Reviewing the Role of Subnational Governance in Rural Development Planning: The Case of Zimbabwe

Abstract

The capacity of governments, partners, and clients (population) to deliver services is shaped by many factors, including policies, politics, funds, calamities, history, and geopolitical characterisation. A Systematic Literature Review with the support of Preferred Reporting Items (PRI) guidelines was adopted. Legislation that governs the formation and functionality of developmental structures spanning 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence was reviewed. The authors also examined fifty-nine journals and books published between 2018 and 2024. The reviewed journals and books provided summaries and promulgated how subnational governance promotes rural development in African and Asian countries. Results showed that the state functions of public administration systems depend on the policies, and strategies and institutional and legislative frameworks referred to as state writs and web of legalities. Catastrophes affect governments’ planning and use of resources beyond fiscal budgets’ limits. When such happens, the coffers meant for other service delivery are emptied, thus diverging from the original intent. There have been spontaneous words without action where governments were called to action as a culmination of economic and political pressures that challenge the customary public administration models. Zimbabwe has connoted and implemented many public administration advances. There is a need to research further why some do not garner enough traction.

1. Introduction

The planning and delivery of rural social services is a fundamental domain of public administration that keeps evolving. The capacity of Governments, partners and the clients (population) to deliver services is shaped by many factors, which include policies, politics, funds, calamities, history and geopolitical characterisation. The 4th edition of the Public Administration Handbook [1] categorises critical these as the drivers of public administration. Countries like the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America and France transfer policies because they have similar economic status, ideology and history. The state and functions of the public administration systems depend on the policies, strategies, institutional and legislative frameworks referred to as state writs and web of legalities [2].

The COVID-19 emergency ushered in a significant change in the public administration of national governments to deal with the catastrophy, and there was a drastic shift in the way of doing business. The virus caused an economic depression worse than the Second World War. Within the first four months of its spread, China’s industrial production had reduced by 13,5% [3], and the world’s 3,2 billion workforce was severely affected (ILO [4]). The emergence of catastrophes, typhoons, droughts and cyclones affects how governments prioritise and operationalise resource use and service delivery. Catastrophes affect governments’ planning and use of resources beyond fiscal budgets’ limits. When such happens, the coffers meant for other service delivery are emptied, thus diverging from the original intent.

There have been spontaneous words without action, such as Brexit, where governments were called to action as a culmination of economic and political pressures that challenge the customary public administration models. There were insufficient funds after the 2016 UK Brexit exit [5]. For a whilst, the population did not trust the politicians since the UK population was unsure if the politicians were anti or pro-leavers—the public distrust and fear of the unknown stalled planning and the delivery of public administration of services [6]. China–Africa relations are a networked governance model currently shaping public administration and foreign affairs in both the West and East. There is an emergence of theoretical frameworks and complexity theories, such as the BRICS, which also affect how different governments provide services to the population. Three public administration models in Southeast Asia are colonial-bureaucratic, postcolonial-developmental and current “new public management”. These models, borrowed from Western nations, are at different stages of evolution based on each country’s geopolitical and economic status [7]. Whereas considerable work has been undertaken in the developed countries, much is desired for developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Phillips & Seifer [8] opined planning is a form of agency establishment. They defined agency as the capacity to intervene by influencing a process or the state of affairs. Thus, planning what communities want can be referred to as agency. Chambers [9] noted that for an agency to be created, the following factors are needed: relationships, structure, power, shared meaning, communication for change, motivations for decision-making and integration of these disparate concerns and paradoxes within the field. [10] further argued that understanding conceptual underpinnings and power balances goes a long way in understanding how planning can be conducted. In his book Contemporary Strategy Analysis, Grant [11] cited that planning is only successful if it necessitates a strategy that can respond to events positively or negatively with flexibility and clarity of direction. Phillips et al. [8] argued that planning at subnational levels should provide an opportunity to interface systems and methodologies that lead to consensus building and implementing projects and programmes to address the Community’s felt needs. The purpose of the development framework is to promote community participation in development interventions. The argument is that this would increase ownership, sustainability and accountability levels. This book chapter aims to provide an entry point into understanding governance underpinnings at subnational levels in Zimbabwe and other developing countries.

2. Conceptualising subnational governance

For this chapter, subnational governance is understood in the context of devolution and decentralisation. According to UNICEF [12], decentralisation is a process in which authority for planning, management and resource allocation is transferred from the central Government to regional or local government departments. There are three types of decentralisation: devolution is the transfer of authority to local Government; delegation is the transfer of authority to semi-autonomous public authorities (e.g., housing authorities); and de-concentration is the transfer of authority to ministry departments at the subnational level. The way local decisions are made and implemented is referred to as local governance [12]. This includes decisions regarding the mobilisation, prioritisation, allocation and utilisation of public resources. Local governance is shaped by policies and informal interactions and the relationships among various levels of government and local actors [13]. Whilst decentralisation is intended to formalise local governance, local governance takes place in both centralised and decentralised contexts. The term’ local government’ includes all levels of Government below the national level (or state level, in federal contexts). Local Government exists in contexts that are rural (e.g., districts, communes) and urban (e.g., towns, municipalities). Local Government includes institutions with varying mandates and powers, for example, mayor or governor (appointed or elected); local councillors or assembly members (appointed or elected); technical and administrative units that deliver services assigned to local Government (e.g., education department, social affairs department); and local offices of semi-autonomous government agencies (e.g., water authority). Local governments usually play a prominent role in local governance.

3. Methodology

The authors adopted a Systematic Literature Review with the support of PRI guidelines. Legislation that governs the formation and functionality of developmental structures spanning 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence was reviewed. These include the Prime Minister’s directive on decentralisation of 1984, the Provincial Councils Act of 1985, the Rural Councils Act of 1988, the Traditional Leaders Act of 2000, 13 principles of decentralisation, Statutory Instrument 15 of 2000 and the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. Integrated rural development remains fundamental to the growth and success of developing countries in Africa and Asia [14]. The authors reviewed fifty-nine journals and books published between 2018 and 2024. The reviewed journals and books provided summaries and promulgated how subnational governance promotes rural development in African and Asian countries. The authors synthesised the summaries to ascertain how the subnational governance promotes public administration models in Zimbabwe, Africa and Asia.

4. Results

By 1984, Zimbabwe’s developmental planning aimed to ensure that the underprivileged, marginalised and vulnerable communities participated in processes to understand challenges and propose solutions within their context [15]. In 1984, the then Prime Minister issued the Prime Minister’s Directive on Decentralisation, which provided the basis for a hierarchy of representative bodies popular participation in development planning at the village, ward, district and provincial levels [16]. The Prime Minister’s Directive was followed by the enactment of the Provincial Councils Act in 1985. The Act assigned the provincial governor to chair the Provincial Council (PC). The PC was the highest policy-making body in the province, and its mandate was to guide the development processes. The PC was supposed to get technical assistance from the Provincial Development Committee (PDC). The PDC comprised all the heads of government ministries and departments, the private sector and Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs).

Subsequently, the Rural District Councils Act (1988), Traditional Leaders Act (2000) and Statutory Instrument 15 of 2000 were enacted. The Rural District Councils Act was a culmination of a process meant to create a single local authority system in the rural areas, which previously had rural councils responsible for large-scale commercial farming areas and district councils communal areas. The Traditional Leaders Act attempted to redress the historical situation where successive colonial governments disenfranchised the traditional leadership in Zimbabwe. There was a realisation that depending on the political processes without the traditional norms and values would somewhat result in hollow development. On another level, the Traditional Leaders Act strengthened grassroots participation in development. Statutory Instrument 15 of 2000 provided legal support for the lower level structures such as the Village Development Committees (VIDCO), which are the bedrock for any rural development processes.

The preamble to the Constitution posits that the purpose of the Constitution is to “…… entrench democracy, good, transparent and accountable governance”. There can only be democratic, reasonable, transparent and accountable governance if all the citizens are involved. Section 13(2) of the Constitution posits that the state should “involve the people in the formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes that affect them”. Section 13(4) states that the Government “must ensure that local communities benefit from the resources in their areas”. The importance of community planning, equity, democratic participation and national unity is further provided under Chapter 14 of the Constitution.

The 2013 constitution emphasises the devolution of power and responsibilities to lower tiers of Government in Zimbabwe [17]. According to section 264 of the Constitution, devolution gives local governance capabilities, promotes accountability, preserves national unity, respects the rights of communities, ensures equity and encourages capacity transfer. The Constitution provided the structures that should lead in the devolution process.

The Government’s 13 Principles of Decentralisation in the 1990s brought about devolution. Devolution was associated with “secessionism”, particularly in the country’s southern parts, because people felt marginalised on political grounds. As a result, there was a transfer of functions and not fiscal support. After the 2013 constitution, the Government generated interest in the devolution agenda by convening provincial and district consultative meetings and disbursing funds to local authorities. Section 301(3) stipulates, “Not less than five per cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year must be allocated to the provinces and local authorities as their share in that year”. The Government has disbursed devolution funds to US$846 million and US$1,446 billion for 2019 and 2020, respectively. Despite the commitment and disbursements of devolution funds, the local government legislation (Rural District Councils Act, the Urban Councils Act, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act, the Traditional Leaders Act and the attendant statutory instruments) are not aligned to reflect the provisions of the new Constitution.

5. Synthesis

The Constitution’s provisions pose several ideological, systemic and structural challenges related to subnational governance. In the 2013 constitution, the makeup functions of the PC changed and became more representative socioeconomically and politically. The parliament members and senators who are also part of the Provincial Committee came from different political parties. The new Constitution broadens the membership to include duly elected members from all political parties. However, with the polarisation that had dominated Zimbabwean politics, it is still difficult to see thePCs functioning and focused on inclusive development. Suppose the business conduct in the Zimbabwean national legislature is anything to go by, where there is more heckling of members from opposing parties than focusing on real national development issues. In that case, there is little hope for the subnational-level structures. The polarised environment has been blamed for the delays in realigning the current acts of Parliament to the new Constitution, the apathy surrounding the general elections and the active participation of communities in development programmes.

The mismatch between the Constitution and the Acts somehow destroyed the communities’ enthusiasm and commitment to contribute to the development of their areas. The legislation before 2013 provided for community participation at the subnational levels but did not go far enough to improve governance at that level. The 2013 Constitution, for the first time, referred to local governance at that level. It provides for expanded structures and a clear road map to devolution. However, there had been slow progress in addressing the challenges that pre-2013 legislation presented. The existing pre-2013 legislation is still not aligned with the Constitution, and the structures referred to in the Constitution have not been set up. There are severe challenges of apathy at the community level due to the experiences that they have had with development structures. However, provisions in the 2013 constitution are a testament to the willingness and commitment of the Government to ensure community-based planning using subnational governance structures.

What is often referred to as universal knowledge in public administration is Eurocentric, and little is associated with the realities of Africa and Southeast Asia [7]. The rural development frameworks ensured that communities participate in planning depending on known priorities. Once the village plans were agreed upon, the Government would provide the implementation resources through screening. The system worked in the early years as the Government could call upon development partners to fund some projects. However, with the political and socio-economic challenges that the country faced since 1996, support was no longer forthcoming. The Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP), which the Government used as a rural development vehicle, became inefficient. In a study by Kamuzhanje [18], only 3% of the projects implemented in Matabeleland South between 2006–2007 were funded by the provincial investment plan. This meant the province’s development priorities were set at the national level, not the village level. This mismatch between the planning and budgeting process would result in planning fatigue at all levels. Local and subnational approaches to public administration increased around 2010. This resonated with the Indian situation when the Ashoka administrative empire of India was split into provinces and districts. Service delivery improved due to reduced bureaucracy. Using e-government improved the monitoring and implementation of activities and, subsequently, accountability and transparency. Interestingly, in empires such as the Mauryan, which are loyal to the king, the public administration models are similar to those in the West [19].

Lipton, in 2023, found that India’s agricultural investment is increasing because the Government encourages extra food stocks to replace investment in food imports. If any government in Asia or Africa keeps importing food, the funds that could be further invested in mechanisation and value addition would not accumulate. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Western donors developed and advocated for Structural Adjustment Programmes [20], which emphasised macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation and free-market development [21]. In Zimbabwe, the effects of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) were felt from 1991 when the Government, on the advice of the Bretton Woods institutions, liberalised the economy and allowed market forces to take over. The Government was advised to reduce its investment in non-productive sectors. This meant that the Government could no longer support the PSIP, which was used to channel resources towards rural development. This further eroded progress in promoting Community and civic participation in rural development activities. One mantra for improved public administration is to reengineer and improve institutions. However, Elaine et al., argued the need to invest in designing and testing emerging institutional models to establish the financial and operational tradeoffs.

In 1987, the two biggest revolutionary political parties, PF ZAPU and ZANU PF, signed a unity agreement to contain the country’s insurgency. By 1999, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and other civil society organisations joined the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), providing the most vital test to the ruling party, ZANU PF. Before the MDC’s emergence, political polarisation was driven more by factionalism within the ruling party. When the MDC was formed, ZANU PF dealt with the polarisation more decisively. Participation in development interventions became very partisan. This means that some of the Community’s voices were no longer being heard. ZANU PF had a firm hold on the rural areas in Zimbabwe, making it difficult for the other political parties to make any meaningful inroads in their development agendas.

Africa performs better than Asia in terms of press freedom, voice and accountability indicators. Corruption perception index, government size, voice and accountability, regulatory quality and economic wealth [2] significantly positively affect government effectiveness. Press freedom negatively impacts government effectiveness, suggesting that freedom is necessary but not sufficient if there are political actors whose actions undermine freedom [2]. Similarly, as reflected by checks and balances, the political constraint index is essential but insufficient to enhance government effectiveness, especially in Asia [2]. South Korea’s developmental assistance to the DRC faced efficiency challenges, including tribalism, tribal conflict, incomplete administrative organisation at the local level, shortage of agricultural technology, agricultural market openings and unrealistic project goals [22]. The results suggest the need for comprehensive research on the local area and preliminary feasibility studies to secure sufficient time to plan the project and design suitable initiatives for recipient countries and target sites [22]. An exhaustive monitoring and development plan and systematic conflict management and resolution were recommended.

There is a need to articulate power relations and cultural, ethical, religious, social and artistic beliefs when climate change affects countries [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. In 2000, Cyclone Eline struck Zimbabwe, resulting in 136 fatalities and destruction to 59 184 houses and huts, 14 999 toilets, 538 schools and 54 clinics [28]. The 2002 drought left about 8 million people in acute need of food assistance [28]. In 2007–2008, the cholera and typhoid outbreak resulted in over 100,000 positive cases and 5,000 deaths [29]. All these catastrophes resulted in Government and NGOs intervening and providing relief services. Most of these services were targeted at the poorest of the poor and were free. Whilst the intentions for providing free goods and services were noble initially, they have become an entitlement, resulting in dependency. The communities no longer see the importance of participative planning because they know there is always external support. Consequently, this has harmed the usefulness and impact of the legislative and institutional frameworks.

Nemeth [30] defines ideology as “a social tool capable of changing what is into what can be”. Socialist-communist ideologies from Russia and the Eastern Bloc dominated Zimbabwe’s early years of independence. Asian countries perform better on international procurement indicators since they comply with international or Western standards [31]. The success of Asian countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) is based on the exportation of industrialised goods and pro-poor agriculture, and poor agriculture should be the focus of African countries (Nigeria and Kenya). The notion of planning and working together was more pronounced, hence the initial success of utilising governance structures [32]. However, with the interventions of the Bretton Woods institutions, in 1991, the country embarked on ESAP, which included the liberalisation of the economy and put the country on a capitalist trajectory. Zimbabwe has pursued communist and socialist ideologies, resulting in mixed and conflicting messages on how the communities should implement development interventions. Africa’s rural agriculture development follows the Asia pathways. The fundamental underpinnings include adopting or fusing technology and research, securing property land rights, improved ICTs, investments in human capital, training and launching high-value agriculture and value addition [33]. Market-oriented agriculture development may reduce poverty and increase marginalisation in Laos and Rwanda. Gender, ethnicity, partiality of land rights and security further and domestic politics worsen marginalisation as some access services at the expense of others [34].

In the 1980s, the subnational governance structures were successful because the government institutions were fully functional and funded well enough to provide the communities’ necessary support. Due to the economic meltdown, the capacity to respond to the communities’ needs was reduced. Salvo et al., 2022 agree that poverty reduction is possible in third-world countries by creating employment opportunities, undertaking economic and institutional reforms, revitalising systematic microfinance programmes and incentivising the private sector [35]. The country lost over 500,000 civil servants between 2000 and 2004 due to poor working conditions. Due to institutional incapacitation, the NGOs emerged as a support mechanism. The NGOs had the resources to support the communities and government departments [23, 24, 36]. The NGOs created parallel structures to the VIDCOs and WADCOs, resulting in parallel planning processes. The Government planning and budgeting calendar ran from January to December of each year, but some NGOs had different planning cycles. Investing in technical vocational training to build capacity is necessary so that the population does not depend solely on government projects [37].

The taxation system should be revised since the national Government raises revenue from taxes, yet subnational structures such as local authorities also raise revenues from fees and rates. There is a chance of double taxation for some individuals and business enterprises, resulting in tax evasion as people and businesses seek to protect their investments and earnings. Due to the economic meltdown over the past two decades, the tax base has been shrinking. Resultantly, funds allocated to the devolution fund will be reduced over time. The tax issue partly derailed the devolution process in the 1990s when the central Government was not ready to hand over some taxable areas to the local authorities. Parallel political systems have also been formed to function along with the development structures, resulting in them remaining in name only. For example, ZANU (PF) has arrangements starting at the village level, known as “cells”. It is more advantageous to be associated with the cell than the VIDCO due to the party’s political influence. Whilst resettlement and land redistribution seem essential, investing massively in research to understand the socio-economic, political and historical realities is vital to not harm the noble cause [38]. Agricultural growth remains the cornerstone for Africa’s development and transformation if growth is based on production rather than area expansion.

6. Conclusions

The concept of subnational structures and governance does not operate in a vacuum. The impression has been created that it is a question of either or. This is quite far from the truth. Devolution and decentralisation, in various forms, can only truly work if the central Government is strong enough to provide technical and policy support to the lower levels. Just as important is that the citizenry must be convinced that their agency is critical in shaping local governance at their level. The challenges that have bedevilled subnational governance structures in Zimbabwe have been caused in the main by the reluctance of the Central Government to commit fully to the provisions of the 2013 Constitution, just as much as there was no political will to implement the 1996 Decentralisation programme. This, complemented by a polarised political environment and a disempowered citizenry, has made it possible for the process of rationalising the Acts in line with the provisions of the Constitution to take the amount of time it has taken.

It is also important to note that many interventions have been implemented by the central Government that have failed to garner enough traction. Some of them have made it difficult for the people to retain interest and confidence in the processes and any other initiatives by the Government. The key one already discussed is the ESAP. Whilst the programme opened up the economy and set the stage for the liberalisation of the economy, the fact that it led to the loss of livelihoods for many households meant that its benefits were largely lost. In addition, the loss in income for the households also meant that they could not pay for some of the services they were receiving, thereby compromising the ability of the local authorities to provide these services. So, all of a sudden, an action taken by a higher level of Government affects the lower levels. The same argument could be made about the land reform programme of 2000. In principle, the programme was meant to benefit land-starved rural communities. However, it ended up benefitting already well-to-do and connected party activists. In what was mainly seen as a political gimmick, in July 2013, the Government, through the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, issued a circular to all local authorities to cancel all debts by ratepayers. Whilst this was celebrated as a good move by the residents, it led to the near collapse of most local authorities, who had to find resources elsewhere to meet the costs of the services they were providing.

There is a need for the Government to make a deliberate attempt to strengthen subnational structures [39, 40, 41, 42]. Currently, structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs only exist in name. Their functionality has been impeded by the lack of a financial framework that allows them to meet their development aspirations. There is now an apathy at these lower levels to participate actively in the development discourse [42, 43, 44, 45].