Can Turkey’s Winter Be Europe’s Spring? Turkey’s Dilemma as a Buffer State Protecting Europe from Irregular Migration

Abstract

Europe may not realize that “buffer states” like Turkey also have the potential to become a source of migration, and this is increasing. What is the current situation and future of Turkey, which is designed as a buffer zone, and what are the implications of this future for Europe? Do European states foresee that the buffer zones they have created to save the day will allow their own citizens to reach the European border as immigrants? In this context, in order to concretize the answers to the relevant questions, a survey study is used to reveal the increase in the demand of Turkish citizens to emigrate from the state in recent years, the direction of this migration and its relationship with irregular migrants. Thus, it is aimed to make European states question their potential to turn the geographies selected as Buffer States into new countries of emigration moving towards Europe and what they will do in this case. This is because the hate speech against immigrants in Turkey and the decline in the willingness of educated Turkish citizens to stay in the state is increasing.

1. Introduction

The report shared by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on June 14, 2023, shows that approximately 3.6% of the world’s population is forced to live outside their state of birth. Turkey has also received its share of the migration phenomenon due to its location and domestic-foreign politics. Turkey, which is the country of first asylum for many refugees and immigrants due to its geographical location, is home to approximately 4 million registered refugees and asylum seekers (3.7 million of whom are Syrians) as a result of an unprecedented influx of refugees. Connecting Europe and Asia, Turkey has historically been a transit and destination state for immigrants. In other words, migration is a phenomenon to which the state is no stranger. Therefore, the issue of migration and immigrants is not new in this state. However, the increasing demands for migration and asylum in parallel with the violence and instability in the world have brought new international and national legal regulation obligations for states. Naturally, in this period of diminishing protection of national borders, it is the European states that have panicked the most and have been the first to implement these obligations. These are the states that are at the forefront of economic prosperity, and they once lectured other states on freedom and tolerance. The European Union (EU) and its member states have a basic migration strategy in the Mediterranean Basin, where Turkey also assumes the mission of a “buffer state”. Pressure is put on neighboring states such as Turkey, Morocco and Libya to create a buffer zone around the strategy of stopping immigrants and refugees before they reach EU member states. In fact, these states do not have the economic, sociological or historical background to fulfill the conditions of being the “most responsible state” in the migrant crisis. Turkey, which Europe is concerned about “effective protection” on behalf of immigrants, is almost alone with the phenomenon of irregular migration with the decisions taken by the current government. It has been proven time and again that neither the buffer state nor the European states care about the effective protection of immigrants in this equation. The current government is bargaining with the EU over the refugee issue and making some economic and political concessions. At the same time, they have found the cheap labour of immigrants as a formula to solve their own economic crisis. However, states whose policies are guided by long-term and sound decisions and practices rather than short-term interests cannot behave in such a manner. Turkey, which tries to maintain its buffer state mission despite all its impossibilities, is experiencing extraordinary changes in its demographic structure due to the irregular migrant problem. The change in the economic and security conditions of the state is causing upper and middle-class citizens (in terms of socio-economic class) to leave the state.

In this study, publications and research by Turkish academics and organizations based in Turkey have been used as much as possible in order to reflect the country’s “attitude towards migrants” across all social strata.

2. From temporary admission to permanent status

Migration is a phenomenon that has been experienced since prehistory. We know that large migration movements were experienced in prehistory to adapt to environmental problems. The phenomenon of migration as we understand it today has a multifaceted nature due to its demographic, economic, political, psychological, anthropological and sociological effects [1].

The vast majority of the world’s refugees are documented to be hosted in countries that share land or maritime borders with their country of origin. The highest percentage of refugees is found in relatively low-income countries. In contrast, almost three-fifths of the countries that do not share borders with the countries of origin to which refugees migrate are relatively high-income countries. These figures represent the reality of historical refugee flows around the world. Most of the events leading to asylum today occur in regions of the South and East with fragile characteristics. These are often low-income countries that share borders with the country of origin in fragile regions and are primarily affected by migration flows. Asylum-seekers seeking to settle in a safe country naturally first migrate to countries that share borders with their countries of origin [2, 3].

However, the first country to which one migrates or is forced to migrate is not necessarily the final destination. The problem arises when asylum seekers in the first country of asylum or in their own country want to migrate to another country where they can potentially enjoy better living conditions.

Turkish citizens and millions of people migrating to Turkey face this problem.

In fact, Turkey is a country familiar with the phenomenon of migration in the context of its geopolitical position. The main reason for this is that Turkey is a bridge between some Middle Eastern and Asian countries with conflicts and instability to the east and south and European countries with high welfare and human rights standards to the west. In particular, due to the presence of conflict and political and economic instability in neighboring countries in the Middle East, Turkey is a transit route for migrants aiming to cross into European Union (EU) countries. However, it seems that the majority of migrants are condemned to stay in Turkey, where they have arrived as a temporary accommodation centre or as a transit route. Turkey, despite all the difficult conditions peculiar to it and despite the unrest of its own citizens, is also doomed to host these migrants. The difficulty in the choice of terms such as “refugee”, “asylum seeker”, and “asylum seeker under temporary protection status”, which have been used in our academic studies in recent years, stems from this. A migrant is a person who migrates from their country of citizenship to another country for social, economic and political reasons [4]. In other words, a voluntary migrant is someone who chooses to leave their home for a variety of reasons, for example, people who move to improve their lives by finding work or education. In contrast, forced migration is migration due to a direct threat of persecution. This suggests that migrant is an umbrella category that also includes refugees and asylum seekers. A refugee is a person who has been forced to flee their country because of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. An asylum-seeker is a person who has fled persecution in their own country and is seeking safe refuge in another country but has not yet received any legal recognition or status [5]. Thus, the broad concept of migration includes externally displaced refugees. However, it is important to note that not all migrants are refugees. Refugees face the threat of persecution and lack the protection of their home country. Based on this recognition, for a person to be recognized as a refugee, they must first be unable to live safely in their own territory. This may be due to racial, religious or political persecution or other human rights violations. Secondly, they must have been unable to obtain protection from their own government. Therefore, anyone who does not possess one or more of these characteristics is not recognized as a refugee. Asylum-seekers are individuals seeking international protection. They are protected in other countries but have not yet received any legal recognition or status [5].

Numerous articles of law in Turkey state in detail that persons arriving in Turkey as a result of mass migration from the Middle East cannot be recognized as migrants, refugees or asylum seekers [6]. Instead, a new nomenclature, “Foreigners Under Temporary Protection Status”, has been introduced in Turkey. This regulation is related to the initial expectations of the Turkish public. Turkey initially acted on the assumption that the mass influx was temporary and that Syrians would return to their country after the end of the civil war and shaped its policies accordingly. As a matter of fact, in the press and official statements in Turkey, it has been observed that Syrians who fled the war and came to Turkey are defined as “guests”, which has no legal equivalent, and this expression is frequently used [7]. In this context, the expectation that they will return to their country when their guest status ends comes to the fore. “Temporary Protection Status” aims to protect the interests of the states to which this human mobility is likely to be directed, while providing protection to those seeking asylum. Recognizing that mobility is temporary, persons who are not subject to international individual refugee status determination procedures due to the large number of asylum seekers are not sent back in the event of a mass influx. Thus, a temporary human rights guarantee area is provided in the buffer state.

To summarize, the initial expectations of both Turkish citizens and those coming to Turkey in large groups through external migration from the Middle East are similar. Turkish citizens initially saw them as guests, expecting them to return home after a certain period of time or to use Turkey as a transit country to move to Europe. Similarly, the majority of those who migrated to Turkey did not intend to stay in Turkey permanently. This is most evident in the sharp decline in the number of refugees traveling to Europe after the EU-Turkey migration agreement. For example, the number of refugees traveling to Europe via the Mediterranean has increased rapidly since the early summer of 2014, reaching record numbers. According to IOM figures, more than 1 million refugees traveled to Europe in 2015 [8]. However, as a result of the EU-Turkey migration deal, the number of refugees traveling to Europe fell to 169,060 in 2016 (IOM, 2017). These data are linked to the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016, under which Turkey was designated as a “buffer country”. The acceptance of this status is directly related to the fact that the ruling party in Turkey has gained many new opportunities in the domestic and foreign politics of the country. As a matter of fact, the ruling party associated this phenomenon with its ideology by surrounding it with a religious discourse of the necessity of brotherhood and made itself a part of the process of foreign policy. The ruling party’s discourse of “accepting oppressed Muslims to the country despite many difficulties” is in line with the party’s claim of ideological leadership of the Muslim world, which is based on historical Neo-Ottomanism. Similarly, the issue of Syrians, which is constantly on the agenda, has helped to suppress other debates that may arise. In such a political and cultural environment, it was not difficult for decision-makers in Turkey to position the country as a buffer country. The EU agreed with Turkey to limit asylum claims and irregular migration in order to control and reduce the flow of refugees traveling to Europe. This agreement is an indication of Turkey’s positioning as a “buffer country” in front of the countries to which refugees are traveling. Unfortunately, like any buffer, it has a limited saturation and stopping capacity. The main problem is whether the limits of this capacity are really perceived. This is because studies on Syrian migrants in Turkey after 2016 show that migrants have now accepted that they are permanent in Turkey.

For example, in the “Demographic Outlook, Living Conditions and Future Expectations of Syrians in Turkey Field Survey” conducted by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) in 2017, approximately 41% of the Syrian guests responded to the question on how much of the Syrian guests would be permanent in Turkey that they thought half of the Syrians would be permanent in Turkey [9].

At this point, it is useful to recall the following discourse: “Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ - not ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in the first safe country they reach asylum from persecution” [10]. However, contrary to this assumption, it is well known that the EU uses Turkey as a buffer country to limit asylum claims and irregular migration from the Middle East. The question to be asked at this point is the following: does the EU realize that the residue (unrest and anxieties) accumulated behind this buffer has the potential to lead to a much more marginal migration movement towards Europe in the long term?

3. Defining Turkey’s winter as a buffer state against irregular migration

Turkey is a country founded by immigrants. Therefore, after 1980, it opened its doors to millions of people fleeing from the wars and conflicts in its region. Millions of people have flocked to Turkey in the last 40 years from many countries, especially Iraq, Iran, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan [11].

The “Migration History of Turkey”, published by the Migration Administration of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Turkey, also shows the influx of foreign migration to the country. Accordingly, since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, foreign migration movements and the number of migrants to the country are summarized as follows:

• 384,000 people from Greece between 1922 and 1938,

• 800,000 people from the Balkans between 1923 and 1945,

• 800 people from Germany between 1933 and 1945,

• 51,542 people from Iraq in 1988,

• 345,000 people from Bulgaria in 1989,

• 467,489 people from Iraq after Gulf War I in 1991,

• 20,000 people from Bosnia between 1992 and 1998,

• 17,746 people after the war in Kosovo in 1999,

• 10,500 people from Macedonia in 2001,

• Approximately 3.6 million people arrived in Turkey between April 2011 and March 2019 due to the civil unrest in Syria [12].

Based on the figures quoted, it can be said that since 2011, Turkey has faced a large-scale irregular migration movement that has never been seen before in its history. Many also argue that Turkey’s economic, socio-cultural and demographic structure, public order and security are under threat as a result of this irregular migration movement.

According to the literature, Turkey has experienced three major external migration movements throughout its history. The first one is the migration movement that started with World War I and was mostly composed of Turks from the Balkans. These immigrants found the opportunity to live harmoniously within Turkish society. Today, these immigrants do not even have immigrant status in the country. The second wave of migration took place with the Gulf Operation and the US intervention in Iraq. In this process, a large number of Iraqi migrants or asylum seekers crossed the borders into Turkey and were hosted in shelter centres established near the borders. The third and most important migration wave is related to the Syrian crisis. Today, more than 3 million (approximately 3.6 million) Syrian asylum-seekers are living in the country, some of them in temporary accommodation centres and most of them in different cities of the country as asylum-seekers [13]. In countries like Turkey, which are accustomed to immigrants, there are basically three important facts that “determine attitudes towards immigrants”:

1. The number and distribution of migrants.

2. Adaptation and adoption of migrants.

3. The socio-economic conditions of the country.

In mass external migration movements, it is inevitable that many physical, economic, social and political problems arise for both the migrants and the citizens of the new country of settlement. What the migrant population and the country that welcomes them try to do in this process through migration policies and adaptation efforts is to minimize these inevitable problems. After the 2011 civil war in Syria, mass migration to Turkey has had a significant impact on the country’s economy, social structure and politics. Due to the three important facts mentioned above, it is not possible to say that the emerging problems have been minimized.

First of all, the number and distribution of migrants have caused the problem to be of a magnitude that cannot be ignored. As Turkey opened its doors to Syrians without discrimination of religion, language and race within the scope of the open door policy it has been implementing since the beginning of the migration, asylum-seekers who were first accepted in 26 temporary accommodation centres in 10 cities were later started to be accepted according to the principle of non-refoulement.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)‘s “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan”, “Since 2014, Turkey has been managing the world’s largest population of persons under temporary and international protection. As of February 2, 2023, the number of Syrians under temporary protection was more than 3.5 million, almost half of whom are children and around 46 per cent of whom are women and girls. In addition, Turkey hosts approximately 320,000 international protection applicants and status holders from other countries. While Syrians remain by far the largest population in need of international protection in Turkey, requiring sustained international support, there are also significant numbers of Afghans, Iranians and Iraqis facing serious protection challenges and additional barriers to assistance compared with Syrians” [14]. Currently, around 98% of Syrians under temporary protection live in urban and rural areas in Turkey’s 81 provinces, with only around 2 percent residing in the remaining seven Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) [15].

The challenging socio-economic context and public concerns about the burden placed on Turkey by such a large refugee population have resulted in the Government of Turkey adopting a stricter approach in 2022 towards persons under international and temporary protection. Policies have been introduced to suspend the registration of new international and temporary protection applicants in nearly 1200 “closed” neighborhoods due to the high density of foreigners compared with the host population, while requiring new registrations of Syrians under temporary protection to take place in TACs [16]. Such measures were introduced when it became impossible to control the migrant population and its distribution. And Turkish citizens’ discontent with migrants played a major role in the measures taken.

According to the data of Refugees Association for January 2024, the rate of Syrian migrants staying in Temporary Accommodation Centres is only 1.96%. They mostly live in big cities and without considering the conditions of concentration and distribution. As of January 31, 2024, the number of Syrians living in cities was announced as 3 million 118 thousand 841 people. 98.04% of Syrians live in cities. A total of 1169 neighborhoods in Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Düzce, Edirne, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Muğla, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, Tekirdağ and Yalova, where foreigners live in large numbers, and in 63 cities where the foreigner density exceeds 20% of the Turkish population, have become closed to all foreigners of all statuses [15]. However, this did not ensure that migrants could live in the provinces where they were resettled. The distribution has become more uncontrolled with each passing day. Syrian asylum-seekers who were granted “temporary protection status”, whose camps were called “temporary accommodation centres”, and whose schools where children were educated were called “temporary education centres” did not turn out to be “temporary” as expected. Over time, especially after 2013, while the proportion of Syrian asylum-seekers staying in camps has decreased, the proportion and number of those living in cities intertwined with Turkish people have become a permanent part of Turkey’s social, economic and political life. Unfortunately, Turkey’s existing social, economic and political conditions were not even sufficient for its own citizens to live in prosperity. Moreover, the potential for the migrant population to increase due to its demographic characteristics increases the perceived threat to this prosperity (Table 1).

Age	Male	Female	Total
Total	1.650.823	1.507.901	3.158.724
0–4	206.178	192.689	398.867
5–9	274.169	258.471	532.640
10–14	186.903	177.400	364.303
15–18	125.776	115.912	241.688
19–24	184.677	162.700	347.377
25–29	174.809	144.813	319.622
30–34	129.857	105.450	235.307
35–39	109.340	89.198	198.538
40–44	77.695	69.377	147.072
45–49	52.858	53.557	106.415
50–54	41.256	42.998	84.254
55–59	33.003	34.184	67.187
60–64	21.882	23.671	45.553
65–69	14.633	16.093	30.726
70–74	9.173	10.187	19.360
75–79	4.571	5.467	10.038
80–84	2.238	3.100	5.338
85–89	1.073	1.528	2.601
90+	732	1.106	1.838

Table 1.

Distribution by age and gender of registered Syrian refugees recorded by taking biometric data [17].

There are reports that access to international protection in Turkey is becoming more difficult [18].

Secondly, the level of adoption and adaptation of migrants is another major source of problems. Given these figures, it is not possible for Turkey, the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, to continue providing protection and support to those in need of international protection and for public institutions to adhere to national and international refugee law. Under the current circumstances, the only reason for the government to continue its pro-migration and pro-immigrant actions is to overcome its political deadlock with the support of refugees. Turkish citizens, on the other hand, are both unhappy and angry at being forced to share the economic and social resources that enable them to live in limited and difficult conditions. This reaction stems both from the change in the Turkish citizenship regime and from their unwillingness to share their already meager resources. These resources should not only be thought of as economic resources and opportunities. They are all citizenship rights arising from the state’s responsibilities towards its citizens. There are, of course, financial assistance programmes and various support funds that the European Union has put in place to reduce the economic pressure caused by refugees in Turkey. However, this support does not prevent Turkey’s structurally troubled economy from worsening with millions of refugees in the country.

First of all, until recent years, the Turkish citizenship regime had a unique structure. The dominant feature of the Turkish citizenship regime, which was shaped in an intertwined manner with the nation-state construction, was ethnic and religious selectivity. The inclusion of those who were not ‘cognates’ was only possible through the necessity of assimilation. For this reason, only certain groups that were deemed assimilable to Turkishness within certain historical-cultural and ideological boundaries, or that were predicted to become Turkic, acquired Turkish citizenship as immigrants. The mass acquisition of citizenship by foreigners of Arab ethnicity throughout the history of the Republic is a new phenomenon. Therefore, the current situation corresponds to a new inclusiveness and a partial de-ethnicization [19].

The majority of Turkish citizens react to this “new inclusiveness”. Among the main reasons for this reaction is the initially touted “temporary” status of migrants, their numbers, their distribution within the country, their level of integration into society, their transformative impact on social and political life, and their perception as a source of economic problems.

This reaction has become particularly visible in the political elections held in Turkey in recent years. In Turkey, a large number of studies have analyzed the impact of attitudes towards immigrants on voting preferences using quantitative methods. The basic assumption that these studies agree on is that as negative attitudes towards immigrants increase, the rate of voting for the ruling party that implements immigration policies decreases [20]. In sum, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which has been in power in Turkey since 2002, was openly criticized by the opposition for the first time in the 2023 elections due to its open-door policy towards refugees and moderate migration policies. And many parties that increased their voting rates in the 2023 elections adopted anti-immigration as a core policy.

Migration reveals the distinction between natives and migrants, which has an important place among the sources of social and political segregation. The perception of prejudice, fear and anxiety that locals have towards migrants, supported by economic and social experiences, deepens, broadens and sharpens the segregation. The competition (struggle) between natives and migrants in almost every field evolves into politics and paves the way for a power struggle. The division between natives and migrants can reduce the level of influence of previously effective divisions and the sources of these divisions. The local-migrant divide can render previously effective sources of class divisions such as class divisions, ethnic divisions, religious or sectarian divisions dysfunctional. Recent migrants are often seen as the weakest link in society and constitute the segment of society closest to social exclusion. In fact, social segments in cities that previously fought against each other in almost every field (segregated) may prefer to act together in the face of recent migrants [21]. Developments in Turkey, especially since 2011, have been in line with this narrative. The current government’s ability to accommodate migration has had an impact on the political impact of migration and attitudes towards migrants. The extent to which a political power welcomes migration is also related to its interests and the socio-economic conditions in the country, which depend on its efforts to maintain its power.

In order for immigrants to live their lives freely, arrangements have been made in employment, education, health, etc., over time to create fluidity in normal life. However, at some points, the desired fluidity could not be fully achieved, and at this point, the issue of adaptation of immigrants and the level of social acceptance of the local people have come into question [22].

Numerous empirical studies have been conducted on the adaptation and adoption levels of those who came to Turkey through external migration. The common discourse that comes to the fore in these studies is that the level of adoption of immigrants by the local people decreases over time. At the beginning of the migration process, the perception of Turkish people, regarded Syrian asylum-seekers as religious brothers and sisters and defined them as muhajir¹ and themselves as ensar,² has changed over time. For example, in one of the comprehensive studies to determine the perceptions and thoughts of the Turkish people towards Syrian asylum seekers, the result is as follows:

“It is not realistic to expect a high level of social acceptance towards Syrian asylum-seekers who have different cultural and demographic characteristics (the majority of them are young and unemployed men, women’s education level is lower than the average of Turkey, fertility rate is high, etc.). Moreover, this is an approach that ignores the interests of the Turkish society. According to the same study, 72.8 per cent of the Turkish society think that none of the Syrian asylum-seekers should be granted citizenship”. (p. 61) [23]

Similarly, in addition to generalized prejudices against ethnic out-groups, there are also studies in which prejudices specifically targeting Arabs are found to be applicable in exclusionary attitudes towards Syrian asylum-seekers. The findings of a study conducted by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Association are as follows: When the participants were asked to what extent they agree with the statement “Arabs have always stabbed us in the back throughout our history”, 66.47% of them answered “Agree” or “Strongly agree”. Those who “disagree” or “strongly disagree” remained at 13.20% [24].

Many studies have been conducted indicating the reasons for the negative perceptions and attitudes of Turkish citizens towards Syrian refugees. In one of these studies, these reasons are summarized as follows:

• Disruptions in basic public services (health, municipality, education, etc.),

• Economic concerns (loss of job, loss of income, rising rents, insufficient social assistance, etc.),

• Security concerns (public order, suspicion, uneasiness, tension, increase in crime rates, etc.),

• Concerns about basic rights (work permit, residence permit, citizenship, etc.) [25].

Finally, the socio-economic conditions in Turkey, which has been subjected to an influx of external migration, are an important source of problems determining the attitude of the local population towards migrants. The Turkish economy is plagued by high inflation, rising unemployment rates, a depreciating currency, increasing government debt and widening trade deficits. Even without the presence of migrants, these factors would lead to extremely difficult living conditions for Turkish citizens. In this context, the willingness of the political power to host Syrians under temporary protection, bearing the bulk of the costs associated with refugees, is disturbing Turkish citizens. Migrants are cited among the major causes of unemployment and high inflation in the country.

There are a number of studies analyzing the views of Turkish citizens on the negative impact of migrants on the Turkish economy. In one of these studies, 63.1% of the sample group of Turkish citizens believed that Syrian refugees were dragging down Turkey’s social welfare level; 77.7% rejected the idea that social assistance to them should be increased [23].

The social and economic burden of hosting such a high refugee population has been exacerbated by COVID-19, while global economic challenges are impacting populations and governments everywhere, particularly in countries hosting large refugee populations [14].

In the context of all these narratives, it can be observed that the youth population, which constitutes an important part of Turkey’s demographic structure, has a view of their own country and a tendency to migrate out of the country, recognizing their country as unlivable.

According to Castles et al. [26], the motivations for large-scale migration are mainly economic. This motivation rate is much higher among young people. In addition to economic conditions, one of the most important motivations for migration is the desire of young people to leave political systems in which they are politically oppressed.

In Turkey, the hopelessness of the young population about the future, which develops in parallel with the economic crisis and the political environment, triggers a remarkable increase in their migration plans. The labour market participation and economic integration processes of the Syrian population, which numbers close to 3.6 million in Turkey, inevitably affect the labour supply, income distribution, economic mobility within the country and the balances related to the labour market in Turkey. The main problems faced by the migrant population in Turkey in accessing the labour market are listed as unregistered employment, low wages, employment in unskilled jobs and competition. However, these problems, which lead to unfavorable working and living conditions for migrants, do not change the negative perspectives of Turkish citizens towards them. This is because the young population, who are Turkish citizens, see these working conditions, which are defined as problems for migrants, as obstacles to their own economic welfare. For them, unregistered employment or low-wage labour of migrants are the biggest obstacles to their own unemployment. On the other hand, the perception that immigrants are more influential than them in political decision-making processes and the belief that immigrants benefit more effectively from health, education, etc. opportunities than they undermine Turkish youth’s sense of belonging to their country.

In the context of these claims, this study aims to provide concrete data on the migration tendency of Turkish youth. The effect of the perceptions of Turkish youth towards refugees coming to Turkey through external migration on this migration tendency has also been revealed. At this point, we would like to remind Martiskova’s table, “List of push and pull factors based on economic, demographic, socio-cultural, political and miscellaneous conditions” (Table 2).

Conditions	Push factors	Pull factors
Economic factors	Not enough jobs Few opportunities Slavery or forced labour Poor housing Economic crisis Poor medical care Loss of wealth University crisis	Better career prospects Better living conditions Industry Finance support: Financing education: scholarships, government-financed subsidized research programmes Better medical care Attractiveness of the Universities or research institutes of the advanced countries
Demographic factors/socio-cultural factors	Poor chances of marrying Primitive conditions Racial religious Bullying	Better chances of marrying Enjoyment Life experience abroad Familiarization with different cultures High level of education Family relatives Friends links •Social network
Political; factors	Political fear or persecution Political crisis Political instability Death treats War Military coups Corruption	Political or religious freedom Living in societies with higher tolerance towards the other reveals that cosmopolitanism Security
Miscellaneous; factors	Condemned housing Discrimination Foreign invasion Social instability Famine or drought Natural disasters Pollution	Attractive climate Adventures/experiences

Table 2.

List of push and pull factors based on economic, demographic, socio-cultural, political and miscellaneous conditions.

4. A study on the migration tendency of Turkish youths

4.1 Method and sample

Within the scope of the research, the population of university students aged 18–25 in Istanbul was studied. The sample size of the study was based on the minimum sample size in terms of representativeness, which is stated as 384 in the literature with a sampling error of 0.05 and a 95% reliability interval [27]. In this context, the questionnaire form was sent to the student groups online using a 5-point Likert scale with a one-stage simple random sampling method, and the study was finalized with the completion of the minimum number of 384 forms. In the questionnaire on which the research is based, the first part of the questionnaire, which included eight options for age (between 18 and 25 years old), gender and university information, was followed by a second part of 25 questions structured with a Likert scale. At the end of this section, the participants were asked a single open-ended question to find out how many million refugees they think there are in Turkey. The study was limited to young people between the ages of 18 and 25 who are university students in Istanbul. This research was designed and conducted in accordance with ethical principles. Participants were asked to participate in the study voluntarily, and they were given clear and understandable information about the purpose and process of the research. The privacy and confidentiality of the participants were protected, and the data obtained was kept confidential and used only for research purposes. Additionally, any risk of discomfort during the research process was minimized, and the rights of the participants were respected.

5. Findings and discussion

When the basic demographic characteristics of the participants were analyzed, it was found that all of them resided in Istanbul because they were students at universities in Istanbul, and 60.9% of them were female (n = 234) and 39.1% (n = 150) were male. 6.3% of the participants were 18, 6.3% were 19, 17.7% were 20, 20.8% were 21, 16.7% were 22, 9.9% were 23, 6.3% were 24, and 16.1% were 25 years old. The average age of all the participants was 21.7 (Table 3).

Variable	Category	n	%
Gender	Female	234	60.9
	Male	150	39.1
Age	18	24	6.3
	19	24	6.3
	20	68	17.7
	21	80	20.8
	22	64	16.7
	23	38	9.9
	24	24	6.3
	25	62	16.1

Table 3.

Analysis of demographic characteristics of participants.

The participants consisted of students from 18 universities in Istanbul. After the questionnaire form was sent to student groups, it reached a wide range of universities, and students forwarded it to each other (Table 4).

Bahcesehir University	Bogazici University	Halic University
Istanbul Beykent University	Istanbul Gedik University	Istanbul Kultur University
Istanbul Medeniyet University	Istanbul Medipol University	Istanbul Okan University
Istanbul University	Cerrahpasa University	Koc University
Maltepe University	Marmara University	Nisantasi University
Ozyegin University	Uskudar University	Yeditepe University

Table 4.

Distribution of participants by universities.

A significant majority of the young university students who participated in the research stated that they would like to study and live abroad. To the Likert scale statement “I would like to live abroad if I had the opportunity to choose”, 61.46% (n = 236) of the participants responded positively (agree-strongly agree) and only 6.25% (n = 24) strongly disagreed (Table 5).

Scale	n	%
Absolutely disagree	24	6.25	22.92
Disagree	64	16.67
Neutral	60	15.63	61.46
I agree	92	23.96
Absolutely agree	144	37.50
Total	384	100

Table 5.

The proposition of: “I would like to live abroad if I had the opportunity to choose”.

Similarly, 82.8% of the participants (n = 318) responded positively to the statement “I would like to study abroad if I had the opportunity to choose”. Only 10.42% of the participants stated that they did not want to study abroad (n = 40), while 6.77% remained neutral. In this context, it is possible to conclude that university students between the ages of 18 and 25 are not satisfied with their current student status and have a serious tendency to emigrate from Turkey, to settle abroad and, if possible, to study abroad. Of course, the refugee crisis in Turkey cannot be considered as the sole or the most important reason for this situation. Nevertheless, this crisis, which reveals the effects of structural problems that can be postponed until today and which can be easily associated with many other problems, has an impact on students’ motivation to leave the country. Table 6 contains the analysis of the responses to the proposition about studying abroad.

Scale	n	%
Absolutely disagree	14	3.65	10.42
Disagree	26	6.77
Neutral	26	6.77	82.8
I agree	130	33.85
Absolutely agree	188	48.95
Total	384	100

Table 6.

The proposition of: “I would like to study abroad if I had the opportunity to choose”.

The research provides a variety of information about the interrelated multidimensional discontent of the students. For example, 59.36% (n = 228) of the participants believe that they cannot achieve their career goals in Turkey, and only 3.64% (n = 14) “strongly agree” that they can achieve their goals. This statement is one of the statements with the highest neutrality rate (26.56%, n = 102). It can be accepted that this situation points to the future uncertainty of university students aged 18–25, whose general opinion about their possible careers is negative (Table 7).

Scale	n	%
Absolutely disagree	134	34.89	59.36
Disagree	94	24.47
Neutral	102	26.56	14.05
I agree	40	10.41
Absolutely agree	14	3.64
Total	384	100

Table 7.

The proposition of: “I believe that I can achieve my career goals in Turkey”.

Analyzing the other propositions containing opinions about the future makes the situation more understandable. Since the importance of young people between the ages of 18 and 25 for the future of society is obvious, their responses to the propositions regarding their opinions about the future should be analyzed carefully. As a matter of fact, these responses reflect the relationship that young people, who will start to have a say in the next decade of the country with their thoughts, actions and careers, establish with the country, the level of satisfaction they adopt and their hopes/despair (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Opinions about the future.

The opinion of 42.68% “strongly disagree” and 26.39% “disagree” (total of positive responses: 69.07) given by the participants to the statement “I am hopeful about the future of Turkey” together with the negative response to the statement “I believe that I can achieve my career goals in Turkey” (59.36%) shows that young people in Turkey are not hopeful about the future of the country. These views of the participants are directly related to the refugees in the country. As a matter of fact, this situation is evident in the open reaction to another proposition regarding the future of the country. For the proposition “I think that asylum-seekers will adapt to Turkish society in the future”, 83.32% disagreed (strongly disagree: 68.22% and disagree: 15.10%) with the statement. In this context, a significant portion of young people think that the current problems related to asylum seekers will continue in the future and that asylum seekers will not be able to integrate into Turkish society. Beyond this opinion, the participants accept that asylum-seekers are a threat to the future. In this context, a significant number of young people think that the current problems related to asylum seekers will continue in the future and that asylum seekers will not be able to integrate into Turkish society. As a matter of fact, 82.8% (strongly agree: 65.10 and agree: 17.70) of the respondents expressed a positive opinion of the statement “I think that asylum seekers in Turkey pose a threat to our future”. Only 8.85% of the respondents are sure that asylum-seekers do not pose a threat in the future. Similarly, the rate of those who responded positively to the statement “I think I will not be able to earn the income I aim for in Turkey” is 64.58% (strongly agree: 43.75% and agree: 20.83%). Only 21.34% of young people (strongly disagree: 9.89 and disagree: 11.45%) think that they will be able to earn the income they target in the future. In this context, it is understood that young people’s concerns about the future of themselves and the country, their views that they will not be able to reach their career goals and that they will not be able to earn the income they target in the future are partly related to asylum seekers in Turkey. In other words, one of the main reasons why young people who are currently studying at university in Turkey want to migrate abroad for education or find it preferable to live abroad is that asylum-seekers in Turkey affect young people’s predictions about the future in terms of security and economy (Table 8).

Scale	n	%
Absolutely disagree	190	49.47	65.09
Disagree	60	15.62
Neutral	34	8.85	26.03
I agree	42	10.93
Absolutely agree	58	15.10
Total	384	100

Table 8.

The proposition of: “I think that asylum-seekers in Turkey contribute positively to the Turkish economy”.

Aboubt 65.09% of the participants (n = 250) think that asylum-seekers in Turkey do not contribute positively to the national economy. Therefore, two-thirds of the participants recognize asylum-seekers as economically insignificant to the country. The propositions related to political perceptions also provide data on the negative attitudes of young people towards the presence of asylum seekers on security and economic grounds and their concerns about their future in the country (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Political Perceptions.

Aboubt 87.49% (n = 336) of the participants find the current asylum-seeker policies of the government wrong, and 71.86% (n = 276) state that the policies regarding asylum-seekers affect their voting behavior. In other words, a large part of the young people believe that their opinions on asylum seekers are not represented in the current political atmosphere. It is clear that this view is related to hopelessness about the future. Similarly, 78.12% (n = 300) of the participants agreed with the statement “Asylum-seekers in Turkey disrupt the population structure of Turkey”, and 83.85% (n = 322) stated that they were uncomfortable with too many asylum-seekers. Similarly, 86.97% (n = 334) of the participants think that granting citizenship to asylum seekers is not the right decision. Therefore, a significant part of the participants do not find the government’s policies right, and they are worried about the future as they think that the disturbing number of asylum seekers disrupts the demographic structure of the country. The response of the respondents to the proposition about whether they feel safe or whether they are satisfied with their lives also provides data on the preference for brain drain from Turkey (Table 9).

Scale	n	%
Absolutely disagree	206	53.64	75.51
Disagree	84	21.87
Neutral	60	15.62	8.84
I agree	18	4.68
Absolutely agree	16	4.16
Total	384	100

Table 9.

The proposition of: “I feel safe in Turkey”.

Aboubt 75.51% of the participants (n = 290) stated that they do not feel safe in the country. Similarly, only 3.12% of the youth responded strongly agree to the statement “I am satisfied with my life” (18.22% of those who said “agree”), and 42.18% of the youth responded positively to the question “I have difficulty in meeting my living expenses such as nutrition and shelter” (19.79% strongly agree and 22.39% agree). These situations are associated with asylum seekers by the youth. As a matter of fact, the research shows that 45.82% of the participant youth (19.79% strongly agree and 26.03% agree) accept that the most important reason for the economic problems in Turkey is the public expenditures for asylum seekers.

Another important data on the perceptions of young people about asylum seekers is revealed by their answers to the proposition, “I think that we can learn accurate numerical data about asylum seekers in Turkey”. This Likert scale statement was followed by an open-ended question in which they were asked to state how many asylum seekers there are in Turkey (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

The proposition of: “I think we can learn the correct numerical data about asylum-seekers in Turkey”.

The graph shows the perception regarding the awareness of the number of Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey. While 83.33% (n = 320) of the participants do not believe that they are able to find out the actual number of asylum-seekers in Turkey, 11.40% (n = 44) believe that accurate data are shared. The average of the answers given by 326 participants to the question “How many million asylum-seekers do you think there are in Turkey?” is that there are 10 million 458 thousand asylum-seekers in Turkey. As of December 31, 2023, it has been officially announced that there are 3 million 214 thousand 780 asylum-seekers in Turkey, and young participants believe that there are only 30.73% of the official number of asylum-seekers. In other words, 83.33% of the participants think that there are three times more refugees in Turkey than the official number of refugees. It can be concluded that this perception is related to security and economic indicators and that the refugee problem motivates migration abroad by creating future anxiety among young people.

In Turkey, a book was published that begins with Amin Maalouf’s quote, “Every man has the right to leave, it is his country that must persuade him to stay-no matter what the boisterous politicians say” [28]. The title of the book written by Evrim Kuran is: “They Migrated From Here: Turkey’s New Migration Generation” [29]. In his book, Kuran conducts research between February 3, 2020, and July 6, 2020, involving 3253 participants who migrated from Turkey in 728 cities of 118 countries. The main assumption we can reach from his study is that Turkey has not been able to convince its young people to stay in its bosom. The official data of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) also supports this assumption. The last survey conducted by TUIK on the number of people emigrating from Turkey to other countries is for the year 2022. According to this research, the emigration of Turkish citizens increased by 62.3% in 2022 compared to the previous year [30]. This upward trend has continued for years.

6. Conclusion

TurkStat data show that the number of migrants to Turkey and the number of migrants from Turkey have converged over the years. As explained in this study, the migration phenomenon takes place under the influence of the country’s attractive and repulsive factors. However, since 2011, when Turkey started to experience an influx of foreign migration far above its resources and potential, both the reasons and the numbers of migrants from Turkey abroad have changed. This study focuses on the perspective of a sample of university students in Istanbul on the phenomenon of migration, the impact of migration on the current situation of the country, and their views on the future. Intensive foreign migration is an important reason for students’ dissatisfaction, hopelessness about the future and their desire to leave the country. Because of the current conditions in Turkey, most of the push factors seem to be related to the foreign occupation factor. This association has been and will continue to complicate the living conditions of both those migrating to Turkey and those migrating from Turkey. The increasing negativity in living conditions, that is, the increase in push factors from the country, has the potential to become an important problem for the EU in the near term. Turkey’s mission as a buffer country in the migration movement from the Middle East to Europe, especially since 2014, will no longer be sustainable in this context. At this point, migrants in Turkey, as well as Turkish citizens, tend to leave the country at the first opportunity. The route that this tendency will take is well known to everyone. Therefore, as stated in the title of this study, the “winter” of Turkey as a buffer country due to the migrant problem cannot be the spring of Europe in the long term.