Harbinger of Democracies? The Role of NGOs in Driving Democracy in Africa

Abstract

The interest between civil society groups and democracy in developing countries is not a new phenomenon. Today, as part of civil societies, NGOs are dominant in the African market, acting as ‘gap fillers’ as well as driving democratic efforts in these countries. By considering the multifaceted relationship between NGOs and governments in developing countries, this chapter critically discusses attempts by NGOs to drive democracy in African autocratic regimes. NGOs are alleged to be ‘compradors’ and drive democracy through moral rehabilitation of imperialist regimes. NGOs are active parties used by international observers in ensuring credible elections. However, some scholars have argued that NGO are active ‘re-colonizers’ in the twenty-first century as they bid the will of Western regimes to attain funding. As such, NGOs are explicated through external domination of African regimes and not necessarily driving democratization. In exploration of this topic, a mixed methods research design has been designed, underpinned by the fundamental tenets of a pragmatism philosophical position.

1. Introduction

The current discourse and architecture on NGOs as civil societies is based on different versions, leaning towards liberal democracy in the region. Kukkamaa [1] states that;

“…a strong and plural civil society is necessary to guard against the excesses of state power…. widen citizen participation as well as empower local communities”.

Kukkamaa [1] plots the discourse that NGOs are active institutions responsible for the vitality of political democracy. Literature in line with this assertion considers NGOs as active civil societies that regulate abuses of power and accountability to citizens. Even though NGOs are regarded as separate and autonomous spheres of operative civil societies, Dicklitch [2] contrasts this argument, especially in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. The foundation of the latter spat is that Sub-Saharan Africa has numerous political changes happening with limited legitimacy and distinct cultural heterogeneity. This implies nations to a hostile working environment for NGOs and as such, inadequate resources for strong and democratic functioning of a society. Although the “NGO decade” dates back to the 1990s, the growth of NGOs across Africa has not slowed, obscuring the fact that they are regarded as the “earliest forms of human organization” [3]. According to the NGO Explorer website, there are roughly 8000 NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa. The article further points out that accumulatively, these NGOs spend roughly 8 billion pounds, which is equivalent to 10% of total UK charity spending which is projected at 79.2 billion pounds [4]. Mathews [5] also noted the mushroom growth of NGOs across Africa, majorly responding to poverty and other social issues. It was noted that there are more than 100,000 registered non-profit organizations. Focusing on Kenya, the growth has been over 400% since 1997 to 2006. Such growth could be attributed to African regimes welcoming development but at the same time, these governments tend to control them through different forms as will be discussed later in this chapter. However, other scholars opine that NGOs are harbingers of enriched panacea in democratizing African states. By reviewing these different perspectives, this chapter aims to deepen our understanding of NGOs as drivers of democratic states across Africa. Can NGOs as civil societies drive and consolidate democracy in Africa’s developing nations? By looking at the current discussions of politics and NGOs, the main aim of this chapter is to discuss if NGOs can be used as harbingers of democracy across Africa. The guiding research questions are as follows;

1. As part of civil society institutions, what is the role of NGOs in driving democracy across Africa?

2. Which function/role of the NGOs in Africa is prevalent/dominant?

2. Methodology

2.1 Introduction

A research process is not “mechanistic” but a subtle, complex and deliberative procedure where a researcher investigates an occurrence in a discrete manner. Unlike a “recipe for baking a cake”, researchers cannot simply ‘read off’ the planning and conduct a research process [6]. Either in the field of natural science or social research, research is construed to be a negotiated process with distinct “trade-offs” on what a researcher wants to achieve. With research being unidimensional, however, there is no single to plan and conduct research owing to the fact there is no ‘one’ single truth that will be discovered. In light of these propositions, this section critically explores and determines the best methods that the researcher applies in answering the research question developed in the introductory part.

2.2 Philosophical paradigms

Living in pluralistic world, there are immediate concerns with the existing relationships between the environment and a comprehension of the study phenomena and how it is presented and researched. Therefore, Hitchcock and Hughes [7] argued that research processes are guided by ontological assumptions, axiological values and epistemological assumptions. From these assumptions and values, ([6], p. 4) maintains that “through a sequence of formal steps of logic, from the general to the particular, a valid conclusion can be deduced from a valid premise”. Indeed, what “makes science a science during inquiry is the inherent falsifiability of propositions [8]. In light of this, a pragmatist philosophical approach is deemed fit in exploring whether NGOs are critical drivers of democracy in Africa. According to Saunders et al. [9] citing [10] researchers need to adopt a research philosophy which is a continuum rather than opposite positions. That is, “at some points the knower and the known must be interactive, while at others, one may more easily stand apart from what one is studying”. Pragmatism is therefore based on the tenets of “what will work and adjusted processes” towards answering the research question. Therefore, assumptions of truth and reality are usually generated through experiential transactions but have to be continuously substantiated [11].

Tashakkori and Teddlie [10] noted that pragmatism is intuitively appealing as it allows the researcher to avoid pointless debates. That is, a researcher avoids engaging in pointless discussions about truth and reality but having a focus on what is of interest. By applying a pragmatism position, the researcher will study NGOs in the way that is deemed appropriate, using the results to bring positive outcomes in the value system. Since the focus on practical applied research [9], the research will observe NGOs as harbingers of democracy through objective and subjective points of view in provision of requisite knowledge as per the research question. Other research paradigms have been avoided. For instance, in realism, a study occurrence or phenomenon exists independent of human consciousness [9]. As such, the rationale that social conditioning (critical realist) is applied in explanation of an occurrence makes it unfit for the current study as NGOs as fillers of democracy in autocratic nations is evidently dependent of human consciousness. Interpretivism position is also avoided in this study. This position holds that reality in a research occurrence is socially constructed and that a researcher is inseparable from what is being researched [9]. Subjectivity as the researcher’s motivation towards exploring an occurrence makes it challenging to contextualize the research which is value-laden and thus avoidance of this position.

2.3 Research design

Research design is typically a plan and existing foundations to the plan in which a researcher uses to operationalize and investigate a research occurrence. When exploring an occurrence at hand, do researchers suddenly don a qualitative or quantitative hat? Howe [12] refutes these dogmas arguing that both qualitative and qualitative methods are compatible, often referred to as mixed methods research. Qualitative research is a scientific research process where the investigator uses non-numerical data to understand the reality and truth behind a research occurrence. Contrariwise, quantitative research applies the use of numerical data to test research hypothesis [6].

In underpinning a pragmatist philosophical position, this research will be guided by a mixed methods research ([6], p. 36) states that “in pragmatism, what something ‘means’ is manifested in its practical, observable consequences and success in practices, with its links to experience, rather than, for example, abstract theory with little practical import, or ideology, or dogmatic adherence to a particular value system or epistemology”. With pragmatism pulling its weight on practical utility, a combination of these two methods will allow the researcher to intelligently attend to NGOs as democracy harbingers and provide succinct data or information which allows in evaluation of judgments in a rational manner. However, the combination of these methods, the researcher will grapple with ‘commensurability’ (reconciling of qualitative and quantitative data) [6]. Although it’s a notable challenge, [13] put forward the notion that application of mixed methods renders research as less biased. Therefore, the use of quantitative research maximizes the investigators to make more accurate conclusions on the role played by NGOs in contextualizing their role in driving democracy across Africa.

2.4 Research approach

Following the proposition that research is a linear process [9], a research approach infers the underlying reasoning that determines choice of methodologies. In line with pragmatism and mixed methods research, this research applies an abductive approach/reasoning. Following the review by [14], since an abductive approach is centered at addressing deductive and inductive approaches’ weaknesses, the investigator will start with ‘surprising facts’ towards explanation of these facts with constructs and findings being derived and inferred from the data collected. Unlike inductive and deductive reasoning, in abductive approach, the researcher will use known premises (theory and literature propositions) reviewed in the previous chapter to generate testable conclusions [15].

2.5 Collection and analysis of data

The collection and data analysis phase remains the most important phase in the study as it is directly linked to researchers appropriately answers to the research question. This study will apply a secondary research method where it revolves around using data that has already been developed and used [16]. Contrasting primary research where data is collected by the researcher firsthand, the use of secondary research in this study was linked to various justifications. Firstly, the use of desk research, which is inexpensive and time sensitive, allows the researcher to collect information through internet research. Secondly, the use of secondary data was opted for because information regarding NGOs and their role as fillers is widely available from numerous sources, for example from credible reports from the UN and international NGOs. In addition, the use of secondary was opted because without necessary involving state officials in African governments and corporate NGO leaders, there exists numerous reports on how NGOs participate in either advocating or dispiriting democracy. The use of secondary data allows the researcher to identify trends that NGOs prevalent in Africa adopted over the years in improving democratic initiatives. The inclusion criteria for this research include reports and articles from 2010 to 2024. A wide inclusion criterion is usually adopted owing to the fact that democracy is an ongoing process and in the context of African politics, a range of roughly 15 years will provide critical insights in regard to democracy initiatives by these NGOs. Data collected from this study will be analyzed through content analysis technique. Content analysis technique gyrates on researchers identifying and evaluating themes from data collected [17]. These themes will relate to NGOs as gap fillers as well as ways democracy is promoted or dispirited.

In answering the research question; as a civil society institution, what is the role of the NGO in driving democracy across Africa? the researcher will distinguish methodologies. Firstly, the researcher is guided by a pragmatist philosophical position. The foundation to pragmatism is that multiple views are chosen to best answer the research question. That is, observable phenomena will be viewed from both a subjective and objective lens as this paradigm focuses on practical and applied research. While avoiding other positions such as realism and interpretivism, pragmatism which is based on ‘what works will allow the researcher to apply thoughts which should lead to action, to prediction and problem solving. In line with this, a mixed methods research design will be applied. This means that the researcher will rely on both numerical and numerical data collected to explore and contextualize the research occurrence. The researcher will use secondary data rather than primary data not only because of data accessibility, but it is also inexpensive. The data collected will be analyzed through content analysis technique to identify and evaluate themes of interest in regard to the research question.

3. Theorizing NGOs; origins and applications

3.1 Civil societies; origin and definitions

Before understanding existing debates on NGOs as surrogates for improved democracy, a domineering comprehension of the origins and definitions of NGOs is indispensable. Kukkamaa [1] contextualizes NGOs in light of civil societies as preconditioned from the Western model of associations. This model embodies NGOs as representatives of the society conditioned for the development and communal welfare. Considering a neo-liberal discourse, NGOs negate the notion that regimes are successful in-service provision and this stems from these institutions being “non-governmental”. The origin of NGOs can also be explicated and be understood from the work of Friedrich Hegel who developed ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ in the latest eighteenth century. This concept is assumed as a ‘bourgeois society’, meaning ‘freedom from traditional bonds’ [18]. At the height of this ‘freedom’, civil society is viewed from Antonio Gramsci’s perspective that it revolves around the ‘social arena’. In this setting, civil societies are concerned with the needs of the society and therefore, they are battlefields for fighting inequality and despotic societies/leadership. [19] reviewed civil societies as a combination of social movements and unconstrained collective institutions, with efforts directed towards the betterment of society. These implicit connotations in the African context tend to infer NGOs as civil societies offering social services towards development but deficient in politicization.

3.1.1 The civil society discourse

Although civil space literature is distinct and differing [20, 21], it becomes challenging to define NGOs, especially with growing restrictions on independent civil society organizations. Dupuy et al. [22] defined non-governmental organizations in the context of ‘civil space’, citing that they are non-profit organizations. NGOs (non-governmental organizations) are;

“Non-governmental organizations as private, not-for-profit, non-state formal organizations that are not controlled or operated by governments or the market, but which may receive funding and other resources from governments and businesses” [22].

Hearn [23] resolutely reiterates that NGOs can be contextualized as voluntary and non-profit organizations. This context means that they are independent of government control and business. However, “non-governmental” boundaries are blurred considering new debates on what encompasses governmental and non-governmental. Salamon and Sokolowski [24] consider NGO definition and debates as diverse and contested terrain owing to the tremendous diversity of institutions. In their conceptualisation of NGOs, these scholars consider these institutions to operate in the “third sector”. However, popular perceptions on NGOs through the “third sector” discourse boils down to ‘premium individual entrepreneurship’ usually underpinned by autonomy [24]. In most cases, these institutions are a buffer against state power or rather a vehicle for progressive policies and in this case, in third-world countries. In light of this, the contemporary and dominant discourse in this chapter is that NGOs are self-governing institutions geared to improve the quality of life [25, 26, 27, 28]. In this regard, this chapter considers NGOs as part of civil society groups that are intermediaries in service provision but set up for the public and mutual benefit of the community.

3.2 Theoretical models on NGOs

NGOs have been theorized distinctively from different angles. Markham and Fonjong [29] used the interest group theory to explain how organizations work towards similar interests. Specifically, this theoretical perspective considers political systems in developing nations and independent groups that work to influence the quality of life (public interest groups) [29]. Following Olson’s hypothesis of the ‘free rider problem’, NGOs in both developed and undeveloped nations are usually supported because individuals in these communities have common interests and efforts by NGOs will improve societal wellbeing. In addition, the community members perceive this as a chance to extend their skills or rather learn new skills. However, interest group theory, when applied to developing nations, could be limited. The majority of nations where NGOs camp have an authoritarian rule, and quasi-authoritarian rule, implying that minimal legal capacity and political structure for NGOs to thrive [29].

Political processes approach: theories of political opportunity structure, as part of social movement theory, emphasize the notion that even though a ‘societal problem’ exists, it does not directly denote that social movements will be developed [29, 30]. A political approach perspective on NGOs infers that these institutions need to align with the prevailing “external conditions”. That is, political opportunity (construed to social, economic and political conditions) tends to influence the success of NGOs attracted to African regimes. While reviewing dimensions of the political opportunity approach that influence the success of NGOs in both developed and undeveloped nations, Markham and Fonjong [29] assertion is construed as political regimes having an openness to new ideas. In contrast, ‘unopen’ regimes would discourage NGOs in their regions from repressing the formation and uncontrolled advancement of social movements.

Comprador theory is also crucial when it comes to understanding the role of NGOs in driving democracy. Stemming from imperialism during the early 1920s. In further contextualizing compradors, [31] stated that;

“The national middle class discovers its historic mission: that of an intermediary.. . Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent and will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner” [31].

Considering this contribution, comprador theory considers African NGOs as compradors in the international political economy. In this regard, NGOs are ‘wholly appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon imperialism for their survival and growth’ [23].

4. Donor dependence in Africa: nGOs as democratic fillers

Contemporary NGOs are often prevalent in transitional societies [2, 32, 33]. Although these institutions are operationally constricted by the political economy of a regime, NGOs offer a reduced role for the state thus acting as fillers in service provision. Taking into account the New Policy Agenda designed for operating NGOs [2], NGOs tend to rely on donor-driven aid to act as a ‘substitution’ for failed states [34]. But at what extent are NGOs considered as dependents? Failed governments, especially in third world countries rely on NGOs to provide basic services and amenities to citizens. When applied to NGOs and other charitable organizations, government failure theory contextualizes NGOs to provide ‘pure public goods’ or rather fill niches left unserved by failed governments. As put forward by Weisbrod government failure theory, non-profit sector is considered to be more active in cases where service needs of political minorities are said to be met [35]. Acting as substitutes could be expanded to NGOs being viewed as vehicles of democratization, thus filling the role of eliminating neo-liberalism in transitional societies.

[32] draw from Duncan Green’s criticism in his article “From Poverty to Power” where NGOs have been overly criticized in their roles in service provision. Following this criticism, this section conforms to assertions made by [32] that NGOs are fillers of ‘technocracy’ and transformational development in transitional or rather developing societies. This criticism is further reiterating NGOs acting as dependents towards societal improvement. As critical purveyors, this chapter assumes that NGOs offer critical services to citizens in the context of pursuing social, political and economic transformative societal agendas further explicating dependence of these institutions in developing countries. Although NGOs face discrepancies and overlaps between service delivery and civil society functions, the underpinning theme is the elimination of poverty and as phrased by [36], they act as ‘moral crusades against poverty’. Nevertheless, the extent literature emphasizes NGOs facing external pressures from existing monocratic regimes as well as Western ideological criticism of ‘empowering’ the poor and thus mismatch in change [32, 37].

Acting as gap fillers is service delivery owing to government failures, and NGOs’ success is having a complementary relationship with governments. The majority of regimes in Africa rely on NGOs to provide critical service delivery. At the start of the millennium, Uganda used NGOs which act as fillers by providing medical aid, education, and safe water in the region [2]. Similarly, a report by Relief Web showed that Somalia is one of the regimes marred by war and poverty and consequently, dependent on NGOs in service provision. The report noted that in 2022, over 1.5 children faced starvation and malnutrition [38]. Kabonga [39] affirms the role of NGOs in the provision of sustainable incomes for citizens in Zimbabwe. Some of the stratagems employed include a focus on the agricultural sector as well as microcredit schemes. However, such reliance obliges having a complementary relationship with existing regimes to make service delivery consensual. But as Nasong’o [40] observes, this relationship is shaped by clientelistic patronage and class but often betrayed by ‘catalepsy’ of ideas [41]. For instance, while considering NGOs and their impact on Uganda, one of the government officials asserted that NGOs work closely with local council systems in the country as these systems were vital in implementation and policy development [2]. Even in the context of climate governance at the grassroots level, non-governmental organizations are mirrored to improved presentation and participation. Disposing claims that citizens are usually represented through government delegates [42], NGOs increase democratic representation in governance, resulting in authorized and accountable changes in the context of climate governance. The role of ‘filling’ among NGOs is evidenced by increasing transparency through representation and participation.

5. Neoliberalism: democratizing Africa through NGOs

5.1 NGOs as compradors

Deeply ingrained in the roots of colonialism, populist movements exacerbated by authoritative regimes are common occurrences in contemporary African political debate. Such environments act as catalysts to the recent democratic recession in Africa. For instance, a report by Amnesty International showcases that Zambians living with albinism were subject to discrimination and mutilation. The NGO further reported that LGBTQI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex) individuals were subject to government threats from government officials. Zambian government openly condemned consensual sexual relations in online and offline media through #BanNdevupaNdevu #BanHomosexuality movements on the basis that the country is a Christian oriented nation [43]. Such instances openly exemplify declines in democracy in the realm of the twenty-firstt century. However, non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International remain vocal in driving democracy in these transitional societies. The NGO can be argued to drive democracy by documenting regimes still engrained in authoritarianism and little promise of diminution. This argument underpins the earlier view that NGOs are compradors of change and that transitional societies continue to witness imperial power which is explicated by NGOs [23]. NGOs such as Amnesty International tend to impose an “indirect” rule on transitional societies in the milieu of moral rehabilitation of imperialist regimes. Such intervention is so embedded and routinized in that “it would be more useful to conceive of donors as part of the state it-self” [44]. However, interpreting such instances though Foucauldian analysis in the context of liberal governmentality, such coercive pressures regimes in autocratic states forming acceptable and “novel forms of discipline” [23]. However, as independent compradors, it is disputable that imperial power possessed by NGOs need not be explicated through external domination or rather suffering legitimacy crisis and antagonism. Even though driving democratic transitional societies, it averts recolonization claims.

5.2 Participatory democracies

NGO act as harbingers of democracies as they drive participatory democracy in transitional societies. These institutions are said to provide a host of basic services by allowing accountability and contributions from unprivileged societies [45, 46, 47]. Literatures on African political discourse is not ideologically driven as they rest on authoritative regimes, dominant personal personalities and ethnicity. Nonetheless, this does not imply that authoritative regimes are not immune in spreading liberal ideologies [48]. These liberal ideologies, spread through non-governmental organizations, will reduce the monopoly of public spheres through accountability and participatory measures. [47] draw from interviews in The Mail and The Guardian and established that NGOs in South Africa have extended collaboration and participation among citizens. For instance, developed in 1988, AIDS Foundation of South Africa was developed to curb expansion of HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), STIs (sexually transmitted infections) and TB (tuberclosis) infections. By promoting participatory approach, such NGOs have democratized activities across the country. A participatory democratic approach allows NGOs to drive democracies by allowing citizens to implement strategies and quest for solutions. Such a claim is underpinned by an article put forward by [42]. This article specifically embodies NGOs as addressing concerns in light of representation inequities. As posed by [49] how fairly are representation rights distributed among the member states? Although the focus is on climate governance representation through NGOs, representation of these vulnerable societies in this context increases “moral responsibility” in regard to democratic governance.

5.3 Inclusive electoral processes

It is no secret that NGOs impact the state, but this effect is often perceived in terms of territorial reach. With cultural and business integration, aided by globalization, African regimes have recently opened up the ‘public sphere’ allowing NGOs not only to provide basic services, especially in failed regimes but also ‘steer’ the ship of state [50]. Non-governmental organizations, posed as election observers, tend to influence the democratic processes during African elections and this could be argued to ‘steer’ fair democratic elections. Similar to developed nations, leadership transition in African regimes is through regular elections but even with the epoch-defining fall of the Berlin Wall [48], geopolitical contests are often rife, with many countries having a deep-seated de facto one-party rule. It is within this context that NGOs act as purveyors of democracy in electoral processes as they lobby for increased transparency and accountability in elections. Governments and NGOs are separate units of the organization (country) directed to provide transparency in service delivery [51]. Since comprehending NGO-state relations is devoid of appreciating abstract objectives and structures in a country, NGOs drive state democracy in elections by educating the wider public as well as the state. For example, the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) is one the prominent NGOs that was used in educating good governance among youthful leaders in Nigeria before the 2023 General Elections [52]. The African Union in 2021 uses the South African Youth Forum as the relevant NGO case study to explore how involving South African youth in participatory decision-making processes and peacebuilding increases the extent of democracy in elections. One of the notable strategies was the NGO coordinating with other national youth forums in 16 SADC Member States (South Africa Development Community) to train youths on election observation, peace initiatives as well as transitional justice [53]. The report concluded that such advocacy by the NGO resulted in improved peace initiatives and advocates in the region. These instances give inference to NGOs performing the basic function of states which is to impose and maintain political order [51]. With the intractable nature of political suppression of African politics, NGOs are disposed to integrity, and educative responsibility in driving peace initiatives, predictors of democracy.

NGOs, by acting as election observers, drive democracy through advocacy [54, 55, 56]. Working closely with legal electoral bodies in African regimes increases citizens’ participatory democracy as voter turnout during elections is improved. Citizens are encouraged to closely work with collective and activist organizations, nonprofits and other kinds of civil society organizations thus augmenting participatory democracy. Disputably, citizens are encouraged to engage in electoral processes owing to the belief that social capital will consequentially be improved [34, 56]. By eliminating the “paradox of voting” (casting a vote exceeds individual benefits), NGOs assist in jettisoning dilemmas by providing assurance to citizens and portraying voting as a civic duty, especially in the expansive autocratic African regimes. For example, in the recent elections in Tanzania, international in collaboration with local NGOs actively educated and mobilized voters even though the country had the same party in power since independence and the fact that anti-NGO laws are rife in the region. In Uganda, local NGOs strived to engage voters in the 2016 elections despite the 2015 anti-NGO law adopted [56]. In both instances, voter turnout was exemplary. Therefore, NGOs can be constructed as ‘pillars’ of electoral democracy, agreeing with the Tocqueville-Putnam model of civil society. This model affirms the role of NGOs in creating social capital thus improving citizens’ trust and confidence in electoral democracy. In Kenya, citizens’ contact with NGOs proliferates, not only legitimacy in elections but also participation by almost 44% [57]. Nonetheless, with the lack of legal capacity in the majority of regimes, citizens are unable to express other forms of democracy. For example, in Kenya, citizens are often subject to protesting election irregularities and this soils NGO efforts to drive democracy through elections [57, 58]. In addition, NGOs are perceived by ethnic minorities as setting double standards in the electoral process. Such double standards are often linked and argued to serve the interest of Western Nations, where the majority of these NGOs hail. NGOs have been accused of triggering election violence as well as participating in flawed elections, considered the foundation of ‘double standards’ in election violence [59].

Widening political consent; NGOs are first responders in legitimizing political power as they act as ‘manufacturers’ of political consent [50]. By existing regimes, NGOs serve as the hegemonic function of justifying state domination. NGOs drive political consent in African regimes through three major ways: widening public participation, protecting citizens from predatory regimes, and guaranteeing political accountability. Considering NGOs in the shadow of neoliberalism, it is disputable that these institutions (international NGOs which give support to local African NGOs) are transformative antisystem systems that are a “corrective” add-on to the African political economy [60, 61]. However, although political consent is widened in the sphere of international NGOs, [62] rightly observes that rather than these institutions purporting to “speak up”, exclusions have been reinforced. For instance, such reinforcements can be perceived in anti-NGO laws which continue to be adopted.

6. Challenges faced by NGOs

NGOs as elite, dominating and institutionalized organs of attaining improved democracy in African regimes are often met with unforeseen challenges that limit their functioning. African regimes have increasingly imposed measures that continually affect the functioning of NGOs. Propagated known as anti-NGO laws, African regimes have come up with a comprehensive set of rules designed to “starve” non-governmental organizations [48]. For instance, Sudan adopted restrictive NGO laws in 2006 but in 2017, the country drafted tougher and harsher restrictive laws. Some of the anti-NGO restrictions are evidenced through regimes having multilayered registration requirements, at the national and local level. For example, operating NGOs in Uganda require manifold registration requirements; NGO Bureau certification, Uganda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a letter of operations from the embassy of their home country and a commendation for the sectoral ministry in which the NGO operates [48]. Exacerbated by polygonal procedures, unfettered discretionary powers of NGOs therefore remain in control of governments and this is a cause for abuse as witnessed in the Amnesty International report [43]. Scantiness in autonomous operations results in NGOs being regarded as double-sided, only addressing the interests of those in power.

NGOs are also restricted when it comes to foreign funding. The majority of African regimes are placing a cap on foreign funding, and this limits the scale of operations. For example, in Ethiopia, NGOs that received 10% of funds from foreign agents were placed under the watchful eye of security agencies and this could arguably impact NGO operative capacity. Similarly, although former President Uhuru Kenyatta faced political pressures from NGOs and the opposition, the president vowed to allow external organizations not to advance ‘foreign interest’ on Kenyan soil, further calling on restrictions on foreign funding [48]. These instances are critical examples of how African regimes tend to foist restrictions and controls over NGOs. It is a result of these controls that NGOs are restricted towards advancing communal agendas and democracies. Brass [63] affirms the role of organizations having resources for the existence and effective operations of an organization. However, the instances of foreign fund capping exemplify the challenges NGOs face in seeking democratic operating environments in the African context. These “caps” could also result in the displacement of accountability-seeking groups and in the long term, loss of democratic efforts. The risk of bureaucratic gridlock in NGO operations is evidenced by some African governments intervening in NGO affairs [48, 63, 64]. For example, in early 2019, Burundian authorities deregistered more than 30 international NGOs on the basis that they distributed “rotten” seeds and that some failed to meet ‘non-negotiable’ regulations set aside by the Ministry of Agriculture. Including Ligue Iteka (the leading human rights activist NGO) [48], the ban and closure showcases intrusive anti-NGO legislation that could implicate democracies in the region. The intrusion, often requiring NGOs to align with government priorities, is a severe violation of the UN requirements for NGO operations. This obvious tension reduces NGOs’ freedom to associate freely and pursue democratic interests. As organizations acting as heralds of democracy, should we be surprised at such a level of mismatch? If NGOs design programs that improve accountability and citizens’ participation, anti-NGO laws prove that tensions continue to exist. As Dicklitch [2] observes, NGOs in Uganda are expected to work as “partners” if democracy is to be attained. However, the overarching anti-NGO measures weaken accountability, and this can be argued to lessen democracy.

7. Rethinking NGOs in democratization efforts: a way forward?

Substantial bodies of literature on NGOs and democracy exist. However, as put by [65], the majority of these NGOs are ‘caught between a rock and a hard place’. This means that the structural position of NGOs is not only to offer public services but also to drive development and democracy. But at the same time, with autocratic regimes still in place, the fastening of anti-NGO laws makes it difficult to advance the conjecture of NGOs as harbingers of democratization. While numerous NGOs, both local and international, share a common orientation with the Western powers and not just neoliberal orthodoxy, these institutions have an appended chance to develop democracies. NGOs and other civil society organizations have the chance to move from “restrictions” towards accommodation. Shviji [66] identified practical and intellectual resistance of NGOs considering structural adjustment policies in African regimes. However, there is an opportunity for African NGOs to align with these intellectual struggles and evangelize on donor fads. NGOs, through lobbying and educating the public, have a chance to raise awareness of basic democratic rules as well as rights. Such awareness could result in African regimes working towards a more accommodative environment rather than a pushback of these civil societies. Yet, the realization that NGOs cannot replace governments, it is imperative that the autonomous nature of NGOs be allowed to exist but at the same time, align interests with those of the government. However, this could require a change of orientation [32, 67]. That is, NGOs could drive democracy by changing the “original roots” as harbingers of democracies to becoming supporters and facilitators of networked political action against autocratic regimes. Such kind of support could occur through funding, capacity-building, leadership education and institutional linkages. However, the risk concomitant to such an orientation is the question of representativeness. As a risk, are all strata of the society fully represented if democracy is to be achieved?

8. Conclusion

Do NGOs act as surrogates for improving democratic governance in Africa? This chapter has critically examined conjectures that NGOs are harbingers to having an improved democratic state in Africa. Central to democracy in Africa is the role of NGOs as these institutions act as “gap fillers”. Duncan Green’s article emphasizes NGOs instigating transformational development in transitional societies. As gap fillers, NGOs play an important role in service delivery, especially where developing governments have failed. This chapter identifies that acting as gap fillers compels these institutions to develop complementary relationships with governments. NGOs are regarded as considered as surrogates to democracy as they are compradors to having flexible government administration. These institutions act as agents of change in transitional societies. NGOs force these changes through coercive pressures on autocratic states and this results in acceptable and “novel forms of discipline” in African regimes. Taking into account Foucauldian analysis of liberal governmentality, it has been established that NGOs tend to impose an “indirect” rule on autocratic states, aligning these regimes with a more bureaucratic leadership but to some extent, this is highly linked to recolonization. Apart from NGOs being compradors, democracy is augmented as NGOs encourage participatory democracies. This means that NGOs reduce the monopoly of public spheres through accountability and participatory measures. NGOs increasing participation and collaboration by citizens raises “moral responsibility” and thus improves governance. NGOs also act as harbingers to democracy, and this was seen through having inclusive electoral processes. For instance, in Nigeria, the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) was utilized to educate young leaders on issues of good governance before the 2023 General Elections. NGOs are disposed to integrity, and educative responsibility in driving peace initiatives, and predictors of democracy. However, their role as harbingers is often limited owing to the growing and fastened anti-NGO law. These laws limit the capability of NGOs as well as their freedom to freely and democratic interests.