Perspective Chapter: Brexit, Emmanuel Macron and the Resurgence of the Europe puissance

Abstract

Tensions on continental Europe have become more pronounced in recent years following the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union. Brexit required a reorientation of the European Union. With the aim of challenging German leadership of the EU, French President Emmanuel Macron revived the Gaullist Europe puissance – the concept of a European military entity to rival the superpowers on the international stage. Macron – a critic of Brexit and NATO – wanted a common defense policy for Europe, which guarantees ‘strategic military sovereignty.’ This chapter will examine two themes. Firstly, the proposed EU restructuring as a competitor of NATO will be discussed to discover the military threats of a Europe puissance when Putin’s Russia looked to expand its borders into Ukraine. Furthermore, the decline in Franco-German relations will be investigated since Macron’s concept provoked backlash from German leaders and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Exploring the Europe puissance allows us to ascertain the divisions between EU partners when NATO became Europe’s voice in geopolitical matters.

1. Introduction

On 25 April 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron gave a speech at La Sorbonne, which attracted the attention of many domestic journalists present. It did not, however, cause much consternation outside of France despite its inflammatory rhetoric. Macron said ‘We are at a tipping point, and our Europe is deadly. It’s just up to us’ [1]. The two-hour long speech referred to Macron’s grand design for the European Union in military and geopolitical terms. He continued ‘The Europe puissance is simple, it makes itself respected and ensures its security’ [2]. The Europe puissance is a concept that has taken on many different guises since French Prime Minister Guy Mollet first proposed it in November 1956. The timing of the Europe puissance proposal is very important to contextualizing the concept in geopolitical history. The Mollet government decided to pursue the construction of a European superpower (Europe puissance) as a means of counteracting France’s imperial decline, which the failed Franco-British intervention in the Suez Canal in October 1956 only served to exacerbate. The British acceptance of a cease-fire on 6 November 1956 further embarrassed France, and forced the Mollet government to reorientate its defense policy towards its European Community (EC) partners. Mollet’s vision for a Europe puissance contained the integration of EURATOM – the EC vehicle for nuclear cooperation and collaboration through a Franco-German Comité militaire et technique [3]. Thus, one aspect of the Europe puissance remains constant: the inclusion of European supranational frameworks for the construction of a new superpower to disrupt the existing bipolar world order. This was certainly Mollet’s intention in 1956, and also that of his successors with French President Charles de Gaulle seeking to augment France’s position on the world stage by proposing the French nuclear deterrent as the base for a Europe puissance during the 1960s.

Macron’s vision for a Europe puissance follows the same line of continuity as his predecessors. In 1953, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France argued against the creation of a European defense network, stating that it would undermine efforts towards European integration in the energy and economic sectors. However from 1956 to the mid-1960s, the Europe puissance became an en vogue concept. During this period, there were several concepts for European defense being discussed. NATO reforms were high on the European defense agenda. President de Gaulle offered a more nuanced alternative of European defense planning, which augmented the share of control that EC member states would have on the continent. De Gaulle’s Europe puissance existed as a means for France to challenge the bipolar order and reassert the world power role, which was diminished because of the Suez Crisis [4]. For European Community countries, European defense philosophy in the post-Suez period centred on the separation of continental military decision-making from US management. France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) sought to exert some degree of independence over their defense policies, and openly criticized Britain for holding to their previous status as a Great Power and not adapting to the new bipolar order, with their acquiescence to US dominance in the West [5]. German Foreign Minister Franz Josef Strauss disapproved of Britain’s post-Suez posturing on the European continent, going as far as critiquing Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to France ‘as dwelling on the past glories of the entente cordiale rather than on the new European philosophy.’

Much of the academic work has centred on French leaders’ failed attempts at cultivating the Five European Community nations into accepting a Europe puissance – de Gaulle’s alternative to NATO and the WEU. For instance, Douglas T. Stuart has argued that the French desired this alternative avenue for European defense as it offered a way to exert control over military affairs on the continent. Stuart’s argument, among others, has concentrated on the incompatibility of French foreign policy and US control within the Atlantic Alliance command structure. The crux of this argument can be found in the United States’ treatment of France during the Suez Crisis, since the former was coerced ‘to choose between its African vocation and its friendship’ [6].

In the broadest sense, it is well-known that the Europe puissance grew from a lack of acceptance over US domination in European defense decision-making. The concept has taken on many forms since the Suez Crisis and has, most recently, been revived to act as a military wing for European Union during the Iraq war and later following Britain’s withdrawal from the European Communities framework [7]. However, any examination of the Europe puissance must consider the changing dynamics of the political landscape. This chapter seeks to understand how Emmanuel Macron has revived the Europe puissance to maintain French influence in the current geopolitical climate. In particular, this chapter will discuss the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and how Macron’s proposal for a revived Europe puissance was not compatible with the resurgence in NATO’s significance. In addition, the chapter will also investigate how the French government used the Europe puissance as a potential power grab in the wake of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union in December 2021. In doing so, this chapter will argue against Galtung’s analysis that the EU was a ‘capitalist superpower’, particularly when referring to geopolitical defense matters [8].

2. Brexit and the reorientation of the European Union

On 26 September 2017, Emmanuel Macron stood up at the Université de la Sorbonne to make a speech on his future grand design ideas for the European Union. It is noteworthy that this speech came four months after his inauguration as French President and set the tone for the guiding principles for his tenure. He began his speech thusly:

I have come to talk to you about Europe. “Again”, some might exclaim. People will just have to get used to it, because I will not stop talking about it. Because this is where our battle lies, our history, our identity, our horizon, what protects us and gives us a future [9].

Macron’s speech laid bare his political ambitions for his European partners to see. He referenced the advent of the migrant crisis and the growing ‘nationalism, identitarianism, protectionism [and] isolationist sovereignism’ in EU member states as issues which France needed to combat. The solution to those crises was the Macronian Europe puissance. However, this new French grand design idea was not completely predicated on the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent akin to its predecessors. The Macronian initiative required the establishment of an armée européenne to ensure European autonomy where its security and global influence is concerned. Jacques Delors had previously recommended an Europe puissance during his tenure as EU Commission President, describing the creation of such a project as a new ‘hardcore’ proposal for the preservation of the European Communities [10].

The revival of the Europe puissance can be traced to the resurgence of disruptive forces on continental Europe. The annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014 created a tense atmosphere between European nations and the Russian Federation. The threat of expansionist nations on continental Europe and the marked decline of democratic institutions in nations of strategic importance caused Macron to revive the Gaullist grand design idea. He stated in his speech ‘a European Union reinvented in this way is a precondition for their not turning their backs on Europe and moving towards either Russia or Turkey, or towards authoritarian powers that do not currently uphold our values’ [9]. The French President’s desire for reform of the European Union into a more secure and autonomous geopolitical institution has received much attention from academics. In the context of Russia and Turkey’s departure from the expected democratic norms of the post-Cold War period, Soli Özel has argued that the ‘post-national, liberal… project of European integration is in a profound crisis’ since nations on the near-exterior of the EU have been openly challenging the founding principles of the Community project [11]. Indeed in 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adopted a Eurasianist approach with the aim of becoming an influential power in the Middle East. The Eurasianist approach was Erdoğan’s attempt to challenge the bipolar order in the Middle East by establishing itself as an ‘order setter’ in the region. In addition, Turkey experienced a turbulent – albeit short – military coup against the Erdoğan regime in July 2016. The state’s move towards soft authoritarianism was the rationale for the army’s revolt. The failed coup unironically led to the purge of 45,000 education workers, generals, military personnel and several governors which served to enhance Erdoğan’s reputation as a quasi-dictator [12]. Erdoğan’s move towards authoritarianism represented the deep divide between the EU and Turkey in the post-Arab Spring period, especially in relation to the NATO command structure. Turkey’s strategic position on NATO’s southern flank accompanied by Russia’s expansion in the Crimea required the strengthening of Europe’s military complex [13]. Macron’s Europe puissance was considered the appropriate alternative to the weakening of NATO. French politicians of the Gaullist tradition expressed unwavering support for the Macronian grand design idea. Xavier Bertrand, the leader of the Conservative party Nous France, praised Macron’s desire to strengthen the French military hardware complex through the development of France’s nuclear energy manufacturing. Bertrand described France’s atomic energy production as ‘une énergie d’avenir’ [14].

The support from right-wing French politicians made Macron’s case for European sovereignty over military decisions easier to fight, particularly during a period of great uncertainty for the European project. On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Gibraltar took to the polls to vote on their continued membership of the European Union. The result has become a source of much controversy and continues to plague British politics to this day. With 52 per cent of the votes, the United Kingdom’s future outside of the European Union was secured. However, this left the EU in a quasi-identity crisis. Former French President de Gaulle had once argued that France needed intra-European relations to succeed if she was to remain in the ‘front rank’ of world affairs, something he demanded given that, in his view, ‘France cannot be France without greatness’ [15]. Thus, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU framework caused a power imbalance within the Communities since the UK was the third largest financial contributor to the Union. Macron – an uncompromising critic of both Brexit and NATO – stated that he wants a common nuclear policy for Europe, which guarantees ‘strategic military sovereignty’. In addition, the French President also stated that Brexit was a ‘mistake’, and that Britain must pay for turning its back on the ‘common ambition’ of the European Union [16]. The Brexit vote signaled a positive outcome to right-wing political movements across Europe. In France, the negotiations surrounding the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union ran in parallel with the rising popularity of the Rassemblement Nationale (RN), which has seen its share of the Presidential election vote increase from 33.9 per cent in 2017 to 41.45 per cent in 2022 [17]. Indeed, RN Party President Marine Le Pen has reflected the impacts of Brexit in the formulation of her policies. For the 2017 Presidential Election, her guiding policy was to protect ‘France’s national sovereignty in a Europe of independent nations at the service of its peoples’ [18]. The policy shares similarities to the Leave campaign’s landmark slogan of ‘Take Back Control’ during the Brexit referendum, according to Helen Drake [18]. The possibility of a so-called ‘Frexit’ placed pressure on Macron to ensure that his grand designs for closer fiscal and military cooperation within the structure of the EU became a reality.

The success of the Brexit campaign laid bare the inadequacies of the EU to maintain its present structure. Policies regarding strict legal and economic frameworks have emboldened populists across continental Europe. Macron’s proposals for strict budgetary requirements – namely, increases – following the British withdrawal from the EU highlighted the fragility of France’s position within the Community’s leadership. In March 2018, Macron set out economic reforms in the National Assembly as a means of steering France to a position of budgetary security in the eyes of its European partners. Macron’s reforms were a geo-political necessity given German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s outright rejection of his economic outlook for the EU. Following Macron’s accession to power in July 2017, he proposed a radical transformation of the European economy – one relying upon a resurgent labour market supported by favorable EU-wide state pension systems. However, Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) vetoed the idea, principally as Macron did not command support from many of his contemporaries from other political groups [19]. The French workers’ unions, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), resisted Macron’s economic reforms as the decentralizing of the work force would ultimately weaken their members’ right to protest – an essential facet of the French grévoculture [19].

German resistance to Macronian initiatives also impacted negatively on the Europe puissance idea. Macron’s economic and cultural liberalism was a public humiliation on the continental stage. Between 2017 and 2020, the French economy experienced a significant decline of eight per cent following the Yellow Vest protests and the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns [20]. Fabian Escalona has argued that the decline of national unions and the loss of French monetary independence in the public sphere deteriorated France’s ability to manipulate the direction of travel within the European Union [20]. Additionally, Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union left the Community without its key strategic guide within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), given that the United Kingdom only contributed 2.3 per cent of its forces to the Communities’ mission preparation [21]. Thus, Macron vigorously argued in favor of institutionalizing the Europe puissance as a necessary addition to the CSDP following the United Kingdom’s departure. The Europe puissance was characterized as an important augmentation of the existing European Union framework. Merkel and the current President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen were originally suspicious of Macron’s model for the Europe puissance. In the case of von der Leyen, she supported the idea of a European security network, which looked towards cultivating new bonds with partner nations in the Indo-Pacific. The rationale for von der Leyen’s alternative was the growing threat of China to nations around the world, something she said was paramount given the ‘considerable damage’ a ‘simple laptop can cause’ [22]. Von der Leyen also called for a supranational Europe puissance, rather than a French-led organization proposed by Macron. The EU Commission President’s alternative focused on the cultivation of multilateral projects of ‘common European interests’ [23]. Thus, Macron’s Europe puissance would have struggled to gain traction with Community partners since it did not have the support of its current leadership.

The French proposal for a Europe puissance also failed to overcome German objections. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has a historical precedent for rejecting multiple iterations of the Europe puissance. Following German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s agreement with de Gaulle to institutionalize Franco-German relations in the context of European integration, the 1963 Élysée treaty created a bilateral axis within the European Communities where France would lead defense preparations as a prelude to the creation of a Europe puissance [24]. As a key player in central Europe, Germany has found itself torn between two different defense grand design philosophies since the 1960s. Firstly, West Germany had benefitted from close alignment with NATO from 1955, which included membership of the Western European Union (WEU). The foundational principle of the Europe puissance proposals of de Gaulle’s tenure reflected the geopolitical realities of the period. De Gaulle wanted to use France’s growing nuclear weapons capability to create a European military superpower, with the intention of challenging the existing bipolar framework consisting of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries under the leadership of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It was the nuclear element that weakened any chance of the first Europe puissance proposal being accepted. The FRG’s membership of the WEU also constrained its ability to lead de Gaulle’s Europe puissance as the Control of Fissile Materials agency ensured that it was unable to use any nuclear components for the purposes of national defense [25, 26]. Leadership in Europe was an important concept for Germany throughout the Cold War period following a resurgence in their economy during the late-1960s. Germany’s alignment with NATO ensured its incorporation into US grand design proposals, such as the ill-fated Multilateral Force (1962–1966). Adenauer’s successor Ludwig Erhard later clarified that while the FRG would still consider assigning forces to the Multilateral Force, Franco-German cooperation was the most effective means of ensuring that the West German people would ‘have the right to self-determination’ [27].

Subsequently, the German position on leadership of the European Communities has been more entrenched over the ensuing decades. As the 1980s progressed, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl professed of a Germany that would acquire a leadership role within the existing European framework. Kohl stated that the new Germany, which he envisaged would rise post-reunification, would be ‘built under a European roof’ [28]. Kohl’s portrayal of Germany as a European nation suggests a slight departure from his predecessor’s direction of travel. This characterization of Germany as a leader in Europe provoked much concern in France. French historian Pierre Guillen has previously warned that a unified Germany with its growing technological and economic power, its geographical position and sizeable population had ‘a power which will upset the balance in Europe and which will ensure it a quasi-hegemony’ [29]. In many ways, academic discourse has debunked the fears of Guillen and his contemporaries. Ulrich Krotz argued that the Élysée Treaty demarcated a new ‘special relationship’ between both European nations [30].

The re-emergence of Germany as a political actor on the European stage hindered the development of the Macronian Europe puissance. Indeed, one of the main German objections to the proposal centred upon nostalgia. The Macronian Europe puissance – while an advancement of the single-mindedly nuclear powered, Gaullist alternative – still maintained some of the themes which led to the failure of its previous iterations. The former Permanent Representative of France to the EU Pierre Sellal identified German objections as a ‘certain mistrust’ of partner nations, particularly France which would lead the proposed superpower [31]. Suspicion of fellow European partners is nothing new, with historical precedents set before the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. In fact, the French government had increasingly found itself isolated on the European stage because of its persistence with previous iterations of the Europe puissance idea. Germany’s attitude to increasing its defense role with European partners has focused primarily on strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. For instance, in 1969, months before de Gaulle’s resignation as French President, Germany and the United Kingdom opted to create a contre-coalition designed to support the Benelux Plan – a proposal conceived by Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, with signatories signaling their support for the creation of a Europe economic and monetary union (EMU) by 1979 [32]. A Germano-British coalition severely undermined any hope of the French President’s proposal for a Europe puissance, which by 1969 had been adapted to include a Free Trade Agreement with member states, from achieving any success. The British took concrete steps to subvert the French proposals [33]. The majority of EEC and partner nations accepting the Benelux plan highlights the increasing isolation which the French government experienced because of its commitment to the Europe puissance. Progressively this isolation has been reflected in academic discourse. Coralie Delaume argued that the Europe puissance proposal, regardless of its interpretation, cannot achieve success given that by its very nature, it would create a contre-coalition against the existing NATO command structure designed to oversee the defense of continental Europe [34].

The historical precedents concerning the failure of the Europe puissance idea reflect the current geopolitical climate. Macron’s desire to revive the Europe puissance has met with a similar lack of success as its predecessors. General historical trends of bipolarity have thwarted French governments in establishing the Europe puissance as a credible defense alternative. For example, in 1973 the superpowers’ move towards nuclear non-proliferation further eroded the Europe puissance’s chances of success. While Britain received upgraded Polaris technology, it came at the cost of strict adherence to the Strategy Arms Limitation Treaties, thus limiting any potential counter-balance a Europe puissance could manifest against Soviet aggression and ensuring US defense hegemony in Europe remained [35].

3. The resurgence of NATO and the postponement of the Europe puissance: for now

The perceived failures of the Atlantic Alliance as an organization responsible for the coordination of European defense matters were one of the catalysts for the Macronian Europe puissance. Macron could not have been clearer in his Sorbonne speech of September 2017 that, in his eyes, the European Union would become a competitor for NATO in the military sphere. Indeed, the perceived rapprochement with Germany over defense matters resulted in a renewal of Franco-German relations. While she was critical of his economic policies, Merkel supported the idea of a revived Europe puissance given the increasing demand of the CSDP following the United Kingdom’s impending departure from the EU. Merkel considered the ‘narrow confines’ of the CSDP restrictive to Germany’s influence within the wider sphere of European defense [36]. Thus, closer ties and negotiations between Germany and France between 2017 and 2019 evolved into a renewed bilateral agreement. On 22 January 2020, the French President and the German Chancellor signed the Aachen Treaty, on the 56th anniversary of the ratification of the Élysée Treaty. The timing of this bilateral agreement was noteworthy as both countries agreed to revive promises within the Élysée Treaty. France and Germany agreed to strengthen cybersecurity, defense against autocratic regimes (in this case Russia) and cooperate over civil engineering projects. However, one discreet facet of the Aachen Treaty was the decision to strength a Franco-German voice within the European Union. The creation of a new Franco-German axis in the European Communities owed much to the advent of Brexit and Donald Trump’s US presidency. Macron emphasized France’s role within a strategically autonomous European Union as a key to the resurgence of the Europe puissance. The presidency of Donald Trump contributed to France acting more unilaterally on the European and international stage. Following Trump’s election, the French government concentrated its defense spending on preparations for investing in EU military matters [37]. Furthermore, Macron also used Trump’s introduction into geopolitical affairs to discredit his right-wing opponents. Known Eurosceptic and President of Rassemblement National Marine Le Pen, who criticized Macron’s Europe puissance concept and vigorously defended the early actions of the Trump presidency, was charactised as a Trump ‘apostle’ for declaring that the ‘EU is dead, but does not know it yet’ on the day of his inauguration [37].

In addition, the introduction of Trump caused a profound North-South split among EU partners. The growing presence of right-wing governments in European governments resulted in European integration in military terms being even harder to achieve than before the Brexit referendum. For instance, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Melloni has recently committed her country to the priorisation of European defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In a speech to the Italian Parliament, she clearly stated: ‘it is Italy’s duty to fully contribute, because […] freedom has a cost and that cost, for a nation, is its ability to defend itself and prove it is a reliable partner within the framework of alliances to which it belongs’ [38]. The Italian Prime Minister’s bold declaration of her – and her country’s – Atlanticist credentials highlights the growing divide between the Franco-German axis within the EU and other member states. Her role as President of the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists Party further demonstrates the growing split between European leaders around the proposed defense of Europe. Macron hoped that the Europe puissance would gain traction among his European partners. However, the rise of right-wing parties in positions of power across Europe, in particular Italy and Hungary has led to a loss of interest in continental defense being constructed from within the European Communities.

The divisions between EU member states has been epitomized in recent years by Emmanuel Macron’s inflammatory comments about the future of NATO. On 21 October 2019, in an hour-long interview with The Economist in the Élysée Palace, President Macron delivered a stark warning to his European allies – mainly, that they cannot rely on the United States any longer for leadership on defense matters. He stated bluntly ‘What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO’ going further to warn that the European Union stands on ‘the edge of a precipice’ [39]. The stark warning concerning NATO was a response to the fledgling Europe puissance concept. Macron’s grand design for Europe was in a slow decline with his beating of the drum for European defense integration falling on deaf ears. In particular, several EU states had recently begun to prioritize Euro-Atlantic defense. Between 2017 and 2023, Finland, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Sweden had joined the Atlantic Alliance with existing member states committing to undertake military deployments in the face of a growing threat from Russia. Macron questioned whether NATO as an organization was still committed to the principles of collective defense following the United States’ withdrawal from northern Syria [40]. His comments drew criticism from his closest allies. Merkel disagreed, describing his words as ‘drastic.’ Despite the disapproval of France’s Aachen Treaty partner – and perhaps more shockingly – the Putin government welcomed Macron’s comments, describing them as ‘truthful words’ [40]. Macron’s comments went against the whole character of the Atlantic Alliance. Article Five of the NATO Charter guarantees the ‘collective defense of territory’ under the control of member states [41]. Macron’s use of the US withdrawal from Northern Syria as criticism for the Atlantic Alliance was unfounded considering that the area was not under total US control. Furthermore, the Syrian matter highlights the deepening divisions between the US and France which prompted Macron’s criticism. The French government favored a political settlement led by direct involvement from the international community in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, which the Trump administration openly disregarded through its withdrawal from Northern Syria without prior consultation with NATO allies. In particular, the French government upheld the importance of ‘reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic’ while ‘urging all parties to the UN-facilitated political process to adhere to the principles identified by the International Syria Support Group’ [42].

Macron’s attempts to focus the international conversation around the ‘brain death’ of NATO were ill-timed. In 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation. Article Nine of the Declaration guarantees that both parties’ ‘mutually reinforcing strategic partnership contributes to strengthening security in Europe and beyond’ [43]. Going further the Declaration reads:

NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We will further mobilize the combined set of instruments at our disposal, be they political, economic or military, to pursue our common objectives to the benefit of our one billion citizens [43].

It is the assurance that both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance will contribute to the advancement of international security which undermines any fundamental progress for the Macronian Europe puissance. The Declaration also contained evidence of pre-existing military cooperation between NATO and the EU, which further demonstrates the lack of need for a Europe puissance. Article Eleven states ‘We have reached tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, military mobility, defense capabilities’ [43]. Between 2016 and 2018, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was the epicenter for 74 joint actions between the EU and NATO. While these joint operations laid the foundations for the Joint Declaration in 2018, they papered over the cracks in the multilateral relationships between transatlantic partnerships [44]. The move towards greater unity in defense matters between NATO and the EU has greatly mitigated against the impacts of the Brexit process. Macron’s comments about the decline of NATO did not have the intended impact. The implementation of a Europe puissance now looks quite unlikely. However, this was not always the case in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote. Sir Robin Niblett, the former director of Chatham House and specialist on international relations, had previously stated that ‘France has seen itself as the policy leader of the EU’, and with the United Kingdom’s absence from the EU framework, ‘Mr Macron is acting with too heavy a hand’ [45]. Nevertheless, the growing amity between the EU and NATO has stifled any appetite for competition. The departure from ‘Great-Power’ competition, which has experienced a resurgence following the Cold War, has been a welcome development in fostering stronger relations between NATO and the EU. The ratification of a bilateral relationship between both organizations has successfully quelled the desire for further competition over defense matters on the continent.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the Europe puissance. On 3 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that intervention into Ukraine was essential to Russia’s strategic interests considering ‘the threat to the lives of citizens of the Russian Federation’. He submitted a petition to the UN General Assembly proposing the use of ‘armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine until normalization of the socio-political situation in that country.’ Interestingly, Lavrov’s rhetoric follows similar patterns to the backlash to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 [46]. The reaction of the international community to Russia’s false determinations of self-defense was one of overwhelming support for Ukraine. Both NATO and the EU have either began or continued the process of making Ukraine a member of their organization. Since the 2006 Bucharest Summit, NATO has worked with Ukraine on the road towards membership. In fact, In September 2020, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved a National Security Strategy with the aim of advancing his country towards full integration with NATO [47]. Arguably, this is part of the reason behind Russia’s invasion considering the growing Atlanticist influence within Eastern Europe, with its nearest neighbor Poland already being a member of the Alliance.

Similarly, the EU has opened its doors to Ukraine following the invasion, with the country formally announcing its application on 28 February 2022. It was not until December 2023 that the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine on its role within the European Union with the first intergovernmental conference for negotiations occurring in June 2024. Now, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a significant turning point for discussions around the idea of a Europe puissance. The North Atlantic Council twice held consultations between members of NATO and the EU. The results were decisive. Since Ukraine was not a NATO member state, Atlantic Alliance forces could not intervene directly under the terms of Article Five of the NATO Charter. However, Article Five of the Washington Treaty guarantees the protection of ‘all Allies’, which gave NATO member states the pretext to begin openly supporting the Ukrainian war effort with military hardware and armed forces staff for training purposes. As of the end of March 2022, 40,000 troops from NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) stand ready on its Eastern Flank. In addition, all Allied member states have strengthened the Forward Presence battlegroups based in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in case of Russian advance towards Allied territory [48]. The concentration of the NATO allied forces on the situation in Ukraine circumvented any discussions around the future defense of the European Union. Nevertheless, the growing support from NATO member states, including France, for the Ukrainian war effort is not the most mitigating piece of evidence for the collapse of the Europe puissance idea. In January 2022, the French government, in conjunction with the commanders of its armed forces, decided to take up the leadership role of the VJTF, with the aim of restoring its credentials as a leader on the European stage – an idea that has been progressively weakened during Macron’s tenure. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg praised Macron’s government for renewing its interest in Alliance activities. He said, ‘the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force is a substantial contribution to our collective defense, and France’s leadership is a strong display of commitment and capabilities’ [49].

Macron’s turn towards NATO has only continued in step with the war in Ukraine. France has only recently hit its target of spending two per cent of Gross Domestic Product on NATO defense projects, a statutory aim for all members of the Atlantic Alliance. Despite ceding control of the VJTF in January 2023, France has continued its contributions to collective defense by stationing more troops on NATO’s Eastern Flank, principally in Romania and Estonia. Following a meeting between Macron and Stoltenberg in Paris on 24 June 2024, the Secretary General praised France’s role in NATO aviation and maritime defense particularly in the Baltic regions. Stoltenberg was categorical in his praise: ‘French naval ships keep our sea lanes open and safe’ [50]. The icing on the cake for Stoltenberg was the French decision to guarantee NATO access to its nuclear force – the force de frappe – as a condition for the overall security of the Atlantic Alliance. In many ways, the prominent role France plays in NATO’s response to the war in Ukraine highlights how the European security order has changed in ‘ways unseen since the end of the Cold War’. France’s departure from desiring a forcibly generated leadership role within a Europe puissance has shown Macron’s willingness to adapt politically and maintain his nation’s strategic position within Europe, which was coming under increasing threat the longer he persisted with his revived notion of a European superpower within the EU.

4. Conclusion

The Europe puissance, at least for the moment, is confined to the annals of history once again. The advent of the war in Ukraine has proved to be the final nail in the coffin for what was designed to return France to the ‘front rank on the international stage’ [51]. Despite a lack of success for the Macronian Europe puissance, the French President stated in October 2022 that a common defense policy was essential to protect France’s ‘vital interests’ after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat of atomic weapons use returned the question of nuclear non-proliferation to the fore [52]. Nevertheless, the medium through which this common defense policy would now take shape was the Atlantic Alliance. The whirlwind story of the Europe puissance from possible renewal and rebirth during Macron’s Sorbonne speech to the French President’s recommitment to playing a leadership role in NATO demonstrates the controversial nature of the concept in a bipolar framework. For example, the lack of support from France’s traditional ally Germany, coupled with the reticence from EU leaders to adopt such a military plan, illustrates that the Europe puissance in the Macronian guise only succeeded in achieving the same as its predecessors and divide the opinion among European leaders. The French objective remains to create a common defense policy among partners. What has changed since 2017 is the extent of the partnership, shifting from a strictly European collaboration to a broader Euro-Atlantic community with 23 nations now meeting the commitment to contributing two per cent of GDP to NATO defense projects [53]. Thus, while the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union presented an opportunity for Macron to reclaim a leadership role in Europe for France, the Europe puissance concept contained the same issues which plagued the previous models – namely, the renouncing of European dependence on the United States and the lack of a supranational element, which hampered Franco-German relations during Erhard’s tenure. Thus, Macron’s turn towards European defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance is a welcome one given the current geopolitical uncertainties following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.