Open access peer-reviewed chapter - ONLINE FIRST

The Ripple Effects of Climate Change on Migration Patterns

Written By

José María Ramos García and Jimmy Emmanuel Ramos Valencia

Submitted: 05 February 2024 Reviewed: 12 February 2024 Published: 30 April 2024

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.1004698

Refugees and Migrants - Current Conditions and Future Trends IntechOpen
Refugees and Migrants - Current Conditions and Future Trends Edited by Samson Maekele Tsegay

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Refugees and Migrants - Current Conditions and Future Trends [Working Title]

Ph.D. Samson Maekele Tsegay

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Abstract

This chapter rigorously examines the influence of climate change on migration dynamics from the Northern Triangle countries—Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala—towards the southern Mexican and United States borders, analyzed through a national security lens. Utilizing comprehensive analyses of principal diagnostics from the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration, and the United States’ strategic climate change response, it anticipates the continuation of climate-induced migration due to socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing climate change. This investigation uniquely evaluates climate migration, integrating a multidisciplinary approach that includes aspects of migration, security, climate change, and development, highlighting the significant impact of climate change on regional mobility trends expected to persist. Despite these challenges, the prioritization of climate change effects in migrant-origin countries remains minimal, overshadowed by the economic benefits of emigration, particularly through international remittances. The chapter also critiques the current lack of comprehensive international or regional policies to mitigate this migration, despite the strategic efforts by the United States to address the issue from a national security perspective. It underscores the complexity of developing a cohesive policy framework that addresses climate change, migration, rights, and employment, emphasizing the necessity of promoting labor mobility in the face of economic and environmental pressures.

Keywords

  • climate migration
  • national security
  • northern triangle countries
  • socioeconomic impacts
  • policy strategies

1. Introduction

This chapter sets the stage for an in-depth exploration into the complex interplay between climate change and migration patterns, specifically focusing on the Northern Triangle countries—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala—and their migratory flows towards the southern border of Mexico and the United States. This analysis is framed within the context of national security, highlighting the multifaceted impacts that climate-induced migration has on regional stability and security paradigms [1].

Given the interdisciplinary nature of this study, the introduction aims to lay a foundation that is accessible to both experts in the field and readers new to the subject. It begins by outlining the critical role of climate change as a driver of migration, underscoring the urgent need to examine these dynamics through the lens of national security. This approach is necessitated by the increasing recognition of climate change not just as an environmental issue, but as a multifactorial challenge that intersects with socio-economic, political, and security dimensions [2].

The methodology section elucidates the analytical framework employed, drawing on pivotal diagnostics from authoritative sources such as the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and strategic planning documents from the United States. These sources provide a comprehensive backdrop against which the ongoing and anticipated climate-driven migration trends can be assessed.

This study employs a diachronic approach to explore the evolution and prospective increase in migration rates, particularly focusing on how the foreign policy propositions of Mexico and the United States have influenced the mass migration movements from Central America. By analyzing a series of longitudinal data and strategic documents, this methodology enables a deep dive into the shifts and trends over time, providing a forward-looking perspective on migration dynamics. This approach is complemented by a rigorous review of official documents that are regularly updated regarding the migration phenomenon, ensuring that our analysis remains anchored in the most current and relevant data available.

In tracking the phenomenon of migration, special attention is given to the role of climate change as a critical variable in understanding the complex nature of migration in a holistic manner. This aspect of the study draws on foundational works such as “Climate Change in Central America: A Navigation Guide” by Bárcena et al. [3], which offers a comprehensive overview of climate impacts in the region, and “Root Causes of Migration from Guatemala: Analysis of Subnational Trends Policy Brief” by Bermeo et al. [4], providing insight into the underlying factors driving migration from specific localities. These sources, among others cited, form the bedrock of our analytical framework, enabling an examination of how environmental changes exacerbate migration pressures and intersect with socioeconomic factors.

Moreover, the research methodology incorporates a prospective analysis, considering policy responses and strategic planning documents from the United States and Mexico, such as the U.S. Department of State’s bilateral cooperation frameworks and initiatives outlined by The White House to address broader security and migration challenges. This prospective angle allows for an assessment of how current and future policies might shape migration trends, particularly in light of the increasing recognition of climate change as a determinant factor. By synthesizing data from a variety of authoritative sources, including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s migration statistics and strategic security outlines provided by the U.S. government, this study not only maps out the historical trajectory of migration but also projects potential future scenarios, underscoring the multifaceted impacts of climate change on migration patterns.

Anticipated findings suggest that the socio-economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the persistent challenges posed by climate change, are likely to fuel continued migration from the Northern Triangle to Mexico and the United States [5]. This chapter not only explores the direct impacts of these phenomena but also delves into the broader implications for national security, including the adequacy of current policies and the need for a multidisciplinary approach to address the complexities of climate-induced migration.

In conclusion, this introduction underscores the significance of climate change as a determinant of migration and sets the premise for a detailed examination of its implications on national security. Through a blend of theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, this chapter seeks to contribute to the ongoing discourse on climate migration, offering insights into the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in managing these dynamics effectively.

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2. Climate migration: impacts on global security and cooperation

The climate crisis is radically reshaping society and its environment on an international scale, as the climate is being altered due to fluctuations in temperature and the frequency of meteorological phenomena [6]. When climate change is combined with physical, social, economic, and/or environmental vulnerabilities, it affects food, water, and economic security, underscoring the importance of conceptualizing climate change from the perspective of global security.

This priority is relevant considering the implications of climate change in terms of instability and conflicts affecting human security, global security, and the environment in transboundary regions internationally [7]. There is a strong correlation between regions most vulnerable to climate change and those that are fragile and/or facing conflicts or violence. This is the case for the Northern Triangle countries experiencing both phenomena, pressuring vulnerable communities, and increasing human displacement towards Mexico and the United States [8].

Between 1998 and 2020, it is estimated that climatic and geophysical phenomena caused 312,000 deaths and affected more than 277 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the World Meteorological Organization’s report on the state of the climate [6]. In the updated version of the World Bank’s Groundswell report, it is emphasized that climate change could force 216 million people from six regions around the world to move within their countries by 2050 [9].

Climate change is impacting human mobility in the region. The local and regional cross-border dimension of policies is relevant, considering that most human displacements associated with climate change occur at the borders of countries, for example, the Northern Triangle, highlighting the importance of promoting effective regional co-responsibility with countries in the region [10]. However, at the borders of these countries, neither climate change nor labor mobility are priorities, as the central problem for them is food security, because of the pandemic’s effects [11].

In 2021, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre identified more than 1.6 million displacements by disasters in the Americas; in 2020, mobility was estimated at 4.5 million [12]. By 2050, the World Bank estimates the potential number of climate migrants in Latin America to be 17 million if scenarios and the effects of climate change on environmental and social aspects are met [9]. These scenarios are associated with temperature increases, decreased precipitation, and the limited implementation of reactive or strategic policies to reduce the effects of climate change from an international or regional cooperation perspective.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has highlighted that, between 2008 and 2016, an average of 21.5 million people were displaced by effects of climate change. According to the World Bank’s projections, if the impacts of climate change are not as severe, there could be between 1.4 and 2.1 million “climate migrants” in Mexico and Central America by 2050. In a more pessimistic scenario, they could reach 3.9 million, representing 1.9% of the region’s population [9].

Analyzing the number of migrant detentions by the U.S. government over the past 3 years shows that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic influenced historic migration in the flows from Central America to the United States [13]. In the last fiscal year (October 2021 to August 2022), 1,997,769 migrants were detained by U.S. immigration authorities. In the fiscal year (October to November 2022), USCBP has detained 411,125 irregular migrants, highlighting that for 4 months, non-regional migrants (Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela among others) have surpassed migrants from Mexico and the Northern Triangle [14].

These data are historic in the border relations between the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico [15]. These flows are explained by the socioeconomic effects of the pandemic and the growth of the U.S. economy. It is necessary to note that this context is outside the effects of climate change. According to these data, it can be considered that the effects of the economic crisis derived from the post-pandemic have had more influence than climate change on the recent migratory mobility of the Northern Triangle countries and other countries in the region towards Mexico and the United States [16]. Likewise, the deficits in implementing economic growth policies of the Northern Triangle countries have influenced.

The short-term scenario is that rainfall will decrease in Mexico and Central America, and there will be increasingly more extreme climatic events related to El Niño. Climate change and variability will affect the production of corn and beans in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent, Guatemala. As a result, climate change will translate into economic losses and impacts of greater poverty and social inequalities for small farmers and an increase in labor migration. Farmers who depend on rain are vulnerable to droughts, and their families may opt to migrate.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the impacts of climate change are exacerbated by factors such as inequality, poverty, demographic growth, occupation of high-risk spaces, and, in general, ineffective sustainable planning for the exploitation of natural resources within a local-regional development approach [17]. These problems are structural in the case of the Northern Triangle countries, especially in the last 15 years, and reflect their management deficits and policies to address such a scenario, and particularly the effects of climate change, which are not part of government priorities [18].

The agricultural context in Central America also influences the formulation of policies towards climate change and to regulate international migration. For example, coffee production, which is crucial for thousands of farmers in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, is especially vulnerable to climate variations. Additionally, its price at the global level has decreased, which has caused less interest in its cultivation, despite its strategic relevance for the economy and governance. The challenge for the countries in the region is to manage this agricultural scenario and its effects on migratory flows and promote policies that address this agricultural context, as well as those that encourage the mitigation of climate change and better management of migratory flows between the Northern Triangle countries and destination towards the United States [19].

Another relevant context for Central American migration is represented by the Dry Corridor, where more than 22 million people live. The Dry Corridor extends from southern Chiapas, Mexico, to Guanacaste, Costa Rica. It has a length of approximately 1600 kilometers, is located on the Pacific coast, and covers 30% of the area of Central America. This area is characterized by having a dual climate, marked by the El Niño – Southern Oscillation phenomenon and climate change. This means that every year, families in the Dry Corridor face a period of intense drought combined with another of torrential rains and floods. Extreme drought and excessive precipitation and floods in the same year impact the subsistence agriculture of basic grains [20], 80% of the basic grain-producing families in the northern triangle of the Dry Corridor live in conditions of poverty, and 30% are in a condition of extreme poverty [21].

An analysis by the Pew Research Center reports that, from 2007 to 2017, immigration to the United States from the northern triangle of the Dry Corridor grew by 25%, being this the region that reflects the highest growth among all regions of origin in the world.

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3. Central American migration: a multidimensional perspective

Migration from Central American countries is associated with three primary factors: the lack of economic opportunities and low living standards, extreme weather events related to climate change, and violence [22]. Unemployment triggered by the pandemic has been a decisive factor, affecting underemployment and job precarity, especially among youth [8].

Central American migration to the United States has been a historical constant over the last decades, characterized by a series of factors extending beyond the pursuit of better economic opportunities [23]. This predominantly irregular migration has been shaped by elements including insecurity, violence, lack of opportunities, poverty, and increasingly, the impacts of climate change. According to research by Martínez et al. [24], and Castillo and Toussaint [13], the migratory route to the United States through Mexico has become a transit corridor reflecting the complexity of circumstances faced by migrants from their countries of origin and during their journey. These factors, as well as their implications for family dynamics in the context of irregular migration, have been thoroughly explored by Aguilar et al. [25]. This essay delves into a historical exploration of these factors to better understand how they have evolved and continue to influence migration patterns from Central America to the United States.

The recent migratory profile is reflected in the number of irregular migrants detained by the United States Customs and Border Protection. In 2021, approximately 44% of individuals from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were adults seeking opportunities, 40% were families seeking a more dignified life, and about 16% were unaccompanied minors (i.e., 122,000 children and adolescents) [26]. This profile has remained consistent in the fiscal year 2022, but there has been a notable increase in migration from individuals outside the study region, particularly migrants from Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and African countries [14].

Economic precarity is a significant driver of migration from Central American countries. The lack of satisfactory job opportunities, low wages, and poverty have compelled many Central Americans to seek a better future in the United States [24]. The pandemic has exacerbated this situation, increasing unemployment and underemployment rates, particularly affecting youth, a population significantly susceptible to the allure of the north.

Violence is another critical factor driving migration from these countries. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala suffer from high rates of crime and violence, often related to gangs and drug trafficking [13]. Threats to personal and family security have forced many to leave their homes in search of refuge.

Moreover, extreme weather events, exacerbated by climate change, have begun to play an increasingly significant role in Central American migration. Prolonged droughts, devastating hurricanes, and other natural disasters have undermined food security and destroyed homes and livelihoods, pushing more people to migrate [25].

The composition of migration flows is also noteworthy. During the fiscal year 2021, approximately 44% of detentions at the United States border involved adults seeking opportunities, 40% involved families in search of a more dignified life, and about 16% involved unaccompanied minors. While these patterns have remained relatively stable in 2022, there has been an increase in migration from individuals outside the Central American region, with a significant number of migrants coming from Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and African countries [14].

The increase in the number of irregular migrants detected at the border between the United States and Mexico is an indicator of the challenge these countries face. Encounters by the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with migrants from Central American countries, mainly El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, increased markedly from 109,100 in fiscal year 2020 to approximately 705,500 in fiscal year 2022 [14].

In response to this situation, the Biden administration has implemented a mix of strict and humanitarian policies. On one hand, it has introduced a rule that bars many non-Mexican migrants from applying for asylum in the United States unless they have previously applied in at least one of the countries they passed through and were denied [27]. However, it has also implemented investment and assistance strategies in countries of origin, extended protection programs for minors and refugees, and created processes for family reunification [28].

These new migrants join an already established population of Central American immigrants in the United States, which has experienced significant growth over the last decades. Immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have been the main contributors to this increase [29].

It’s important to note that this description represents only an overview of the Central American migration phenomenon, and individual experiences can vary considerably. Migration decisions are complex and multifaceted, influenced by a combination of factors at the individual, family, community, national, and international levels. Therefore, it’s crucial to continue researching and understanding the challenges and opportunities facing migrants to inform future policies and practices.

Migration from Central America to the United States is a multifactorial phenomenon, but increasingly, climate change is playing a prominent role in its drive. This region, particularly the Dry Corridor of Central America, is among the most vulnerable to climate change globally, experiencing prolonged droughts, more frequent and intense hurricanes, and other natural disasters that threaten agriculture, the primary livelihood for many Central Americans [30].

The relationship between climate change and migration is complex and non-linear, but recent academic literature and field reports suggest a growing connection. Recurrent droughts and climate variability, coupled with low agricultural yields and food insecurity, are affecting Central Americans’ decisions to leave their homes in search of new opportunities.

As climate change continues to intensify, its impacts on food security, housing, water, and other essential aspects of daily life are expected to worsen. This means more people may be forced to migrate because of climate factors. Therefore, climate change could become an increasingly important driver of migration from Central America in the coming decades.

To effectively address Central American migration, it will be essential not only to address the immediate causes of migration but also the underlying causes, including climate change. This requires long-term, adaptive solutions that address the socioeconomic and environmental challenges in the countries of origin, help communities adapt to climate change, and provide legal pathways for migration.

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4. Climate migration and security concerns in Central America

Climate change has been contextualized as part of the national security framework by several countries, notably by the United States government [31], due to its wide-ranging social, economic, and employment implications that generally influence migration to the country [14]. From this perspective, the nexus between security and climate change underscores the importance of articulating a governmental agenda that aims to mitigate the negative impacts and thus propose alternatives to alleviate the immediate and long-term effects of climate change. However, most countries in the Central American region, particularly those of the Northern Triangle, have not accorded such a priority within global security since it is not a significant concern on their governmental agenda and because maintaining migration for the purposes of international remittances [9] is considered beneficial, in some cases being viewed as the primary resource for providing these countries with external financial resources. Moreover, in the border regions of the Northern Triangle countries, climate change or labor mobility are not prioritized, as their main urgency is to prevent famine in the populations [32].

In this context, the contribution proposed by the United States Government to manage the interaction between security, climate, climate change, migratory flows, and their socio-economic and environmental impacts is highly relevant [33]. This policy is justified based on the priority granted by the United States government; the national security perspective presented, the public agenda in terms of federal policy, and the actions planned with respect to the countries in the region.

The World Bank report [9] presents other policy recommendations that can help slow down the drivers of climate migration and prepare for anticipated migratory flows. Among these proposals are:

  • Reducing global emissions and progressing towards the Paris Agreement, which implies greater political will, effective international cooperation, and increased regional co-responsibility of migrant-sending countries. The challenge lies in the feasibility of promoting such political will.

  • Integrating internal migration for climate reasons into planning based on a green, resilient, and inclusive agenda. The challenge is to integrate the initiative into the public agenda of the countries in the Central American region.

  • Increasing migratory flows, whereby internal migration for climate reasons can be conceived as an adaptation strategy. This aspect is equally relevant but must be part of the agenda. This concept has not been a priority for migration in the Northern Triangle countries.

  • Promoting greater understanding of the determinants of migration for climate reasons; the challenge is to formulate a cross-cutting policy that generates employment options and resources for migrant-sending communities.

The following questions are raised: What incentives do countries in the region need to engage in a climate change agenda when they have other priorities on the public agenda? Are processes of power centralization maintained or reinforced in the context of the pandemic [34], where irregular labor mobility is the best alternative for obtaining international income?

Among the labor options to reduce regional emigration, it is proposed that regular temporary migration programs could contribute to the economic development of both countries of origin and destination, by fostering skills and generating productive assets for migrants and their households [33]. Additionally, facilitating regular mechanisms of labor migration (temporary) highlights the importance of 2HA and 2HB work visas promoted by the United States government, which can be a situational alternative for inclusion for labor migration from the countries in the region [35].

In South America, some innovation initiatives have been proposed, including promoting action plans and national alignments on climate migration, relocating populations in risk zones, and promoting humanitarian visas for disaster victims [6]. The challenge of these initiatives is to integrate them into a human rights agenda, the Global Compact for Migration, and the 2030 Agenda [9].

Coordination among different actors, the exchange of experiences, and support from the international community are fundamental. The IOM has reiterated that climate negotiations are a space to integrate human mobility, under the premise that it is impossible to undertake climate action without addressing the impacts of global warming on migratory flows [36]. The challenge is: How to integrate such an approach into the policy agenda of the countries in the region, in a framework of scarce governmental priority? It is important to consider that the Northern Triangle countries have other internal policy priorities, such as promoting greater governance, controlling insecurity and violence, and generating economic growth options.

Another difficulty is that the relationship between climate change and its impacts on human mobility has not been part of an international or national agenda. This phenomenon occurs because the problems and impacts of climate change, despite their evident socio-environmental effects, are not part of the public agenda, that is, they are not a priority in government plans, due to predominance of reactive actions and more incentives to promote international emigration under a framework of labor contraction.

Furthermore, international initiatives, while important and have allowed progress in understanding the relationship between climate change and labor displacements, have not generated incentives with the countries in the region based on strategic plans where effective accompaniment by international organizations prevails.

This was the challenge presented at the 27th edition of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27), held in Egypt in November 2022, with the goal of surpassing general agreements and advancing concrete incentives to promote intervention plans that integrate human mobility displaced by the effects of climate change [37]. Although proposals exist, the mechanisms have not been viable, therefore it is necessary to ensure a successful transition towards greener, more resilient, and sustainable economies that protect the most vulnerable populations.

In Central America, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, climate change particularly affects vulnerable populations and contributes to the emigration process. Consequently, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is promoting investment in nature-based climate solutions aimed at vulnerable populations through biodiversity conservation initiatives [3].

Another promoted activity is the generation and application of climate information, and the promotion of climate-smart agricultural practices [4]. The challenge of these strategies is to articulate them in local and regional development proposals, as part of prioritizing a comprehensive development agenda, where international remittances could be part of a strategy to lessen the effects of climate change and generate some local employment options [38].

The IDB study [39] proposes some recommendations considered to be of limited viability. Among the main ones are promoting the role of civil society, local governments, and the private sector through support for educational programs and access to climate information; and encouraging the planning of adaptation by subnational governments and partnerships with the private sector. These options are associated with the United States government initiative [40].

A year after the formulation of the United States government study, progress is limited. It is considered necessary to promote greater regional co-responsibility and improve implementation mechanisms. In particular, the governments of the Northern Triangle have concentrated their decision-making processes, in a pandemic context, marginalizing local governments. At the local level, in the Northern Triangle countries, their priority is food security, education, and job creation for vulnerable groups [41], so climate change is not a governmental priority.

In this context, the climate change agenda in the Northern Triangle countries faces the following challenges:

  • Strengthening the socio-environmental priority in the public agendas of the three levels of government of the Northern Triangle countries.

  • Promoting the participation of the United States government with the goal of articulating the labor mobility agenda with the impacts of climate change on regional migratory dynamics.

  • Encouraging greater regional co-responsibility based on a multidimensional development agenda, in which climate change would be a governmental priority.

  • Articulating the development plan proposals put forward by the governments of Mexico and the United States, along with a common agenda on climate change.

  • Promoting a climate change and labor mobility impacts agenda, based on the agreements of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27).

  • Articulating a common agenda on climate change and labor mobility, in line with the initiatives of the High-Level Economic Dialog (HLED).

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5. HLED’s approach to climate and migration in North America

Over the past 3 years, the governments of Mexico and the United States have proposed initiatives on migration and climate change within the framework of the High-Level Economic Dialog (HLED) and the North American Leaders’ Summit. However, these presidential meetings have not introduced government initiatives that explicitly establish the relationship between climate change and international migration from the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico to the United States. This reflects an independent conception of both issues, not considered as part of the binational public agenda or national security, as posited by the U.S. federal government itself [35].

At the HLED meeting on September 9, 2021, revitalizing cooperation between the United States and Mexico to ensure safe and orderly migration was proposed, as well as revitalizing North America’s economies. Additionally, collaboration on a new approach to regional migration was discussed, incorporating the principles of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration [42], with an agenda focused on development promotion, border security (control of human traffickers), strengthening the rule of law, and increased governmental responsibility by Central American countries.

The second HLED meeting, held in September 2022, focused on objectives of economic growth and development, job creation, global competitiveness, and reducing poverty and inequality. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, who chaired the meeting, emphasized the importance of promoting semiconductor production to advance a strategic partnership in North America aimed at reducing dependence on China.

Secretary Blinken acknowledged Mexico as a priority in current U.S. policy, given a series of shared issues: production and trafficking of fentanyl, management of irregular migration in line with the commitments of the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, climate change, and revitalizing value chains [27].

As observed, the relationship between climate change and labor mobility was not explicitly considered in both HLED meetings. Most of the HLED objectives, particularly the 2021 agreements, have yet to be implemented. Labor emigration has increased in the last 2 years because of climate change and, fundamentally, the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic in the Northern Triangle countries.

Climate change is a priority for the new U.S. government. President Joseph Biden hosted the Leaders’ Summit on Climate Change on April 22, 2021, which was the first global meeting on the issue. He also held a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, where both highlighted their commitment to the climate change agenda and a green economy. The Mexican government, represented by President López Obrador, also can join this agenda and leverage the benefits of a trilateral and global agenda that, articulated with the post-pandemic agenda, generates opportunities for environmental, health, and economic resilience, as well as an option to regulate emigration. Climate change is a central and global security issue [43] on President Biden’s agenda. Consequently, he convened leaders from 17 countries responsible for 80% of global emissions on April 22 and 23, 2021. President Biden aims to make the climate crisis a central pillar of his administration, appointing John Kerry as Special Envoy for Climate and proposing a $1.7 trillion investment in clean energies, while aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050 [33].

Climate change has been a priority on President Biden’s domestic, bilateral, and international agenda. At the North American Leaders’ Summit on November 18, 2021, the presidents of Mexico, the United States, and Canada committed to promoting renewable energies in North America, including technical assistance and the exchange of best practices. Another bilateral challenge is managing asymmetric interdependence based on shared issues and the growth and development priorities of each country. In particular, the proposals made at the North American Leaders’ Summit on November 18, 2021, should be considered, where essential industries were agreed upon to minimize future disruptions given the region’s need for resilient, sustainable, diverse, and secure supply chains to manage economic security [44]. In this framework, a priority strategy for the U.S. government is to accelerate the transition to sustainable transport, including the manufacture of electric vehicles.

The challenge of the proposed environmental and climate change (CC) initiatives lies in integrating the migration agenda, considering that the HLED and North American Leaders’ Summit do not explicitly address the impact of CC on labor migration from the Northern Triangle countries to Mexico and the United States. The fact that this issue is not emphasized in U.S. governmental agendas reflects that there are other more relevant effects of CC, such as drought, fires, the transition to electric mobility, and temperature increase, impacting migration flows. Another challenge is to strengthen the priority of CC effects and alternatives, especially in Central America and Mexico. The level of Mexican development compared to the United States will also condition the progress of the proposed initiatives.

Furthermore, another indicator of CC priority in the U.S. government is the approval, on August 7, 2022, of a federal law by the U.S. Senate that will allow investments against global warming. The estimated budget is $369 billion in spending and tax incentives over 10 years, aiming to boost clean energies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 [33].

This law could be linked to the environmental and CC initiatives proposed in the HLED, North American Leaders’ Summit, and the Summit of the Americas, held in June 2022. Through regional development proposals towards the Northern Triangle countries, a higher priority, agenda articulation, and resources shared by the U.S. government concerning the region and regional cooperation mechanisms would be reflected.

Another opportunity to explore would be the articulation of the CC agenda with migration control in the Program and national security initiative [45] to ensure the U.S. government grants higher priority to the issue and thus advance a joint agenda. From the perspective of the Mexican government, the solution to migration and CC lies in the tree-planting program. President López Obrador proposed to President Biden to expand his tree-planting program, known as “Sembrando Vida,” to Central American countries. The proposal involves planting three million hectares in Central America, which would help stop migration to the United States and create 1.3 million jobs in the region [46].

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6. Climate-driven migration: focus at the summit of the Americas

The Summit is the sole forum convening leaders from North America, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean [47]. It and its associated forums champion cooperation towards economic growth and inclusive prosperity across the region, grounded in mutual respect for democracy, fundamental freedoms, the dignity of labor, and free enterprise. Central themes at the Summit included: the COVID-19 pandemic and its repercussions on health, economic, educational, and social systems. Additionally, threats to democracy, the climate crisis, and the lack of equitable access to economic, social, and political opportunities were addressed [48].

Analyzing the geopolitical interactions and agreements at the Summit of the Americas allows us to understand the political, economic, and social dynamics shaping the regional landscape. Through the review of various academic sources, experts’ perspectives in the fields of international relations and Latin American politics will be explored.

A key topic discussed during the summit was the new geopolitical landscape in Latin America. Scholars such as Malamud and Núñez [49] examine the shifts and challenges the region faces within the evolving global relations context. Moreover, Morgenfeld and Merino [50] emphasize the significance of the United States’ participation, under President Biden’s leadership, and its role in the global dispute, as well as its influence on the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles.

Another critical aspect to consider is the bilateral agenda between the United States and Mexico. Dithurbide [51] scrutinizes the recent positions and shared agenda between both countries beyond the Ninth Summit of the Americas. This exploration provides a detailed view of the agreements and challenges both nations encounter.

Addressing the crisis of U.S. hegemony and disputes within the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is essential. Merino and Morgenfeld [52] delve into this issue, highlighting conflicts and challenges in the region and their relation to the Summit of the Americas.

The analysis of geopolitical interactions and agreements at the Summit of the Americas unveils the complexity and significance of the issues discussed in this regional forum. The region’s outlook and future perspectives are crucial for understanding and addressing the political, economic, and social challenges Latin American countries face. The Summit of the Americas emerges as a key platform to foster cooperation and inclusive prosperity throughout the region.

  • Alliance for Economic Prosperity in the Americas. The Alliance for Economic Prosperity in the Americas represents a groundbreaking agreement to boost recovery and economic growth in the Western Hemisphere, one of the world’s most economically dynamic regions. Key initiatives of this alliance include a) enhancing the resilience, diversity, security, transparency, and sustainability of supply chains; b) creating jobs in the clean energy sector to advance decarbonization and biodiversity protection; c) promoting inclusive and sustainable trade [53].

  • Climate Change and Jobs in the Clean Energy Sector in the Americas. In response to the climate crisis, there is an opportunity to create quality jobs, propel economies based on clean energies, and build resilient communities in the region. Among the proposed initiatives are (a) the partnership between the United States and the Caribbean to address the Climate Crisis 2030; (b) strengthening the clean energy-based economy; (c) the 100,000 Strong in the Americas Climate Initiative [54].

  • In response to this collective commitment, four regional development banks will facilitate financing of 50,000 million dollars. These banks include the Inter-American Development Bank, with the United States as a principal shareholder, the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI).

  • Feasibility of a Climate Change Proposal and Its Integration with Migration. The feasibility of the initiatives proposed at the Summit, including the climate change agenda, depends on political will, effective management, and alignment with relevant outcomes and policies, as well as regional co-responsibility and global security.

It is noteworthy that the Summit did not explicitly address the impact of climate change on labor migration from the Northern Triangle countries to Mexico and the United States [55]. This reflects the prioritization of other climate change effects, such as drought, fires, the evolution of electric mobility, and temperature increases. The feasibility of the Summit’s main agreements, particularly those related to climate change and migration, relies on an effective results-based management model.

The main management elements proposed to address climate change (CC) and its impact on labor migration are described below:

  1. An integrated vision aligned with CC and other dimensions: A comprehensive vision that considers CC alongside social, environmental, employment, and meteorological impacts, as well as its influence on migratory flows at local, regional, cross-border, and international levels.

  2. Strategic direction: A direction prioritizing the multidimensional opportunities of CC and related policies, establishing a connection with a migration agenda encompassing employment, rights, mobility, and resilience.

  3. Strategic agenda: It is essential to define priorities focused on the relevance of CC objectives and alternatives, considering their effects on migration at local, regional, cross-border, and international levels.

  4. Cross-sectional management: A management approach addressing various strategies for CC reduction, considering its impact on different dimensions of reactive, preventive, and strategic policies, and establishing a connection with the migration agenda.

  5. Strategic leadership and promotion of institutional incentives: Leadership promoting impact on multidimensional CC policy and its impact on growth and migration management, through the implementation of institutional incentives.

  6. Intra-organizational and inter-institutional coordination: Effective governmental coordination involving CC policies and their differentiated impact on migration, fostering collaboration among various institutions and agencies.

  7. Coordination with civil society groups: Coordination considering the participation and contributions of civil society groups in CC policies, based on a shared social vision and focused, consensual actions.

  8. Cross-sectoral strategies: Strategies promoting the viability of CC policies across dimensions such as social, cultural, environmental, employment, and gender, establishing their connection with migration.

  9. Implementation and monitoring of cross-sectoral CC policies: The execution and comprehensive follow-up of reactive, preventive, and strategic policies related to CC, and their linkage with migratory flows.

  10. Impact evaluation: An evaluation identifying the outcomes and impacts of CC policies and their relation to migration, aiming for a clear understanding of achievements and challenges.

  11. Management indicators: Indicators to determine the concrete achievements of implementing a comprehensive CC policy and its relationship with migration.

Governments in the Central American region, Mexico, and the United States face the challenge of managing the impacts of CC on migration, strengthening migration governance, and promoting links between migration and sustainable development. It is crucial to establish permanent inter-institutional policies coordinating the U.S. government’s efforts in mitigating and responding to labor migration resulting from CC impacts. This process must consider the structure, coordination, strategies, and budgets proposed by the U.S. government, aiming to advance the viability of the policies.

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7. Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the impact of climate change (CC) on migration flows from the Northern Triangle countries (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala) to Mexico and the United States border. The institutional strategic studies discussed in this chapter support the impact of CC on migration flows in Central America in recent years and for the next 20 years, from a global security perspective. Despite such impact, it is identified that the issue of labor mobility in migrant-sending countries is not a governmental priority, due to deficits in their growth policies and because emigration generates greater benefits in terms of international remittances.

Conversely, for the United States government, labor mobility related to CC is a priority on its national and global security agenda, especially under President Biden’s administration. The U.S. government has proposed a permanent interagency policy on CC and migration, which includes the coordination of policies, strategies, and budgets. However, its challenge lies in the feasibility of such policy, considering the scarce incentives for its implementation in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico.

A significant finding is that the environmental and CC initiatives proposed within the framework of the High-Level Economic Dialog, the North American Leaders’ Summit, and the Summit of the Americas do not explicitly consider the impact of CC on labor migration from the Northern Triangle countries to Mexico and the United States. The fact that this issue is not emphasized in the governmental agenda reflects that there are other CC effects deemed more relevant for the countries in the region, such as droughts, fires, electric vehicle evolution, and temperature increase, than migration flows. The recent approval of the fiscal, climate, and health law by the U.S. Senate on August 7, 2022, represents an opportunity to strengthen the priority of CC, if its financial resources are linked with integration initiatives in North America.

Greater effectiveness and commitment from migrant-sending countries with impacts on CC will depend on international organizations (World Bank, IDB, IOM, and the U.S. government) establishing better incentives to promote viable CC and migration policies in the affected Central American countries. The U.S. government’s strategic study on the impacts of CC on migration and human displacement [45] represents a significant advancement, granting governmental priority from a national and global security perspective. The challenge lies in achieving its short-term feasibility in Central American countries, where such priority does not exist, and regional co-responsibility is limited, despite most CC-associated displacements occurring at the borders of the region.

The irregular migration of Central Americans to the United States has been a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, and this chapter has shed light on the impact of climate change (CC) on this dynamic. Institutional strategic studies support the relationship between CC and migration flows in the Northern Triangle countries, identifying a significant impact in the region in recent years and projecting it into the future. However, a lack of governmental priority is observed in migrant-sending countries, where growth policies and international remittances seem to have greater relevance. This contrast highlights the need to address labor mobility and CC effects comprehensively.

On the other hand, the U.S. government has prioritized labor mobility related to CC on its national and global security agenda, particularly during President Biden’s administration. The proposal of a permanent interagency policy on CC and migration demonstrates a commitment to coordinate actions and allocate resources to address this issue. However, the challenge of achieving the policy’s feasibility arises, given the scant incentives in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico for effective implementation.

A relevant conclusion from this analysis is the lack of explicit consideration of the impact of CC on labor migration in the environmental and CC initiatives in the region. Although there are other CC effects that are priorities in the governmental agenda, such as droughts, fires, and temperature changes, migration flows also need to be addressed comprehensively. The recent passage of the fiscal, climate, and health law in the U.S. Senate provides an opportunity to strengthen the priority of CC, if the financial resources are linked with integration initiatives in North America.

The effectiveness and commitment of migrant-sending countries and those impacted by CC largely depend on collaboration with international organizations and the creation of better incentives to promote viable CC and migration policies in the Central American region. The U.S. government’s strategic study on the impacts of CC on migration and human displacement represents an important advancement by granting governmental priority from a national and global security perspective. Nonetheless, the challenge resides in achieving its short-term feasibility in Central American countries, where the lack of priority and limited regional co-responsibility present significant obstacles, despite most CC-related displacements occurring at the region’s borders.

This comprehensive study underscores the multifaceted nature of climate change’s impact on migration patterns, particularly from the Northern Triangle to North America, revealing a critical intersection of environmental, economic, and security dimensions. Through the lens of institutional strategic studies, it becomes evident that while climate change significantly influences migration flows, the response from both sending and receiving countries remains fragmented, with a notable discrepancy in prioritization and policy implementation. The U.S. government’s strategic approach, aiming to integrate climate change considerations into its national and global security agenda, represents a pivotal step towards addressing this complex challenge. However, the realization of such policies hinges on fostering greater collaboration, incentivization, and a shared sense of responsibility among all stakeholders involved. This study, therefore, calls for a unified and concerted effort to not only recognize but actively address the climate-migration nexus as a central component of regional stability and prosperity, advocating for policies that are as adaptive and resilient as the communities they aim to support.

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Written By

José María Ramos García and Jimmy Emmanuel Ramos Valencia

Submitted: 05 February 2024 Reviewed: 12 February 2024 Published: 30 April 2024