Dual Identity as a New Identity Model in Peacebuilding: On the Context of Afghanistan Case

Abstract

Based on an interdisciplinary synthesis of the literature in political science and social psychology, this chapter emphasises that the issue of identity is critical in the pursuit of peace. The chapter attempts to discuss dual identities, which in the case of Afghanistan allow for both singular identities and a new overarching identity (to be formed in the peace process). The question of how to transform conflicts peacefully is the common point of intersection between theory and practice in the field of peace studies. If conflict, as a never-ending phenomenon, can be transformed into a peaceful perspective, then peace has a chance of becoming permanent on the ground and in the minds. In this regard, the issue of identity occupies an important place in the context of sustainable peace. Because identity affects almost all peace processes in a heard or unheard tone. This chapter will examine the identity issues within the framework of Afghanistan over the social identity theory and the common in-group identity model. Using the example(s) of Afghanistan (in addition Northern Ireland and South Africa), this chapter argues that a new and inclusive identity that does not assimilate individual identities (dual identity) has the capacity to enable sustainable peace.

1. Introduction

Today, as both international and intra-national conflicts continue in various dimensions and shape world politics, the socialisation and sustainable peace is at a critical juncture. The question of how to transform conflicts by peaceful means is the common point of intersection between theory and practice in the field of peace studies. If conflict, as a never-ending phenomenon, can be transformed into a peaceful perspective, then peace has a chance of becoming permanent on the ground and in the minds. In this sense, discussing transformative paradigms beyond the traditional models of conflict resolution makes it possible to produce alternative knowledge. This text examines the issue of identity, which has an important place in the context of sustainable peace and which is discussed in almost all peace processes, whether in a heard or unheard tone. Clancy and Nagle [1] argue that in ethno-nationalist and divided societies, such as Northern Ireland, efforts to create a shared public identity across all political divides is an unrealistic goal, at least in the medium to short term (pp. 78–79). They challenge the premise that binary identities can be reformulated in a new and shared formulation. They argue that the focus should shift from social transformationalist approaches, which aim to create an inclusive public identity that includes others, to consensualism, which places dual or multiple public identities on an equal footing in politics. However, consensualism institutionalises the existence of ethnic differences ([1], p. 84). Yes, consensualism emphasises co-identity rather than shared identity, but it always runs the risk of reinforcing the power of ethnic extremism.

Moreover, when we consider the politics of recognition in the context of peace processes, it is possible to see that constitutional recognition itself can, over time, become a peace-breaking condition. Indeed, this is one of the main criticisms of the Good Friday Agreement. That is to say, the acceptance of multiple public identities through a peace agreement or macro-legal text does more than merely reconcile the groups concerned because it provides the conflicting groups of the past with a hard ground on which they can always hold on and return to the conflict situation at any time. This may not be the case in all cases of reconciliation, but the discourse itself is an obstacle to peacebuilding. So how should the relationship between peacebuilding and identity be discussed in the axis of Afghanistan? In this chapter, which will focus on this question, I aim to elaborate and discuss the relationship between identity and peacebuilding using social psychological perspectives and theoretical approaches. By focusing on Afghanistan, which officially entered a reconciliation process with a peace agreement signed in Doha in 2020, but still has not achieved an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace, this chapter will produce a critical discourse on Afghan identity and the notion of peace.

As a result of the political analysis of the relevant examples, the main suggestion of this chapter, which will enable the socialisation of peace and the dampening of identity conflicts, is the following: Neither the social transformationalist perspective, which is based on the reformulation of pre-existing identities on a common and new axis, nor the consensualist perspective, which recognises the co-legitimacy of multiple identities. Rather, the creation of a new, peacebuilding, inclusive identity (dual identity) that inspires hope and partnership, formulated in light of the common intragroup identity model (CIIM) and agreed upon on the basis of social consensus during formal peace negotiations. This political identity is superior to ethnic or religious identities and includes but does not destroy them. As suggested by CIIM, it is a search for an identity that enables a ‘we’ rather than an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. In this model, both sub-identities continue to exist and a higher identity is created. And these two identities are activated simultaneously, as in the case of Korean Americans. To repeat, dual identity emphasises a new inclusive collective unity, but this unity does not exclude individual identities. Accordingly, the first part of the text analyses social identity theory, inclusive identity and the CIIM in the context of the links between peace, identity and conflict. This will provide the theoretical framework of the chapter. In the next part, this chapter will present the relationship between the peace process and identity in the case of Afghanistan.

1.1 Identity, peace and conflict: Why social identity theory and the common in-group identity model?

Psycho-political confrontations in conflict and peace processes are characterised by practices such as forgiveness, revenge and the venting of anger. Who the parties are, which group they feel they belong to and the extent to which they identify with the group are very critical. This is because the nature and frequency of conflicts created, sustained or characterised by different identities (such as religious, ethnic or national identities) are closely related to whether they are strong, harsh or rigid. Identity politics, whether through recognition or denial, determines or changes the politics of both conflict and peacebuilding. As can be seen in many processes around the world, the reconciling parties are members of two or more strong political identities. At the end of the peacebuilding process, we either witness the recognition of both identities, as in Northern Ireland, or we witness an attempt to create an inclusive identity through identity transformation, as in the period between 1994 and 1999 in South Africa. In other words, we encounter either multiple identities or inclusive identities at different levels.

Indeed, with the emergence of postmodern thought, phenomena, such as the subject, the centre and history, have been reconsidered, seriously questioned and consequently deconstructed. Therefore, the concept of identity, which assigns a visible value to the subject and the self and is based on the subject’s experience, has also been critically examined ([2], p. 127; [3], p. 6). However, regardless of the direction and axis of the debates, identity, or rather how or what we define ourselves as, has always remained valid. Connolly [4] supports this idea as follows: ‘it is probably both impossible and certainly undesirable to be human without being grounded in some identity’ (p. 26). This is because identity itself, identity politics or identity claims cut across social life as well as, or even more so, political life. Fukuyama [5], for example, argues that identity politics is the main lens through which politics breaks down in the US (p. 108). Again, along the lines of conflict in world politics, we witness the struggle of different political identities. As with other identities, politicised ones are constructed in relation to some socially recognised difference. In other words, the existence of difference is constitutive of identity. The consolidation of identity is realised through the construction of otherness. However, how identity is lived and how it is defined through the consideration of other identities can become a problematic situation ([4], p. 26).

The relationship between difference and identity established by Connolly has been theorised by social psychologists within the framework of group categorisation and social identity theory. Social identity theory and self-categorisation theory, developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner on the basis of various empirical studies, argue that social identity arises from cognitive and motivational differentiators. The theory posits that individuals define, evaluate and classify themselves in terms of the social group to which they belong, and as a result of this classification, they identify strongly with the group. Identification forms social identity. In other words, social identity theory emphasises group membership and states that individuals create a negative or positive social identity for themselves by comparing the group to which they belong with other groups. In many of their studies, Tajfel and his colleagues agree on the following idea: The mere existence of belonging to two different groups (in-group and out-group), that is social categorisation in itself, is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination in favour of the in-group ([6], p. 59; [7], pp. 5–6). In-group favouritism and intergroup discrimination persist even if the categorisation or classification, however trivial and temporary, is clearly based on an arbitrary basis ([8], p. 49). This is referred to as the minimal group paradigm and corresponds to one of the most important components of social identity theory. In in-group favouritism, the maximum difference is more important to members than maximum in-group gain. Therefore, group members prefer to compare their group with the out-group and compete with them rather than engage in activities that will increase the profit of other members ([6], pp. 56–57; [8], pp. 27–30). Comparison is the only tool for individuals to grasp the meaning and value of the group to which they feel they belong ([9], p. 189). Members of the in-group make comparisons with similar others ([6], p. 60). Both the above theories attribute the causes of intergroup conflict to unrealistic reasons. For example, according to Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm, even if the in-group member does not know the out-group members, he/she will take a position through the group to which he/she belongs. As has already been pointed out, in this theory group membership alone is sufficient for out-group discrimination.

Although social identity theory provides critical explanations of issues such as group formation, group membership and social comparison, it has not received sufficient attention in both political science and conflict resolution literature for many years. In fact, it can be argued that political psychology has been somewhat distant from this theory, despite the fact that identity politics and identity-related policies are defining, changing and transforming the political sphere in the contemporary world ([2], p. 128). Although it uses a framework largely determined by modernity such as the empirical study of groups and their dynamics, the production of knowledge in this context and the explanation of identities as fluid and situationally changeable structures, this theory is well suited to understanding conflict and its cognitive and psychological causes. Studies that refer to this theory when investigating peace and conflict point out that in-group members feel good about themselves and strive to enhance their social identity (at the expense of excluding out-group members) ([10], p. 496; [11], p. 137). When negative social identities are revealed or reinforced as a result of comparison, the level and intensity of intergroup conflict and disagreement may increase.

For many years, contemporary conflict resolution literature has assumed that conflicts between macro-actors can be resolved by tactical and strategic means. However, peace refers to socio-political and psycho-political situations. Therefore, understanding the cultural, social and political identities of the conflicting groups, or their culture as a whole, and being able to read the dynamics of the groups is indispensable for effective peacebuilding. In this way, it is possible to analyse the conflict well. In fact, the identities held by the conflicting groups, their efforts to recognise or deny each other and the policies they produce in this direction remind us that the issue of identity should be treated meticulously in peace studies. In this sense, it is important to understand the theory of social identity and to include it in analyses. The fact that the modern mind visualises identities as a phenomenon that can be chosen or acquired ([2], pp. 137–138) explains the presentation of social identities as fluid, situational and socially constructed structures. However, ethnic and religious (and similar) identities, which are largely inherited, that is ascribed and therefore taken for granted, are described as fixed, resistant to change, rigid and strong identities. The picture that emerges from peace processes is that the recognition of singular group identities potentially keeps the cause or possibility of conflict alive. Therefore, social change and social mobility, that is the fluidity of identity emphasised by social identity theory, may be difficult for identities with a challenging character. Although transitions between identities may not be easy in the establishment of a common identity that is created with an inclusive and new consensus, it may be possible to create a new identity that does not destroy but transcends them. So what is the contribution of reading the construction of this inclusive collective identity through the common in-group identity model? As emphasised earlier, the first and most important reason for considering social identity theory as one of the approaches to conflict resolution is that this theory (along with social comparison theory) allows us to explain conflict, its source and its causes from an alternative perspective. However, CIIM, which can be loosely described as a critical reading of social identity theory, will mean looking at the relationship between identity and peace from a different perspective. Here, there is a vision of an inclusive collective identity.

1.2 A new theoretical framework for peacebuilding: the common in-group identity model

When we talk about macro-conflicts, including the case of this chapter, we are largely referring to ethnic, religious or similar political identities with sharp boundaries, hard and difficult to penetrate shells. Insisting on these identities as the main actors in peace processes (recognition) or ignoring existing political identities and presenting the constitutional identity as the collective identity are some of the effective barriers to sustainable peace. Instead, actions, such as breaking down prejudices, revealing or creating partnerships that contribute to coexistence, and increasing the number of spaces for encounters, are indispensable for the contact between identities or the creation of a new and commonly accepted identity. Of course, it is not easy for groups that have had an antagonistic relationship with negative emotions during the period of conflict to make a new and inclusive ‘we’ possible. However, when we read the peace literature with the theoretical underpinning of social psychology, we find alternatives that can make this possible.

The model on which this chapter is based is the common in-group identity model, which defends an inclusive identity beyond multiple identities. This model aims to evolve group perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ towards a more inclusive and new ‘we’ ([12]: p. 3; [13]: p. 5). This model was developed using social categorisation and social identity theory. CIIM is a model that provides a theoretical framework for reducing intergroup prejudice and improving intergroup relations. It is well known that social categorisation divides groups into in-groups and out-groups or us and them [7, 8]. As a result, group members have more positive feelings towards members of their own group and develop prejudices or stereotypes towards the out-group ([14], p. 5). Prejudice arising from categorisation represents a pro-ingroup orientation rather than an anti-outgroup orientation. That is, prejudice is not necessarily characterised by contempt, hostility or aggression ([12], p. 3), so both out-groups and in-groups can be viewed positively. However, because the in-group is treated more favourably, in-group favouritism inevitably leads to intergroup discrimination. In several studies, Dovidio et al. argue that for prejudice to change or disappear, the social categorisation that enables it must be rethought.

The strategy in CIIM is recategorisation, not categorisation based on social identity and social comparison, or decategorisation that emphasises individual qualities. This means that instead of different group members coding themselves as two separate groups, they see themselves as a single inclusive superordinate identity. The aim of this model is to reduce prejudice by redefining who is an in-group member ([14], p. 6). Gaertner et al. [12] evaluate this recategorisation in terms of political identities and argue, for example, that the component that should be targeted in order to eliminate highly visible black-white racism is ‘white favouritism’. This is because, according to them, the divergence and prejudice between the two races does not stem from whites developing anti-black attitudes but from whites adopting pro-white attitudes. Therefore, this categorisation needs to be reformulated (p. 6). The creation of a single group representation to resolve intergroup conflict has been supported by empirical research in social psychology. However, it is at this point that important criticisms of this model should be voiced. The first and strongest criticism is as follows: The creation of inclusive shared identities as a result of interventions may produce unstable super-identities or identities that fail and exacerbate intergroup conflict. Another criticism can be expressed as follows: Singular inclusive identities can threaten group members’ need to see themselves as unique and different from others ([14], pp. 6–7). These criticisms led the CIIM researchers to propose a new type of recategorisation. Dovidio calls this a new type as dual identity. Dual identity involves the simultaneous activation of existing subgroup identities and a common in-group identity, for example Korean American. In clinical studies conducted by Dovidio et al. [14], it was found that members of ethnic and racial groups who identified with dual identities had more positive attitudes and behaviours towards other similar groups than those who identified with subgroup identities only (p. 7).

1.3 Afghan, Afghani and Peştun: Different identity models and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

As in many examples around the world, identity crises run parallel in deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland, South Africa and Afghanistan. Intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic divisions are the two main categories in which these crises can be read. In Northern Ireland, for example, there is an ongoing division between unionists (Protestants/British) and nationalists (Catholics/Irish), which allows for a ethno-religious differentiation of identity, and the internal cliquing and factionalisation of these two groups. A similar situation (centered on race and ethnicity) exists between and within the two groups of blacks and whites, the main dividing line in South Africa. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, there is a different kind of division from the other two examples. In this case, where ethnic identity crowds out national identity, there are many ethnic groups that are in major and minor conflict with each other. There is also an Afghan identity that is trying to assert itself as the supreme identity, but which does not correspond to the ‘we’ identity meant by the CIIM. In fact, the main line of conflict in Afghanistan is between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups. Therefore, the Afghan identity, which is equated with the Pashtun¹, is not an inclusive identity. In addition, there are different tribes in Afghanistan that define themselves by belonging to the same ethnic groups. The struggles and conflicts between them have a significant impact on the social and political sphere. So how is it possible to work out multiple ethnic identities, an inclusive Afghan identity and a new identity that can be presented from the perspective of CIIM in peacebuilding in Afghanistan?

Ethno-political divisions are the main axis of the intra-Afghan conflict, which has turned Afghanistan, founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747 who unified the Pashtun tribes, into a place of conflict and has its roots in resistance to colonialism. Pashtunism, encoded in the founding of the state, is the main factor deepening this internal conflict. In addition to the Pashtuns, there are many other ethnic groups, large and small, living in the country, notably Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Within almost every ethnic group, there are tribes and clans of varying influence and size. This tribal and ethnic structure is accompanied by linguistic diversity. As a result, loyalty to tribe, clan or ethnic identity is more prevalent in Afghanistan than loyalty to the state. In this context, ethnic rather than national consciousness grows, and groups that rebel or claim to resist the state rely on certain ethnic groups. Almost all legal or illegal organisations survive with the support of an ethnic group. This has been going on for many years. For example, after Dawood Khan’s failed coup in 1975, the Muslim Youth organisation split into two, with the Pashtuns forming the Hizb-e-Islami organisation led by Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and the Tajiks forming the Jamat-e-Islami organisation led by Burhaneddin Rabbani [16, 17, 18]. The Taliban movement, one of the parties to the recent Afghan-led and Afghan-own negotiations, is also one of the organisations supported by the Pashtuns.

The Afghan conflict is multi-actor, multi-faceted, complex and fragile. It is simultaneously a drug, ethnic, religious (to a lesser extent), regional and international conflict. The intra-state conflict revolves around two issues: Who has the right to govern the state and how to ensure equal political representation. To put it more succinctly, the fundamental issue(s) that characterise the Afghan conflict are political representation and the distribution of power in governance. This also corresponds to the question of which ethnic group should control the state administration. Parallel with many assumptions of social identity theory, ethnic identities can continue to exist here without changing or disintegrating. But it is precisely for this reason that they are too rigid, sensitive and inflexible. In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination are visible and violent because belonging to an ethnic group is more important than any other personal, individual or even national identity.

Afghanistan’s religiously, linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous society has been in a state of conflict for many years. There are many large and small ethnic communities living in the country, as well as Shia and Sunni Muslims (the vast majority are Hanafi) as well as small Hindu and Christian communities. Although some scholars argue that religious identity (Islam) can be the unifying identity of the communities, in fact, religious identity is much weaker here. Although there is occasional friction between Shia and Sunni groups, the main line of conflict is between ethnic groups. The Hazaras, for example, are predominantly Shia (although a small number are Sunni) and face severe persecution, particularly from the Pashtuns, because of this identity, but members of this group identify themselves by ethnicity rather than sect ([19], p. 670). In other words, this group does not identify itself as Shia or Sunni, but only as Hazara ([18], p. 9). Similar to the conflict period, where ethnic identity dominates both national and religious identities, the peace process has also been based on ethnicity in Afghanistan. More specifically, in all efforts since the Murree peace talks, one side has been represented by the Taliban (i.e. Pashtuns) and the other by the government, but all discussions have been based on the position and rights of ethnic groups. In fact, the main axis of the Afghan conflict is not politico-religious, but ethno-political (ethnic structures).

In Afghanistan, ethnic differences have a structure that divides and, in some cases, pits social groups against each other. The multiplicity of ethnicities and the hostility of each ethnic element towards the others have made the conflict in this geography sustainable and prevented the formation of a national consciousness. The weak authority of the state has not been able to erode ethnic identities. As a result, national identity does not have a meaningful place in Afghanistan as an inclusive identity. While ethnic attachment is very strong, there are also claims that national identity is shaped around religion (here meaning Islam) and that religious identity can be seen as the basis for legitimising state identity. However, according to Ehsan [20], such competing comparisons of ethnic and national identity are leaving deep scars on the nation-building process in Afghanistan (p. 119).

According to the UN, the total population of Afghanistan in 2024 will be 43,372,950.² The proportion of ethnic groups in this population (as there is no regular census, different data can be found in different sources) is approximately 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Uzbek, 9% Hazara, 4% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, 2% Baluchi and 4% other. It is possible to find different figures in different studies on both the population and ethnic groups of Afghanistan. While William Maley mentions the existence of at least 55 ethnic groups, the Afghan constitution lists 14 ethnic groups. The ethnic groups listed in the constitution are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq (Aimak/Oymak), Arab, Qirghiz, Kizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes³ [23]. The country’s Muslim population is 99.7% (84.7–89.7% Sunni, 10–15% Shia), with the remaining 0.3% ([18], p. 9). The country’s ethnic differences are accompanied by linguistic differences. In addition to Dari or Afghan Persian, Pashto, Uzbek, Turkmen, English, Arabic, etc., are spoken. These linguistic and ethnic differences, which nourish ethnic identity, are among the reasons for the disruption of the nation-state structure ([24], p. 381).

In Afghanistan, which has been the scene of various conflicts since its inception (since 1747), the struggles of groups in the political arena are closely linked to ethnicity. Although Islamic religious identity seems to be a unifying super-identity, the main identity that determines, influences and changes the sociology and political sphere of this society is ethnic identity. The Pashtuns, the most powerful of the dominant ethnic groups, consist of a large tribal group (the largest tribes being Ghilzali and Durrani) and are distinguished from other Afghan ethnic groups by their Pashto language and Pashtunwali lifestyle (a culture based on Islamic traditions and values) ([15], pp. 9–10). As a powerful ethnic group, they also dominate political life. For almost two centuries, a significant proportion of Afghanistan’s rulers have been Pashtuns. Not only the ruling elite of the state but also, for example, almost all the representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban, who are expected to negotiate an Afghan-led peace deal, are Pashtuns [25]. On 15 August 2021, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan and the interim government, which is expected to be formed on a more inclusive basis, is also Pashtun. When it came to the possibility of a complete US withdrawal from the region as a result of the peace agreement, representatives of other ethnic groups in parliament were concerned that the post-withdrawal distribution of political power would favour the Taliban and indeed the Pashtuns. After all, today it is known that in Afghanistan, both women and other ethnic groups do not participate in the social and political spheres, and there are even serious restrictions, especially on women [26]. When the Taliban announced the representatives of the interim government in August 2021, the US expressed serious concerns about inclusiveness [27]. However, the fact that the term ‘Afghan’, which has never been inclusive of other ethnic groups, means ‘Pashtun’ ([20], p. 122), that Afghanistan is referred to as ‘Pashtun homeland/land’ rather than ‘Afghan homeland’ ([18], p. 8; [16], p. 24), and that the ethnic group on which the Taliban are based is Pashtun, explains the current policies, bans, Taliban in-group prejudices and out-group discrimination.

Because of this association (Pashtun equals Afghan), non-Pashtuns do not want the word Afghan to be used for all citizens of the country. In the pre-2001 period, ethnic identities became too rigid and sensitive due to the hostile relations that developed, and the Taliban equated being Afghan or being Pashtun. Some of the new and unifying terms proposed by representatives of different ethnic groups in the Afghan parliament, which was active before the Taliban’s return to power, include ‘Afghani’ or ‘Afghanistani’ ([16], p. 24). This new common ground refers to the recategorisation of the CIIM. This would create a common in-group identity and a more egalitarian ground where no one feels under Pashtun domination. Such a new common and inclusive identity could also open a new door in the formation of national consciousness. If you ask an Afghan who he is, the first identity that comes to mind is his ethnic identity; therefore, if you ask him who he is, he will tell you his ethnic identity, not his national identity. However, a shared identity (e.g. Afghan) that is produced in an environment where things are discussed on an equal basis, such as a peace process, and with a common consensus, can, over time, produce a change in social perception, as it creates a new ‘we’. In fact, the fourth article of the Afghan constitution defines citizenship, or national identity, as inclusive: ‘National sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives. The nation of Afghanistan consists of all those who hold Afghan citizenship. The word Afghan includes all citizens of Afghanistan. No one from the nation of Afghanistan can be deprived of citizenship’ [22]. In other words, in a commonisation based on citizenship, Afghan, according to the constitution, meant a citizen of Afghanistan. But Pashtun hegemony is also at work in the new era of the Taliban. It is obvious that, in the recent period, the distance between society and the state is short for Pashtuns, but too long for other ethnic groups. According to Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie [28], who have conducted research on Afghanistan, the fact that ethnic groups in Afghanistan (with the exception of the Hazaras) continue to see themselves as Afghans and do not settle in other states, even though they have the opportunity to join their compatriots in neighbouring countries, is an important indication of the existence of a national consciousness (p. 135). So, the term Afghan has the potential to be a common identity that encompasses all citizens. However, these researchers also found in their studies that adherence to the term they proposed was not strong in all parts of the country. Moreover, according to Ali Balcı [24], the official Afghan state does not imply the integration of the state and the nation (p. 380). During the Taliban period, we encounter a relatively harsh rule. While this group runs the state, it does so according to Sharia law and under Pashtun rule. This eliminates the public visibility of many ethnic and religious identities. Although it tried to impose discipline through legal rules and religious punishments, the Taliban could not develop a sense of nationhood because it was based on a particular ethnic group. However, in the period Balcı refers to, between 2001 and 2020, the state was too weak to even use the apparatus of violence. Therefore, there was no favourable ground for national identity and consciousness to prevail.

2. Conclusion

Clancy and Nagle [1], working on the creation of a shared public identity in divided societies, note that the effort to create a society that has succeeded in unity corresponds to the effort to create a society of shared values. In order to build a sustainable peace, it is necessary to create a shared society. In such a society of shared values, the public sphere becomes a space where conflict can be peacefully transformed if it is possible to unite the whole society around a higher political identity, even if its members have different ethnic or national identities (p. 79).

Conversely, Amartya Sen, in Identity and Violence: Illusions of Destiny, argues that when plural identities are ignored and singular identities are preferred, this unique and seemingly unchanging identity (illusion of identity) feeds and perpetuates conflict and violence in the world. One of the main sources of conflict potential is the assumption that people can be grouped into unique categories based on religion and culture. ‘The sense of identification with one group of people can, with appropriate provocation, become a powerful weapon for brutalising another group’ ([29], p. 15). In the relationship that the thinker establishes between identity and violence, one does not exclude the other. In other words, the condition for peace does not exist without an identity-free attitude. Sen mentions that identities can sometimes be very effective unifiers, enriching the space in which they exist. Therefore, he states that the idea that we are different from each other in various ways is more plausible than the belief that we are all very similar to each other. According to him [29], ‘the hope for peace in today’s world is not to be found in confining ourselves to small boxes, but rather in recognising the plurality of belonging and using our reason as common inhabitants of a larger world’ (p. 17).

These two lines are the axes on which identity debates are based in the literature on peacebuilding and conflict resolution. However, as it has been argued above, and as the example of Afghanistan will demonstrate, both singular identities representing the conflictual state of the past (such as Afghan identity) and multiple identities based on the legitimacy of individual ethnic identities (such as Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, etc., identities) are not identities that reduce or eliminate intergroup prejudice and discrimination in peacemaking. It is only through the simultaneous activation of a new and inclusive overarching identity such as Afghani, as proposed by non-Pashtuns during the peace process, and its associated sub-identities, that a new Afghan-led and Afghan-own peace, which will hopefully begin in Afghanistan in the future, can be a crucial element in the peace process. An inclusive identity based on dual identity can also break down or soften the more rigid and sensitive political intergroup conflicts and prejudices. Moreover, such an identity has a theoretical framework that can serve to make peace sustainable.

However, if the theory of Dovidio and Gaertner in the axis of peace between macro-actors is considered, it is necessary to add the following: The sub-identities that the dual identity model prefers to protect are conflicting identities that are in conflict with each other or that take positions according to the distinction between us and them, and yes, a super-identity that assimilates or denies them can make groups insecure and lead to various conflicts in the future. Therefore, it makes sense to protect and recognise these identities. However, the super-identity that is expected to be activated simultaneously with these sub-identities should not be one of the super-identity constructs of the conflict period. This is because identities are also powerful symbols as linguistic expressions and the conflict period accumulates many meanings in the baggage of these symbols. It is very difficult to eliminate these meanings, which are associated with negative emotions, with a peace agreement alone. This is because culture and cultural units are formed over time, transformed into mental constructs and thought of in relational terms. The construct of peace, however, needs a completely new super-identity that does not allow the in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice of the conflict period to be felt. For this reason, the dual identity is based on a new super-identity created in the peace process and with a common consensus.