Bureaucratic Mismanagement: Understanding Refugees and Asylum Seekers Scapegoating in the Context of Global Policy Shifts and South Africa’s Evolving Approach

Abstract

Rather than addressing the bureaucratic mismanagement causing system overload, there is a prevalent tendency to scapegoat asylum seekers and refugees. This scapegoating motivates the introduction of new legal and policy changes. Consequently, governments, including South Africa, respond by introducing measures that scapegoat migrants instead of strengthening their bureaucratic asylum seeker systems. This chapter, based on an examination of recent policy and legal documents, contends that South Africa’s recent shifts in policy regarding asylum seekers and refugees are indicative of a global trend of restricting the rights of this vulnerable population group. These shifts encompass not only the reduced benefits for applicants but also result from overwhelmed asylum seeker systems. The broader issue highlighted in this chapter is the global perception of migration as a crisis, leading governments worldwide to portray asylum seekers and refugee movements as a crisis. This chapter underscores the need to address this problem, emphasising its impact on asylum seekers, refugees, and international refugee governance systems.

1. Introduction

While there seems to be a global consensus in political and policy discourse that the West is facing a refugee crisis, de Haas argues that the actual scale of refugee migration is less extensive than what is portrayed in media attention and political discourse [1]. In fact, from 1985 to 2021, the estimated global refugee population varied between 9 and 21 million, representing approximately 7–12% of the total number of international migrants globally [1]. This means that asylum seekers and refugee numbers fluctuate periodically depending on the displacement drivers (such as wars and conflict, amongst others) in the sending countries. Such countries include Syria, Venezuela, Myanmar, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Ukraine, and recently Palestine.

In 2018, African-born refugees were estimated to be at 6 million, with 5.5 million of those staying within Africa hosted mainly by Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya, demonstrating the argument that refugees prefer to remain closer to their home countries and in familiar surroundings culturally, religiously, and linguistically [1]. Literature underscores this argument by positing that the heightened displacement of Syrians, Venezuelans, and Ukrainians put a strain on the asylum systems of neighbouring countries, which lacked sufficient capacity for conflict-driven numbers [2]. Therefore, South Africa’s recent policy shifts regarding asylum seekers and refugees should be read in this highly contested global context, which also aligns with the broader thematic outlook of this book.

In South Africa, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), the national government department tasked with managing international migration, has argued that Zimbabwe, its neighbour, was the leading country in the top 15 countries of origin for asylum seekers [3]. This high number of asylum seekers from Zimbabwe is accredited to the ongoing socio-economic and political crisis in the neighbouring country which goes as far back as the late 2000s [4]. To relieve the pressure on the asylum system, the South African government introduced a special regularisation permit called the Documentation of the Zimbabweans Project (DZP) in May 2010 [4]. Since then, the government has renewed/extended this particular regularisation programme until recently, when it announced permanent termination, a decision which is being challenged and is awaiting final appeal in the Constitutional Court of South Africa.

The DHA further argues that in South Africa, while it receives high volumes of asylum seeker applications, 90% of the applicants do not meet the requirements to be granted refugee statuses because some of them come from relatively stable countries within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region [3]. On the one hand, an asylum seeker is someone who has fled their home country and is asking for recognition and safety as a refugee in another country, while their application is being reviewed. If their request is denied, they must leave voluntarily or face deportation [5]. On the other hand, a refugee is a person who has been officially granted asylum and protection under the Refugee Act of 1998 [5]. They fall under the 1951 UN Convention, which defines them as either a ‘convention refugee’ fearing persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group, or as someone ‘in need of protection’ who faces torture, risk to life, or cruel treatment if returned to their home country [5].

The country has weaponised the above argument that 90% of the applicants do not meet the requirements to be granted refugee statuses in moving away from the rights-based approach that was seen in the Refugee Act of 1998 to introducing more stringent measures against asylum seekers and refugees to protect what it deems as the abuse of its asylum seeker system, thereby scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees for its bureaucratic inefficiencies.

The movement of asylum seekers and refugees into South Africa has strained the government’s ability to uphold human rights while addressing socio-economic challenges, particularly amongst citizens still affected by apartheid [6]. Although there is political intent to accommodate migrants, economic difficulties have prompted frequent changes in laws, often negatively impacting the lives of foreign-born individuals in the country [6]. This has led to high rejection rates of applications for asylum seekers and refugees. While the 90% rejection rate has been used as justification for stringent measures by the state, refugee rights groups have questioned the quality of status determination processes [7].

Some have labelled these new policy shifts as the disappearance of refugee rights and refugee protection [8]. Others have posited that by introducing these new restrictive and exclusionary policies, the South African government has contributed to generating a significant population of concealed or undocumented refugees and asylum seekers, thereby compelling numerous individuals with genuine refugee claims to stay in the country without proper protection [9].

Other researchers have paid attention to how legislative, policy, and narrative levels all contribute to the deliberate conflation of refugees and other migrants to justify excluding certain unwanted groups of migrants [10]. Some posit that the new paradigm shifts aim to align South Africa with the exclusionary policies observed in numerous countries worldwide concerning asylum seekers and refugees—a broader global trend led by states, intending to impede access to physical territory and refugee protection systems by erecting barriers—be they physical, economic, or social—to entry [11].

Consequently, this chapter aims to build on these previous studies to demonstrate how South Africa’s asylum seekers’ and refugees’ policy approaches have recently shifted from rights-based and progressive policies to restrictive policy approaches in line with global trends. Further, this chapter builds on this demonstration to elevate the discourse by arguing that as a result of recent restrictive policy shifts, South Africa is also scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees instead of fixing its institutional and bureaucratic systems. This trend is similar to global trends. In other words, while South Africa has a historical record of a human rights-based approach on paper to receiving asylum seekers and refugees, this chapter is only grappling with the restrictive measures that have been introduced as a response to the overwhelmed asylum system instead of strengthening the asylum system. This argument and subsequent analysis offer a new academic perspective that needs to be sufficiently explored in research.

The chapter begins by outlining the research methodology employed. Subsequently, it examines international governance systems for asylum seekers and refugees, elucidating their role as a basis for national policy approaches in South Africa. The chapter proceeds to offer a historical overview of asylum seeker and refugee laws and policies in the country, followed by an exploration of recent policy shifts and their implications. The following analysis studied through the bureaucracy management theory, dissects these policy changes, highlighting the justification and legitimisation of such shifts through the global trend of scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees instead of putting more effort and public resources into bureaucratic inefficiencies.

2. Research methodology

The analysis is based on legal and policy documents that are formal instruments for governing the entry and stay of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa. These are government documents that are publicly available on the Internet. The chapter further used public documents from parliamentary proceedings where bureaucratic issues such as backlogs in asylum seeker applications and institutional arrangements and challenges in addressing such were explained by the bureaucrats to the South African legislature. Moreover, previous studies and literature that have also grappled with how the recent policy and legislative shifts have contributed to fewer rights for asylum seekers and refugees were used in the analysis. Finally, the chapter also used NGO reports from organisations such as the Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), who have contributed to legal and policy changes regarding asylum seekers and refugees in the country.

3. Global governance systems on refugees and asylum seekers

South Africa’s post-apartheid progressive asylum seeker and refugee protection governance system is founded on several global human rights instruments. These conventions include the following: Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967 Optional Protocol, and 1969 OAU Convention [12]. Since democratisation, the country has established itself as a nation that prioritises the well-being and advancement of refugees by implementing the 1998 Refugees Act, incorporating global refugee safeguards into its national legislation and surpassing international benchmarks in critical areas [11]. Drawing inspiration from international conventions and the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the South African Refugees Act is rooted in fundamental human rights principles, gaining recognition from the UNHCR as ‘one of the most advanced and progressive systems of protection in the world today’ [9].

However, despite these progressive and internationally recognised policy strides, the country’s bureaucratic management of its asylum seeker system has not been without any criticism. According to the literature, the once commendable global acclaim for South Africa’s lenient approach has diminished due to persistent delays in processing, inadequate and uninformed decision-making, and the pervasive issues of corruption and mismanagement plaguing the asylum process [11]. As a result, South Africa currently holds one of the lengthiest asylum adjudication periods globally, with some instances lingering unresolved for numerous years [11].

Researchers concur with the criticism by arguing that in the past decade, notable changes in both the attitude and policies of the South African government have led to a significant restriction of access to the asylum process, which has, in turn, resulted in a sizable population of concealed and undocumented refugees and asylum seekers, rendering them increasingly susceptible because the DHA strongly believes that economic migrants are exploiting the asylum system [9]. They further believe that it seems the DHA is intentionally ensuring that all migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, remain without documentation, possibly aiming to classify them as illegal immigrants and subsequently expel them from South Africa [9].

This is not unique to South Africa, as this chapter’s overarching argument demonstrates. For instance, researchers argue that the following three problems mainly constrain the whole global refugee governance system [13]:

1. States maintain the ultimate authority over the quantity and standards of asylum granted to refugees within their borders. Despite the refugee regime offering a fundamental definition for those eligible for refugee status and the UNHCR providing guidance on the determination process and supervisory responsibilities, it is the states’ responsibility to decide on the status and rights of refugees within their jurisdiction.

2. Political decisions increasingly influence the fate of refugees and displaced populations in areas beyond the refugee regime, such as travel, labour, human rights, humanitarianism, development, and security (see Figure 1). Various international institutions have emerged in the last five decades, often with scopes and objectives overlapping with the refugee regime.

3. The refugee regime does not obligate states to cooperate for its functioning. While countries providing initial asylum must avoid forcibly repatriating refugees to persecution, there is no binding obligation on other states to contribute to the costs of providing asylum.

Figure 1.

The global refugee complex. Source: Betts and Milner [13].

In its new White Paper which seeks to overhaul the country’s immigration policies, the DHA criticises how after 1994, South Africa ‘blindly’ joined the international governance system post-democratisation without any reservations [14]. This criticism culminated in the production and publication of the new ‘White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection: Towards a Complete Overhaul of the Migration System in South Africa’ in late 2023. The main reason behind this policy proposition and call for change in ratified global governance instruments has less to do with bureaucratic mismanagement and failures and more to do with scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees. The paper has since undergone the public comments process and has recently been approved by the Cabinet, and it will be discussed later in this chapter.

Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018. While South Africa is a signatory to the non-binding Global Compact, this does not necessarily result in actual implementation because the country has not made additional commitments, such as hosting or resettling more forcibly displaced individuals, despite having existing domestic legislative protections [15]. Some have criticised the Global Compact on Refugees rather than signatory nation-states [16]. According to critics, the compact seems to be substituting the Refugee Convention, which is problematic regarding human rights, as the Global Compact inadequately addresses refugees’ rights and interests, prioritising those of states instead [16]. In light of global and national policy shifts regarding asylum seekers and refugees, it is essential to pay attention to the developments surrounding the Global Compact on Refugees, even though it is currently a soft law rather than a binging legislative instrument.

4. South Africa’s evolving asylum seekers refugees policy changes

The previous section demonstrated how South Africa passed the 1998 Refugees Act partly due to its commitments to international legal instruments such as the 1951 Convention, amongst others. It can be argued that the country’s progressive 1996 Constitution also contributed to passing this progressive and advanced refugee law after democratisation. In fact, the DHA asserts that the South African Constitution ensures and safeguards the human rights of individuals seeking asylum and refugees [17]. However, this chapter argues that the country has since regressed in its democratic gains. It continues to do so through different policy and legal changes to the policy paradigms governing individuals seeking asylum and those granted refugee statuses. To this end, the following section will demonstrate how these legal and policy shifts have contributed to the scapegoating of asylum seekers and refugees instead of addressing bureaucratic mismanagement.

4.1 White Paper on international migration

In 2017, the government passed South Africa’s policy paper for managing international migration, including asylum seekers and refugees. In the White Paper, asylum seekers and refugees are scapegoated through the following policy arguments [3]:

• The asylum seeker regime is being abused by economic migrants, resulting in over 90% of the claims for asylum being rejected.

• In order to admit asylum seekers into the refugee regime humanely, securely and effectively, South Africa will establish Asylum Seeker Processing Centres. The centres will be used to profile and accommodate asylum seekers during their status determination process.

• The processing of asylum seeker claims will take place. At the same time, the applicant is accommodated in ‘Asylum Seeker Processing Centres’ or by an individual or an organisation that has made a written undertaking that they will provide for the applicant’s basic needs while the department is determining their status.

• Asylum seekers will not automatically acquire the right to work, study or conduct business in the country. At the same time, their status is being determined since their basic needs will be catered for in the processing centres.

• By reducing the incentive for abuse by economic migrants, the asylum system will be transparent and responsive. It will also reduce the cost of managing many asylum seekers who have to reside in the country for extended periods while their application is being considered.

As can be seen in the arguments put forward by the White Paper on International Migration, the country believes that the asylum seeker system and its dysfunctionalities are a result of economic migrants abusing the system in the absence of alternative legal pathways to gain access to the country and the economy. Researchers have criticised the White Paper in this regard by arguing that instead of being driven by the necessity to alleviate strain on an overwhelmed bureaucratic system, the reduction of refugee rights and the imposition of extra restrictions on refugees seeking safety in South Africa can be more accurately understood as an effort to discourage asylum seekers and refugees from considering the country as a favourable destination [11].

Researchers further posit that the core message of the White Paper’s contradictory approaches indicates a move towards securitising all migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees [10]. To further highlight the trend towards securitisation, indeed, some posit that South Africa uses national security to shut down its borders, prevent asylum seekers from accessing the system and arrest and deport them when they gain entry [8]. The securitisation approach implies that asylum seekers and refugees are a blanket threat to the country’s national security, which in turn further demonstrates how this population group is scapegoated instead of the country fixing its inability to have an intelligence system that identifies threats and risk rather than viewing asylum seekers as collectively undesirable.

As outlined by the DHA, the 2017 policy paper on managing international migration in South Africa reflects a stance that places blame on asylum seekers and refugees through specific policy arguments. The narrative suggests that the asylum seeker system is prone to abuse by economic migrants, leading to a high rate of rejected claims. Asylum Seeker Processing Centres is proposed as a solution that intends to streamline claims processing humanely and securely. However, the denial of automatic rights for asylum seekers to work, study, or conduct business during the determination process raises concerns about the impact on their basic needs.

4.2 Refugees Amendment Act of 2017

While the Refugee Act of 1998 was viewed as progressive and internationally lauded for its humane approach by the democratic government, it has since been amended, and the amendments came into force in 2020, sparking an outcry in human rights and refugee circles. In the Constitutional Court Review, the amendments are described as having extensively altered the refugee protection system, imposing stringent restrictions on asylum entry, revoking previously granted rights for asylum seekers, and withdrawing status and protection from specific refugees recognised under international law, potentially violating the country’s international obligations and constitutional principles [18].

Further, researchers argue that the 2017 Refugee Amendment Act (RAA) represents an apparent regression as it excludes individuals meeting the criteria of the 1951 and OAU Conventions from obtaining refugee status in South Africa in the following ways [18]:

• Abandons asylum claims that would have been assessed under the existing protection system,

• facilitates the establishment of de facto detention centres called APCs, removes statutory timeframes for assessing asylum claims,

• denies asylum seekers certain rights related to employment and education,

• imposes new restrictions on political activities for both asylum seekers and refugees,

• Moreover, it introduces additional cessation clauses, making refugee status more precarious and integration less likely, collectively indicating a substantial weakening of South Africa’s commitment to refugee protection.

Literature asserts that the main focus of the 2017 amendments is to prevent destitute asylum seekers from becoming part of local communities, essentially aligning with the principles of exclusion and self-sufficiency in immigration. Again, the reason for these legislative amendments points towards an approach that views asylum seeker applications as bogus, thus overwhelming the system and resulting in prolonged backlogs [8].

However, as some point out, there are many administrative obstacles that asylum seekers are already facing in gaining admission into the system, namely: inadmissible facilities near the South African borders, issuance of appointment slips and pre-screening procedure, refusal by officials to renew a permit issued initially at another Refugee Reception Office, staffing shortages at the Refugee Reception Offices, closure of Refugee Reception Offices in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, refusal to issue a permit to a delayed applicant, refusal by officials to renew permits for asylum appellants, and refusal to reissue permits to detainees [18]. In addressing all these administrative issues, the South African judiciary has had to intervene through court orders to force the state to implement redress.

The evolution of South Africa’s approach to refugee protection, from the progressive Refugee Act of 1998 to the contentious amendments introduced in 2020, raises significant human rights concerns. Available critique underscores that these amendments, particularly under the 2017 Refugee Amendment Act (RAA), have substantially altered the refugee protection system [18]. The exclusion of individuals meeting the criteria of international conventions, the establishment of de facto detention centres, the removal of statutory timeframes, the denial of certain rights, and the introduction of additional cessation clauses collectively signal a marked regression in the country’s commitment to refugee protection.

Some researchers argue that the focus on preventing destitute asylum seekers from integrating into local communities aligns with exclusionary immigration principles, driven by the perception of widespread abuse overwhelming the system [8]. However, some highlight numerous administrative obstacles asylum seekers face, prompting judicial intervention to compel redress [18]. This complex interplay between legislative changes, administrative challenges, and judicial interventions underscores the need for a more nuanced and rights-focused approach to refugee protection in South Africa.

4.3 White Paper on Citizenship, immigration and refugee protection: towards a complete overhaul of the immigration system in South Africa

The new White Paper, which is currently out for public consultation and comments processes, aims to overhaul every legislation put in place since democratisation in the country, including the international governance systems and protocols South Africa has previously ratified. The new policy calls for a more securitised approach to immigration generally. Moreover, the following passages in the draft White Paper are relevant to this chapter’s argument of the state’s tendencies to scapegoat refugees and asylum seekers [11]:

• The White Paper argues that it is necessary to consolidate the Citizenship Act, Immigration Act, and the Refugees Act into one policy and legislative framework because having them in a fragmented approach makes their implementation difficult, resulting in economic migrants overwhelming the asylum seeker system.

• The appeal process in the asylum seeker and refugee system and immigration services creates a bureaucratic ladder, which leads to further delays and backlogs.

To resolve the problems that come with delays and backlogs in issuing asylum seeker outcomes, the DHA proposes that the country make reservations in line with other global countries that made reservations in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Convention [11]. The DHA proposes that reservations to be made as envisioned in the 1951 Convention are the following: Article 17 as a whole, Article 17 paragraph 2, and Articles 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, and 24; and reservations to be made in the 1967 Protocol are Articles 24 and 29 [14]. Regarding the 1941 Convention, the DHA lists countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Angola, Australia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the UK, and Northern Ireland [13]. And about countries that made exceptional reservations in the 1967 Protocol, the DHA mentions eSwatini, Netherlands, the UK, Northern Ireland, and the US [13].

As a result, the White Paper DHA argues that failure to make any reservations in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol was a serious misstep by the democratic government and therefore, the paper recommends that the Republic of South Africa must embark on the following policy pathways [13]:

• Review and/or withdraw from the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol to accede to them with reservations like other countries—the procedure involves depositing the reservations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

• The new refugee and immigration legislation must have reservations and exceptions as contained in the 1951 Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention, especially because South Africa has limited resources to operationalise the socio-economic rights provided for in the 1951 Convention.

• The Refugee Reception Offices must be located at the ports of entry to facilitate immediate assessment of asylum claims.

• The new legislation must have provisions to repatriate refugees to their countries of origin ‘in order to lessen the burden that comes with recognition of refugees’.

• The process of acquiring citizenship needs to be securitised in line with countries such as the US, Canada, Switzerland, and Britain.

The main message in the proposed White Paper is that the entire immigration legislative and policy framework needs to be overhauled in order to make it difficult for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to gain access to the country’s systems and overwhelm the asylum seeker system. This means that instead of spending time fixing the bureaucratic structures, systems, procedures, inefficiencies, delays, backlogs, and institutionalised corruption, the DHA has decided to scapegoat refugees and asylum seekers. The current draft paper has been criticised by researchers who have argued that South Africa has a trend of introducing policies that are not situated in research and evidence, but rather focused on scapegoating immigrants for the government’s failures [15].

The proposed changes emphasise a securitised approach to immigration and seek to consolidate various acts to address perceived challenges, including the alleged overwhelming of the asylum seeker system by economic migrants. The draft White Paper contends that the current absence of reservations in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, a departure from the approach taken by some other nations, was a strategic misstep by the democratic government.

The proposed policy pathways involve reviewing and potentially withdrawing from these international agreements to accede to them with reservations. Additionally, the document advocates for immediate assessment of asylum claims at ports of entry, repatriation provisions, and a securitised approach to citizenship acquisition. However, this proposed shift has been criticised by researchers, who argue that the trend in South Africa of introducing policies that scapegoat immigrants for government failures needs a foundation in research and evidence. This underscores the importance of a balanced and evidence-based approach to immigration policies that considers national security concerns and the protection of human rights [19].

5. Bureaucratic mismanagement: scapegoating of refugees and asylum seekers

The preceding sections of this chapter have illustrated shifts in legislation and policy initiated by the South African government concerning asylum seekers and refugees. These sections have outlined a discernible pattern wherein the government has been tightening regulations on this demographic, notably curtailing their rights, including the right to work. This represents a departure from the initially observed human rights-based approach evident in earlier instruments following democratisation. The subsequent section delves into a discussion of specific bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in the asylum system in South Africa. Furthermore, it underscores how refugees and asylum seekers have been strategically employed as scapegoats to rationalise the implementation of recent, more stringent policy adjustments.

5.1 Bureaucratic mismanagement in the refugee process

There are two main bureaucratic hurdles that asylum seekers and refugees experience in the South African system: long waiting times for application outcomes due to longstanding backlogs and the closure of certain Refugee Reception Offices [8].

Firstly, status determination outcome backlogs occur as a result of appeals made by asylum seekers to the Refugee Appeals Authority of South Africa and the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs, statutory bodies in the DHA that are responsible for reconsidering applications where asylum seekers believe that their applications were incorrectly rejected by the Refugee Status Determination Officer [20]. In March 2023, the Refugee Appeals Authority of South Africa informed parliament that it had 133,582 appeal cases. Although the DHA partnered with the UNHCR to build capacity for clearing this backlog, the appeals body has not managed to clear backlog cases. Meanwhile, the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs also informed parliament in 2021 that it has a backlog of 28,549 decisions to be reviewed, which it viewed as abusive, unfounded, or fraudulent.

The backlogs are also due to the high rejection rates by the Refugee Status Determination Officers, who have been accused of misinterpreting problems, including applicants’ country of origin information [20]. In fact, the DHA argues that it rejects 90% of asylum seeker applications because most of the applicants are economic migrants and not genuine asylum seekers [3]. It is essential to highlight that asylum seeker application backlogs are not only unique to South Africa but also prominent in countries such as the USA, which had nearly 1.6 million in 2022 [21]. The UK also recorded 132,182 asylum applications backlog in 2022 [22].

Secondly, the closure of some of the country’s Refugee Reception Offices has proven to be a bureaucratic nightmare for asylum seekers and refugees. Some refer to this closure as ‘procedural, administrative and logistical hurdles that complicate an already tenuous status and sustainability’ [11]. Indeed, by closing three offices, the DHA only allowed asylum seekers to renew their permits at their initial application offices [23]. To this end, previous research has found that the closure of some of these application offices puts enormous administrative and financial burdens on asylum seekers and refugees whose permit renewal periods depend on how many bribes they can afford to pay [11]. The rampant corruption has resulted from the heavy backlogs and overwhelming demand in the asylum seeker system [24].

Asylum seekers and refugees in the South African system face significant bureaucratic challenges, primarily characterised by prolonged waiting times for application outcomes and the closure of certain Refugee Reception Offices. The closure of Refugee Reception Offices compounds these challenges, creating procedural, administrative, and logistical hurdles. These bureaucratic hurdles exacerbate the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa, creating a complex and challenging environment for those seeking protection and refuge.

5.2 Scapegoating in the context of refugee issues

While scapegoating immigrants in South Africa generally takes place in the media or via political discourse by accusations such as migrants steal our jobs, migrants cause crime, migrants are overwhelming service delivery, or there are many undocumented migrants in the country, the accusation directed explicitly at asylum seekers and refugees are especially formalised as demonstrated in this chapter through policy and legislative amendments. Previous research has found that while South African migration policies have become less restrictive between the period 1948 and 2020—benefitting undocumented migrants through amnesty and regularisation programmes in the process—border control policies have become more restrictive, with asylum seekers and refugees bearing more brunt in comparison to other categories of migrants [25]. This demonstrates that asylum seekers and refugees are a group of migrants that are considered unwanted migrants, similar to undocumented migrants.

The closure of certain Refugee Reception Offices, the introduction of asylum processing centres, and the reduction of rights to education, work, and trade for asylum seekers and refugees because they are apparently abusing and overwhelming the asylum system demonstrates policy shifts towards scapegoating rather than bureaucratic efficiency.

During the COVID-19, asylum seekers and refugees in the EU were also demonised in language by politicians, with the Hungarian Prime Minister blaming migrants for spreading the virus in Hungary; other right-wing politicians portraying migrants as a threat that brings the virus to countries, such as Italy, Greece, Croatia, France, Germany, and Spain [26]. The same occurred in South Africa when the government needed justification to close all borders. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, South African borders were closed, and the Minister of Public Works announced the plan to erect a 40 km fence to prevent undocumented or infected migrants from coming to South Africa at the Beitbridge Border Post, which costs the public funds R37 million and was destroyed by migrants within a few weeks [27].

In 2016, the president-elect of the United States, Donald Trump, garnered support by using rhetoric that seemed to blame Mexicans and Muslims for various social and economic issues [28]. Similarly, the pre-Brexit campaign in the UK also targeted immigrants and foreign bureaucrats, holding them responsible for a range of social problems, including violent crime and funding challenges for the NHS [28]. Beyond official policy positions, the scapegoating of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa also occurs through utterances by politicians and citizens when they are given platforms in the media. In fact, policy and legislative amendments mostly follow utterances and announcements in the media by politicians (especially during election seasons) who aim to influence citizens to buy into the new stringent controls against immigrants.

5.3 Media representation

The media contributes to the scapegoating of refugees in the language it uses to describe asylum seekers and refugees and their movement. In Australia, there are asylum seekers described as waves that are arriving on illegal boat arrivals, which frames them in a harmful and dehumanising light [29]. This is not different in South Africa. Researchers posit that in South Africa’s media landscape, in discussions surrounding the removal of migrants generally, terms like deport, expel, and hinder are commonly used, reflecting the ideas of deportation, forceful displacement, or the implementation of stringent visa requirements [30]. The narrative also emphasises actions such as arrest, suspect, and detain, reinforcing the perception of foreigners as law violators [30].

During coverage of issues that involved refugees and migrants, mainstream media has been accused of not offering enough counter-arguments to callers and politicians that scapegoat migrants [10]. These narratives have an impact on how society views migrants, especially in a country which is known for xenophobic attacks like South Africa.

5.4 Political discourse

In cities like Johannesburg, immigrants are frequently linked to criminal activities and accused of taking away employment opportunities—politicians capitalise on community discontent with inequality and socio-economic conditions, using migrants as scapegoats for their own failures to address these issues [10]. There has been a rise in political figures attributing problems such as crime, unemployment, and various social issues in South Africa to foreigners [10]. Some researchers contend that politicians have a vested interest in depicting refugees and asylum seekers as constituting a crisis, as presented in the media, because this portrayal serves to rationalise the implementation of strict border controls and measures against this population group, enabling politicians to avoid scrutiny for the lack of political will to host refugees and collaborate with other destination countries in sharing responsibilities [1]. Unfortunately, these utterances trickle down to society via the media, where they have the potential to change the attitudes of citizens towards asylum seekers and refugees.

5.5 Societal attitudes

Examining the impact of politicians scapegoating asylum seekers in the media is essential for understanding its repercussions on societal attitudes, particularly in a nation like South Africa, where xenophobic attacks often target economically disadvantaged African migrants in impoverished areas. The intersection between political discourse, the portrayal of messages to local communities, and the resultant attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers is a crucial aspect that merits careful consideration. This is further linked to the high levels of inequality and the belief that migrants deprive South Africans of job opportunities, a recurrent notion, particularly during episodes of xenophobic violence [10]. This perception aligns with a global pattern where immigrants are often viewed as individuals who steal jobs from South Africans [10]. For instance, in the UK the right to work was curtailed by the Labour government in mid-2002 through a policy change that allows asylum seekers the right to apply for work permission after 12 months, a move away from when asylum seekers could apply for permission to work if they had been waiting in the country for their claim outcome for 6 months [31]. According to Ziegler, a 2018 survey study revealed widespread opposition to refugee reception in South Africa, with 50% of the respondents expressing opposition to welcoming asylum seekers who are fleeing war and violence from their countries of origin [18].

5.6 Impact on refugees and asylum seekers

This is an essential chapter because bureaucratic inefficiencies have severe implications for asylum seekers and refugees beyond policy implications. Migration Observatory posits that making asylum seekers wait for prolonged periods for their outcomes in the UK due to backlogs has mental health costs, integration costs, and financial costs for asylum seekers [22]. Previous research in South Africa has also found that long waiting periods and procedures lead to undue psychological distress, trauma, hopelessness, and worthlessness [32]. Indeed, if the contention is that asylum seekers and refugees strain the asylum system, it would be prudent to prioritise the maintenance of their mental health (by avoiding making them wait in limbo) to prevent potential strain on the public health system.

The scapegoating by curtailing the refugee system benefits in policy further impacts the socio-economic circumstances of asylum seekers [34]. In 2023, refugees in Limpopo faced challenges in obtaining social grants for their children due to their inability to renew expired documents at the DHA, stemming from prolonged bureaucratic delays in the issuance of outcomes [34].

Therefore, this chapter underscores the significant consequences of bureaucratic inefficiencies on asylum seekers and refugees, emphasising the mental health, integration, and financial costs associated with prolonged waiting periods, as observed in the UK and South Africa, while also highlighting the socio-economic impact resulting from policy measures curtailing refugee system benefits and the challenges faced by refugees in Limpopo in 2023 due to bureaucratic delays.

6. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that South Africa’s asylum and refugee protection system, rooted in international human rights instruments, is acknowledged globally for its progressiveness. However, the implementation of these policies has been marred by bureaucratic challenges, leading to criticisms of delays, mismanagement, and intentional restrictions on access to asylum processes. Overall, South Africa’s journey in refugee governance reflects both commendable progress and persistent challenges, urging continued scrutiny and potential reforms to ensure a more effective and just system.

Asylum seekers and refugees navigating the South African system encounter notable bureaucratic obstacles, marked by extended periods of uncertainty in application processing and the shutdown of specific Refugee Reception Offices. The closure of these offices amplifies the difficulties, introducing procedural, administrative, and logistical impediments that further intensify the vulnerabilities faced by those seeking protection and refuge in South Africa, thereby creating a complex and challenging environment for those seeking protection and refuge. This raises the need to fix the bureaucratic dysfunctionality and avoids scapegoating asylum seekers and refugees for their own institutional failures.

South Africa holds a prominent status as a key destination for migrants within the continent. Consequently, it is imperative for the country to acknowledge and embrace this role by formulating policies geared towards effectively managing and understanding the migrant population rather than attempting to discourage migration. It is crucial to recognise that deterring international migration is inherently challenging, given its intrinsic nature in human behaviour. Additionally, asylum seekers and refugees are compelled to seek refuge due to conditions in their countries of origin, factors that lie beyond the refugees’ and South Africa’s direct control. Should the nation persist in adopting restrictive measures akin to Western approaches against asylum seekers and refugees, there exists a potential risk of witnessing a surge in undocumented migrant numbers. Such restrictive measures may inadvertently drive migrants towards perilous pathways and underground channels, as opposed to deterring them.

Attributing blame to refugees and asylum seekers is not a solution for addressing bureaucratic mismanagement within the DHA. Instead, the emphasis should be on strengthening the asylum seeker system and establishing robust governance frameworks to eradicate corruption and alleviate protracted bureaucratic delays. Additionally, the nation ought to prioritise regional solutions that take into account the historical context of migration in the region, addressing the underlying causes of economic migration. It is essential to ensure that legitimate asylum seekers are not deprived of the rights safeguarded by the constitution and international institutions due to the actions of economic migrants exploiting the asylum system. Unless the intention is not to manage migration but to compel migrants to leave, a more comprehensive and equitable approach is necessary.