is transformed to latent power. On the contrary, if the party decides to exercise its power to attain these objectives, it will move onto the analysis of tactics.

  3. Analysis of tactics and the exercise of power: This step involves the transformation of potential power to exercised power. This phase models the way that actor tries to leverage existing capabilities and its potential power to improve its situation and to achieve its goals. To execute its power, A makes an analysis and chooses the best tactics to convince B. The tactical use of power analysis includes the definition of a set of maneuvers representing how a party achieves a result. These tactics are developed by the actor (initiator of the negotiation) taking into account (1) the positions of two actors, (2) past relational negotiation history and (3) the available instruments. We can distinguish two types of tactics that the stronger actor can take to exercise its power:

    • Coercive tactics: They are used with the aim of bringing the other actor to adopt a desired behavior. The goal of this type of tactic is to exert influence on its partners based on exercising force [61] with the intention of controlling negative outcomes relative to each other, either through punishment such as cutting the price or terminating the relationship, see Yeung et al. [51] for more details. The use of non-controllable coercive tactics may negatively influence the partnership increasing conflicts, reducing satisfaction and the weaker actors’ willingness to cooperate [37].

    • Persuasion and convincing tactics: Its goal is to convince the other actor to make concessions by trying to demonstrate that the action request is not only justifiable but important through the distribution of rewards or benefits (written contracts, lobbying of interests through power structures at a legislative level, negotiations and discussions, investments into the production, financial assistance to producers in the form of credit or leasing, trainings and educational activities). For example, the relationships established by Toyota with some promising suppliers (see Liker [80]) are examples of these persuasion exercises of power.

  4. The perception of exerted power: Finally, the success or failure of power exertion depends directly on the perceived power by B. A implicitly or explicitly should show B its goals by the exercise of power.

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7. Illustrative case: a high-tech supply chain in Morocco

The illustration of these results was performed through a deep supply chain analysis mainly by experts’ interviews. The selected company, denoted Fc, is an SME firm located in the center of Morocco involved in information system engineering. Fc sells its expertise and software packages to administrations, companies from the oil industry, associations and sport clubs. For the purpose of simplification in the collaboration analysis, one specific project was selected. In this project, Fc coordinates the implementation of the information system for a customer. The customer is also an SME denoted hereafter Cu for customer. Fc has to implement, manage and control the whole information system of Cu and to do so, Fc uses the software package sold by a software editor Ed, which is again an SME. Finally, Fc buys the required networking equipment from Su. Fc and Su already have an established relationship from a series of past successful collaborations. These companies are of various sizes and could have potential power in some situations, and they look to exert it whenever possible in an opportunistic way. Fc, Su and Cu are located in different areas in Morocco while Ed is in Spain (see Figure 3). We interviewed high position persons (general directors, business consultants and technical directors) in each of these companies. Our goal was to find out.

  1. Whether power plays a crucial role, in an apparent or hidden manner, in their negotiations or not?

  2. What were the main power sources, gains and losses of parties, instruments?

  3. What are the power properties that can be illustrated through the use-cases?

Figure 3.

Fc’s network.

After obtaining their consent to participate, the four companies were first asked to evaluate a draft questionnaire. The consolidated questionnaire was used as a means to guide the interviews. Four semi-structured interviews were conducted containing open-ended and closed-ended questions. Interviewees revealed their point of view regarding their dependency and power relationship.

Focusing on the high-tech sector was a conscious decision to target an area where power relations are highly dynamic leading companies to frequently analyze their own relative position in the supply chain. Coincidentally, this is linked to the concept of clock speed developed in Fine [81]. In short, the reasons for focusing on the high-tech sector are:

Due to the rapid evolution of software and hardware technologies, also known as clock speed, the high-tech sector is characterized by highly dynamic behavior, which also extends to power relationships within the sector’s supply chains. This is to say, that power imbalances do not hold steady for long periods of time. The sources of power evolve, and the owners of these sources must carefully analyze their network on a frequent basis. Furthermore, companies in this sector have to address power issues much more frequently than other sectors.

The sources of power could even offer strong power positions to small firms, primarily in terms of mastered technologies.

Customer satisfaction is measurable with little latency due to the service rate. This yields a stable collaboration establishment equally challenging for all the supply chain actors.

The use or abuse of power could result in quick changes to the supply chain structure, i.e., choosing other partners from a large pool of potential ones.

7.1 Main results and discussion

The interviews we made allowed us to identify the interdependences and power imbalances between companies. Here, we will browse the power relationship between Fc and each of the three actors Cu, Su and Ed. It should be noted that asking actors to express their own power is an important bias. Indeed, the notion of power is not a neutral concept and seems somehow to force actors to emit a judgment.

7.1.1 Facts and sources of power

Browsing the companies, the following observations can be made:

  • Su and Fc: Su sales mainly networking equipment and offers Fc payment facility reaching 90 days. No other customer is allowed to do so. For Su“Fc is an important customer. We know that Fc works on special projects that demand a large amount of materials: server, pc, printers, etc. We must satisfy Fc”. (Extracted from the interview of the Su’s CEO).

  • Cu and Fc: Cu seeks to implement a relevant information system. They chose Fc as the supplier of their information system based on its extensive expertise, quality of service and impressive number of customers (40) who used the same software that Cu needs. From the Fc’s point of view, Cu is also an important strategic door opener: “We have many customers in the south of the country. Cu will give us a wonderful opportunity to expand our market towards the north” (Extracted from the interview of the Fc’s CEO).

  • Ed and Fc: Ed is a multinational company known by its capacity and expertise in the area of integration and implementation of information systems. Fc has developed a partnership agreement with Ed to be able to offer combined software and services. This forms a high level of synergy between the two companies. Through this program, Ed provides technical supports to Fc and allows Fc to gain customers’ satisfaction. In tandem, Fc gives Ed an opportunity to expand its market into northern Africa.

Table 2 shows the main sources of power identified and validated by each of the companies.

ActorSource of power
FcExpertise, quality of service, number of customers, geographic position and its ability to purchase large quantities of equipment.
CuBrand image and geographic position.
EdTechnical and strategic expertise, multinational company, expertise in the areas of integration and implementation of information systems.
SuPayment facilitating.

Table 2.

Source of power in Fc’s network.

7.1.2 Properties of power in Fc’s network

In this section, the transitivity, non-continuity, non-generalization and reciprocity of power relationships can be illustrated through the analysis of the Fc’s supply chain supported by some extraction of the managers’ interviews.

  1. Transitivity property: Fc has noticed that Su is often late to deliver orders. After analysing the situation, Fc understood that orders are often late because the equipment wholesaler does not give the Su orders high priority. According to Su’s CEO, this is not due to strategy. In fact “we do not seek to exploit Fc, but you should know that I also suffer a pressure of my wholesaler”. The equipment wholesaler, denoted W, uses its power over Su knowing that its equipment price is such that Su does not desire to change for any other wholesaler in the area. In its turn, Su imposes its delivery conditions to Fc, which is impacted by this low performance. Fc depends strongly on Su and does not have any means to change the power imbalance because of the payment facility offered by Su. Therefore, there is a transitivity property linking the wholesaler (even if it is outside of the considered supply chain) to Fc via Su.

    PWSuPSuFcPWFc.E7

  2. Non-continuity property: According to the interviews of the Fc top managers, their relationship with Cu is quite balanced. However, from the point of view of Cu, the situation is different. They chose Fc through a long selection process with several competitors. At that moment, let us denote it initial, Cu believed itself much stronger than Fc. However, once Cu’s decision of using the Fc’s software made, they became aware of their need for training and maintenance. In this new situation, referred to as final, Cu became highly dependent on Fc, meaning the power balance was also changed (Fc became stronger than Cu), i.e., the two companies have had power over the other at different times of collaboration

    PCuFcinitialPCuFcfinalE8

  3. Non-generalization: From the illustration of the past property (non-continuity) it can be concluded that the evolution of power relation between Cu and Fc does not allow any generalization of a power pattern. A favorable situation to Cu can be transformed into a less favorable one by including a new source of power by Fc. Therefore, it is not possible to say that Cu is always in a dominant position regarding Fc.

  4. Reciprocity Property and power imbalance: For the CEO of Fc “the relationship with Su is based on commitment and trust”. Fc is satisfied with its cooperation with Su (the equipment seller). Nevertheless, regarding the power imbalance, their level of dependence is different. For Fc, “we present only 10% of the turnover of Su, while Su provides us 79% of our purchases”. Therefore, both companies are in a bidirectional power relation, i.e., they are interdependent.

PSuFcPFcSuPSuFcE9

7.2 The use of power in the Fc’s supply chain or power evolution process

7.2.1 Exerted power

The analysis of the power evolution process within the supply chain shows that almost all of the potential powers are exerted in the collaboration relations. However, it will be observed that the situations are different between the couples Fc-Su, Fc-Cu and Fc-Ed.

  1. Fc-Su: The power relationship established between Fc and Su is based on purchasing and bargaining strategies. Fc seeks to minimize the project’s purchase cost while Su seeks to increase the selling price and the net benefit margin. For Fc “Our supplier, Su, is aware of its power source. So sometimes they try to use their power to increase their margin during contract negotiations. This is especially the case when we need specific products. In this case, Su often tries to increase its profit margin”. This means that in some situations Su uses its potential power, thus transforming it into exerted power. According to the CEO of Fc, Su’s power exertion is admitted and successful. No specific collaboration complication or frustration was noticed from this situation, which is accepted as a matter of fact (reward and referent power, see French and Raven [61]).

  2. Fc-Cu: The evolution of power is more visible in the Fc-Cu relationship. These two companies have power over the other over different periods of collaboration, and each one seeks to gain the maximum benefits from the other. Cu requires of Fc paid penalties if it does not respect the terms of the contract (coercive power in French and Raven [61]), and on the other side, Fc has the ability to instruct Cu to buy other services and to accept another contract for training and maintenance. The analysis of the power patterns can be subdivided into two phases:

    • Pre-contract establishment phase: In this phase, the customer Cu has the main source of power, which is to choose among a series of similar product providers. Often, the suppliers of such solutions are high-tech SMEs needing contracts to launch their activities on a bigger scale. The potential suppliers, such as Fc, have to have enough sources of power to be more attractive than others. The number of established customers, the reputation, for their technologies is among some of the Fc’s sources of power. Cu has a strong potential power, transformed continuously into exerted power, against all of the potential suppliers. According to the situation described by Cu’s managers, they used a precise and long partner selection process. The description of hard discussions between Cu and Fc at the very end of negotiation process gives proof of power exertion by the customer. The situation is accepted as a normal process by Fc because of the non-continuity of the power and the new situation during the second phase.

    • After-contract establishment phase: Once the contract was signed, Fc obtained a much more favorable situation because of the creation of the dependency to its expertise and implemented technology.

      All in all, both companies use their potential power before and after the contract signature. Their potential power is fully transformed and the instruments of power (formal contract conditions from one side and training needs from the other) are applied. No one seems to use the potential power as a latent one.

  3. Fc-Ed: According to the terms of this partnership between Fc and Ed, Fc must pay annually an amount of money to Ed to continue this collaboration. Ed offers Fc reductions based on the number of new customers. Therefore, Ed uses its power by coercive (annual costs) and persuasion and convincing tactics (discounts and providing technical support to Fc).

7.2.2 Analysis of power exertion situations and management drivers for Fc

In the relationship Fc-Su, the power exertion does not create a negative reaction of Fc. In the Fc-Cu relation, the challenge is admitted as the “normal” business game between two collaborating actors. Each of them looks for more benefit while seeking long-term collaboration. From our observer’s point of view, it might be observed that Fc is more dependent to Su than the other way. Therefore, Su has a stronger potential power than Fc; the collaboration is unfavorable to Fc forcing it into concessions.

We noticed a contradiction between the announced terms of collaboration for Ed as an international partner looking for new market in Morocco and its acts. In fact, it can be observed that Ed uses a coercive instrument to force Fc in its collaboration. This can be analyzed as a tough or even aggressive management approach, and further analysis seems to be necessary to relieve Fc from the exerted pressure.

The analysis of exerted power and sources of power of all the concerned actors, from the point of view of Fc, provided in this part can allow us to conclude upon some key management drivers. In fact, it seems necessary for Fc to use the results of this analysis to build a bottom-up business and operations strategy. As the power exertion in the context of this supply chain is usual, if Fc looks for creating sound relationships with others, it would be worth pursuing analysis of its own sources of power and also those of other these companies. This set of results could allow Fc to become more aware of its weaknesses and set up measures to balance the relations.

The management conclusions for Fc can then be summarized in what follows:

  1. Fc has to look for a more balanced relation with Su. Even in the short term, the source of power of Su (i.e., the payment facility) allows Fc to have a better cash flow to dealing with liquidity problems: the late and long delivery delays would harm its business because of possible better conditions offered by its competitors to customers such as Cu.

  2. Fc has to have long term collaboration with Ed. Again, due to the fragile economic situation of SMEs in the high-tech sector, Fc does accept conditions (penalties) that reduce the benefits. Nevertheless, in long term, Fc should identify competitors to Ed or any other strategies, such as developing in-house software, which would help to reduce its dependency towards Ed.

  3. Fc and Cu have a balanced situation in the long run. Through an analysis of the whole business process, Fc can be aware of its concessions during the pre-contract phase while it could have a better position in the post-contract phase. The power analysis therefore shows that no mistakes can be made during the first round of negotiations (i.e., Fc does have to accept certain tradeoffs) because of better conditions in the second phase.

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8. Managerial insights

In general terms, for a given collaboration situation in supply chains, a power-based analysis methodology is designed, where the steps are the following:

  1. Initialization: Identify the actors building the supply chain viewed from the point of view of a focal company. For each of these actors, search for identification of sources of power, interaction contexts, instruments and types of power.

  2. Analysis: Analyze the power properties to determine explicit and hidden power relations.

  3. Strategies design: Define strategies to address reducing dependencies by designing leverage and counter-power strategies. These strategies are based on the focal company’s sources of power and its need for collaboration.

  4. Tactics design: Define tactics for the application of the defined strategies.

    The strategies can be therefore of two classes:

    • If the company is stronger than the partner, several leverage strategies are possible. For one, power can be exerted using various instruments to make the situation even better. This short-term strategy could be transformed into the most dangerous tool to cut off all collaborations. Another modern leverage strategy available is to use as a leverage tool by the stronger partner to help the weaker one reach higher quality and an improved management system, as demonstrated by the case of the Toyota Production System and one of the 14 rules of the Toyota Way (see Liker [80]).

    • If the company seems to be weaker than the partner, several issues are possible: (i) accepting the deal while looking to reduce the consequences of a relationship imbalance by using clever negotiation techniques, (ii) reducing, to the extent possible, the dependency by using alternative technologies, persons, tools, methods, locations, etc. These are the counter-power strategies that have to be designed. Being able to do so means being able to accurately identify power patterns, sources, gains, loses and power exertion instruments.

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9. Conclusions and perspectives

Analyzing power dynamics between partners is a relevant methodological approach for comprehending the behavior of each partner and its impact on the overall partnership strategy. This paper describes the characteristics of power and the process that leads to its possible use. This chapter gives a definition of power in the context of a supply network. We presented a set of elements and properties necessary for understanding power relationships. Finally, a taxonomy of various types of power has been established and linked to the process of potential use of its exertion.

Comprehending power dynamics holds direct significance for managers and practitioners, as it offers a more profound insight into the sources of power within organizations. In a broader context, the insights derived from power relations should be integrated into an analytical approach that offers valuable perspectives, similar to a SWOT analysis [82]. For instance, through the definition of reciprocal power, it can be understood that even a weaker partner has some type of power over the stronger one. A possible exertion of power from the weaker side of a power relationship, if the stronger partner looks to apply pressure upon the weaker one, is to cut the relationship by looking for other partnerships. Even if this is not always possible due to the business context, it remains a powerful way to eradicate the frustrations created in such imbalanced links. Obviously, using power does not always imply that coercive actions have to be taken. Instead, knowing that power includes persuasion and convincing tactics might lead to a change in behavior enhancing cooperation. This is particularly valuable because chain management is the alignment of actions in accordance to one’s interests.

To be able to analyze and manage the relationships in a supply chain, managers need to be aware of characteristics, properties and types of power. From the perspective of supply managers, this is an issue worth studying given the need to understand the role of power as an influencing factor in the conception, development and maintenance of collaborative relationships. Moreover, by enhancing the managers’ knowledge about power, such studies help companies in their supply strategy development. If managers are able to acknowledge power behind relations, they are able to classify their relationships and develop leverage or counter-power strategies on how to handle and manage different types of relations. In such relationship developments, managers will be aware of factors (sources of power) that should be highlighted and considered as the most crucial ones, if their own power position requires development.

The results of the study are also applicable in the process of supplier selection. If supply managers are aware of power in each relationship, they can use this knowledge when selecting supplier among many alternatives. Understanding the relative power towards a supplier is particularly important in cases when the supplier is new and the interaction is planned over an extended period of time. With established suppliers, power might become a means for leverage in contract or price negotiations [14].

This article looks for answering some fundamental questions concerning future research on power and its impact on the design and implementation of a product in a network of partners: how to assess and characterize imprecise fuzzy power, and in more concrete terms, how to model a mathematical relationship of power and how to deduce actors that govern the network. Through the application of a power-based analysis methodology applied to a real case, it is possible to clearly identify not only certain basic power properties (such as reciprocity, transitivity and non-continuity) among actors but also to find out how the sources of power could affect the relative position of one partner regarding the other [71]. The findings support the insights of Kahkonen and Virolainen [54], Cendon and Jarvenpaa [19], He et al. [15] and Zolghadri et al. [14] who called for research on power in networks.

Further developments should be performed to consolidate the power theory, as formulated in this study. Facts, interviews and industrial studies would help to make these primary concepts more robust on a considerably larger scale.

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Written By

Driss Essabbar, Maria Zrikem and Marc Zolghadri

Submitted: 28 August 2023 Reviewed: 30 November 2023 Published: 05 June 2024